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Abstract
Taking its cue from the many Renaissance playwrights who emphasized their
spectators’ participation, this dissertation develops a model of audience response based
on what texts from the period reveal about early modern spectators’ active engagements
with staged bodies and stage space. Discussing plays by Shakespeare, Peele,
Beaumont, Marston, Ford, Middleton, and Tourneur, I establish an analytical arc that
travels gradually deeper into the body, moving from performances that depict the
superficial violation of the body to those that represent its violent penetration onstage,
thereby encouraging spectators to contemplate the body’s physiological recesses. Early
modern anatomical science and its exploration of the body provide a historical backdrop
for an analysis of the spectator’s confrontation with the human body’s ontology, while a
phenomenological approach to the experience of playgoing respects the importance
Renaissance plays placed on the audience’s ability to bring stage phenomena to life.
Chapter One argues that the representational strategies of early modern drama
encourage a metatheatrical awareness on the part of audiences, by highlighting the
conflation of presentation and representation that underlies the theatrical delivery of
fictional bodies and places. The distinction between the actor’s persona (which
presents) and the character’s persona (which is represented) fundamentally influences
the spectator’s engagement with what the body performs—that is, how this dually
invested body exists in space and time (the subject of Chapter Two) and what breaches
of bodily integrity it can physically withstand within the performance arena (Chapters
Three and Four). The drama of the time intimated that by imaginatively participating in
the theatrical exploration of the body’s capabilities and limits, early modern spectators
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could attain the knowledge and power Renaissance culture so often invested in the
physical human form.
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Introduction: Engaging (With) Early Modern Audiences

“My rhymes are so potent that in this small segment
I made all of the ladies in the area pregnant.”
—Flight of the Conchords (2007)

In their song “Hiphopopotamus vs. Rhymenoceros,” contemporary musical duo
Flight of the Conchords boast hyperbolically about the physically infectious nature of
their performance, echoing in a much less serious way what antitheatricalist William
Prynne claimed about Renaissance plays: that they wielded the power to devirginate
maidens in the audience (Prynne 339-340, 392, 555, 796). Whether satirical or serious,
claims such as these are intriguing because they point to an abiding awareness on the
part of spectators and performers of a powerful bodily dimension within performance
and its reception. That a performance can bring about influential psychic and kinetic
responses from spectators is one of the overarching ideas that inspires this dissertation.
Moreover, it is an idea that also inspired and captured the attention of early modern
English dramatists, whose plays came to life in a cultural milieu that in some ways both
celebrated and condemned what might transpire in the bodies and minds of spectators
when they visited the theatre1. Taking its cue from the many playwrights who
emphasized their spectators’ participation, this dissertation develops a model of
audience response based on what texts from the period reveal about early modern
spectators’ active engagements with staged bodies and stage space. The drama of the

1

For more on early modern antitheatricalism see Laura Levine’s Men in Women’s Clothing: Antitheatricality and Effeminization, 1579-1642 (Cambridge UP, 1994), and Jean Howard’s The Stage and
Social Struggle in Early Modern England (Routledge, 1994).
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time intimated that by imaginatively participating in the theatrical exploration of the
body’s capabilities and limits—an exploration that was often violently articulated—
early modern spectators could attain the knowledge and power Renaissance culture so
often invested in the physical human form.
Reading plays by Shakespeare, Peele, Beaumont, Marston, Ford, Middleton, and
Tourneur, I establish an analytical arc that travels gradually deeper into the body,
moving from performances that depict the superficial violation of the body to those that
represent its violent penetration onstage, thereby encouraging spectators to contemplate
the body’s physiological recesses. However, keeping in mind the importance
Renaissance plays placed on the audience’s ability to bring stage phenomena to life all
chapters also implicitly or explicitly stress the phenomenological interdependence of
stage and spectator; therefore Chapter One first devotes attention to the actor-audience
relations established or called for by Renaissance playtexts. Indeed, a range of texts
from the period characterize the role of the audience as indispensable to the play’s
performance in terms of how playgoers help to bring staged representations to
meaningful fruition. Whether the audience’s reaction was to “like or find fault”
(Troilus and Cressida, Prologue 30), theatrical fictions and effects required both the
simulations of the stage and the engagement of spectators. Therefore, any consideration
of the way stage violence resonates in performance must take into account the
audience’s contribution to the creation of meaning in the theatre, which is what I seek to
do in the early portions of this study. Although dramatists anticipated that in some
cases the “audience” for their plays would comprise readers and not spectators since
plays were made available as print documents, the existence of an audience for the play
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is projected by most drama of the time (excluding closet drama). When it comes to
performance, without at least one present auditor, a performance’s invocation of a
fictional register would constitute a gesture towards something not fully realized
without an/other to uphold its status as representation. As W.J.T. Mitchell explains,
representation is “always of something or someone, by something or someone, to
someone” (12, emphasis in original), and as Jerzy Grotowski affirms, “At least one
spectator is needed to make [theatre] a performance” (qtd. in Bennett 1). Like the
“theatre and performance theorists [who] need little convincing that the reception of
performance art […] requires the immediate and interactive presence—the
embodiment—of its performers and receivers” (McConachie and Hart 15), Shakespeare
and his contemporaries keenly recognized, and often explicitly commented upon in their
plays, these structuring dynamics of performance and representation.
The textual traces of the imaginative partnership that early modern audience
members, performers, and dramatists shared helps, I hope, to ultimately shed light on
the “notoriously difficult to index or explain” (Marshall 7) phenomenon of audience
response with respect to the Renaissance audiences that have similarly proven
“remarkably resistant to examination” (Low and Myhill 2). Although Low and Myhill
claim that “throughout the many studies of early modern drama, one interaction has
gone relatively unexamined: that of performance and audience” (2), the number of
scholars who focus either primarily or tangentially on early modern audiences is large
enough to make the topic of “audience response”—even if limited to the early modern
period—quite expansive indeed. With this in mind, I have narrowed my lens of inquiry
to what spectators might have responded to in early modern performances of the
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traumatized or violated body, with the aim of contributing to both the study of
Renaissance audiences and early modern body studies. These I draw upon to address
the underexplored issue of how the intrinsic duality of theatrical performance (as
comprised of actor/characters and actual/imagined spaces) might have structured for
early modern spectators a particular experience of the body in peril. Critics working in
various areas of Renaissance drama studies have long recognized that early modern
dramatists are fond of reminding their spectators of the process of theatrical illusionmaking. However, sustained analyses of metatheatre in Renaissance drama have
neglected violent plays, or violent moments in plays, in favour of instances where the
reminders to spectators that they are watching a play are more insistent or overt, as in,
for example, theatrum mundi metaphors, or disguise and cross-dressing motifs which
call attention to the distinction between the actor and the character he embodies2. This
actor/character distinction, I show, is seminal to audience engagements with all genres
of plays. Although scenes of corporeal violation do not tend towards the same kind of
obvious metatheatrical commentaries upon the drama which is unfolding—and perhaps
this is why violent moments are passed over more often than not in discussions of
metatheatre—the spectator’s recognition of theatricality itself is crucial to how the
performing body signifies under duress. The awareness of the theatre as a performance
venue, and of the actors as representational vehicles structures spectators’ responses to
corporeal trauma in such a way as to make violence and its consumption appealing,
desirable, and even empowering. As assessments like those cited at the outset of this
2

Recently, however, renewed critical interest in Titus Andronicus has occasioned some notable studies
dealing with the play’s violence in terms of issues related to metatheatre; see Kim Solga’s “Rape’s
Metatheatrical Return: Rehearsing Sexual Violence among the Early Moderns” in Theatre Journal 58.1
(2006): 53-72, and Lisa Dickson’s “‘High’ Art and ‘Low’ Blows: Titus Andronicus and the Critical
Language of Pain” in Shakespeare Bulletin 26.1 (2008): 1-22.
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paragraph indicate, however, in investigating how and why early modern audiences
responded to the various iterations of bodily performance enacted upon the Renaissance
stage, critics have voiced reservations about our access to the performances and
audiences of the past. These reservations have prompted me to include here a strong
methodological edifice based on theories of audience response, approaches to
reconstructing theatre performance of the past, and internal evidence from a selection of
non-violent plays, in order to tease out the stage-spectator dynamics that are at play in
more subtle ways in the violent plays which appear in Chapters Two, Three, and Four.
Building such an edifice is the goal of the next two sections of the introduction, and of
Chapter One.

Modern Interpreters, Early Modern Performances
As interpreters who are temporally removed from the subject of investigation we
confront a series of troubling epistemological stumbling blocks: in what respect and to
what degree do current modes of thought contribute to or veil our understanding of
dramatic performance and reception? And, more specific to my aims, how can we
propose to “know” what Renaissance audiences felt, thought, and experienced in
response to corporeal violations on the stage? As Alan Dessen proposes, do we really
“have no way of knowing how much we do not know” (“The Arrow in Nessus” 49)
when we seek to reconstruct performances of the past? These broad methodological
questions are relevant to this study because although I firmly historicize my subject
matter by examining how the body was constructed in early modern culture with
reference to the discourses of anatomy and dissection, my primary goal is to use a
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modern theoretical orientation—the phenomenological approach—to explore spectator
response to the performance of the violated or traumatized body in early modern
theatre. Accordingly, there are two related methodological issues here that I would like
to deal with in turn before I resume discussion of the body itself: the analysis of early
modern audiences through a critical lens like phenomenology, and the methods by
which spectator response—especially of the early modern period—can be accounted for
with historical and scholarly sensitivity.
The conjunction of theory and early modern drama seems to be on surer footing
when the plays are read as texts in and of themselves rather than as scripts for
performances, despite the ascendancy of performance-based criticism in the field. How
then, does one make use of current theoretical paradigms while at the same time reading
early modern playtexts from a rigorously historicist, performance-centered angle?
Under what conditions can one still engage with the plays’ original performances while
enlisting the insights of theoretical texts produced hundreds of years later? Surely,
circumventing unjustifiable assumptions about performances of the past does not—or
should not—mean shelving theory altogether. Undeniably, there are countless
examples of the way in which theory has enabled readings of dramatic performance; for
instance, Laura Mulvey’s psychoanalytic treatment of the gaze, as well as feminist and
queer theorists’ analysis of the performative nature of gender (most notably by Judith
Butler) have informed analyses of cross-dressing, gender, and desire on the Renaissance
stage. Yet an uncertainty surrounding the methodological parameters within which
modern theoretical discourse and early modern dramatic performance are able to meet
seems still to persist in scholarship. In her nuanced and psychoanalytically-inflected
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study of violence, subjectivity, and viewer or reader responses to early modern texts,
Cynthia Marshall states that her use of “modern terminology and the insights of its
discourse” is not meant to “pathologize the desires of the Renaissance but to bring them
into focus and demonstrate their historical contingency” (7), echoing a familiar refrain
voiced by scholars who negotiate between historically-grounded and theoreticallyinfluenced critical positions. Since I am interested in the possibilities for “conceiving of
the plays as staged events and consequently viewing the surviving documents as
theatrical scripts rather than literary texts” (Dessen, “The Arrow in Nessus” 48) while
also using phenomenology to study the spectator’s experience of staged events, I feel
compelled to provide my own version of this “refrain.” Before this section moves on to
establish precisely how a phenomenological approach works in the service of
ascertaining audience response in the Renaissance, it also briefly develops my own
methodological negotiation within the field of performance studies by considering what
it means to be a “modern interpreter” (Dessen’s term) engaging with early modern
performances.
First, I would propose that the intellectual climate(s) and models of the present,
whether deliberately invoked or not, inevitably shape our reconstructions of early
modern drama, its performances, and its audiences—and this need not necessarily be
seen as a drawback. The use of modern frameworks in conjunction with historical
study seems often to be haunted by the peril of superimposition—that is, the forced or
irresponsible application of anachronistic concepts to the past. For example, Dessen’s
valuable historicist work in reconstructing and cataloguing Elizabethan stage
conventions is accompanied by the proviso that the modern interpreter should aim to

8
curtail the impact of present day habits of thought upon the analysis of early modern
stage practice and performance (Dessen 48). A leading figure in recovering information
about the early modern performances of Renaissance plays, Dessen has repeatedly
stressed the need to expunge anachronistic or biased assumptions in academic criticism.
In practice, this feat proves to be difficult. As W.B. Worthen suggests in “Staging
‘Shakespeare’: Acting, Authority, and the Rhetoric of Performance” (1996), there exists
no ideally disembodied, disinterested, Arnoldian critic of early modern performance. In
reflecting upon the trajectory of performance-centered studies and J.L. Styan’s
foundational contribution to its history, Worthen argues that Styan regards modern
theatre performances as fortuitous opportunities for recapturing and restaging
“authentic” Shakespeare. In other words, the eponymous “revolution” of Styan’s The
Shakespeare Revolution (1977), a work which itself contributed to the legitimacy and
popularity of performance criticism, is driven by the sense that the modern stage is
secondary to the early modern stage, and that contemporary performances can “find” or
“restore” what is thought to be genuine Shakespearean meaning3. As the “detective”
rhetoric in Dessen’s “The Arrow in Nessus: Elizabethan Clues and Modern Detectives”
suggests, certain strains of early modern performance studies construct their subject in
terms of concealment and revealment; in this view, whether we can lift it or not, the
obfuscating veil of historical distance conceals an authentic performance as it would
have been staged and received by Renaissance playgoing culture. Worthen argues that
critics and theatre companies who adhere to such a belief are in fact discursively

3

Worthen makes a similar point in “Drama, Performativity, Performance” (1998) when he points out that
“as Michael Bristol and others have observed, this view of text and performance places performance in a
‘ministerial’ or ‘derivative’ relation to the dramatic text, which is regarded as the authentic ground or
source of theatrical meaning” (1094).
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producing a notion of authenticity, rather than recovering some predetermined authorial
essence or essential meaning embedded in the play: “In actors’ descriptions of their
work, as in the wider scope of performance criticism, the Author works to legitimate
‘meanings’ that are in fact constructed as the effect of our own ways of reading,
thinking, acting, producing texts as plays” (25). Worthen’s aim here is to critique the
assumptions of performance critics and practitioners who presume modern
performances have the ability to retrieve the essence of early modern drama, and to
demonstrate that contemporary productions of Renaissance plays produce new
meanings rather than recover old ones. While Worthen’s specific focus is upon new
performances of Shakespeare’s work, his suggestion that we recognize our own
complicity in cultural (re)productions is, I argue, meaningful to scholars whose analysis
of Shakespeare and his peers also constitutes a site of (re)productive meaning. The
contributions of performance critics like Styan, or historicist critics like Dessen, are, as
is my own project, less total restorations of meaning than they are productive and
constructive, new collaborations with meanings given to us by the past, producing new
avenues of interpretation and investigation into that past.
As the previous example suggests, historical “excavations” of the past are by
default shaped by the modern interpreter—this difficulty (if one chooses to term it as
such) is built into the definition of the past as past and into the ineluctable position of
being a historically and contextually situated scholar. Granted, it is important to remain
aware of the ideological and intellectual preconceptions we bring to the study of
audiences and drama of the past, but this awareness also necessarily leads to the
recognition that the ways in which violently staged corporeality engaged Renaissance
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audiences “cannot be apprehended except in mediated form” (Kastan 41). While I
agree with Dessen’s caution when it comes to empirical assertions about Renaissance
stagecraft, I also believe that we risk losing out if we restrict our methods of analysis
too stringently. Rather than attempt the near-impossible task of doing away with the
assumptions and biases that underpin existing critical modes, it makes more sense, I
argue, to ask in what ways the insights of contemporary scholarship and interpretation
can enliven and enrich the study of Shakespeare, of early modern drama, of
Renaissance staging practices, and of audience responses to the performance of the
victimized body, my specific topic here.
In this regard, I am indebted to and inspired by the number of critics who have
amply shown that engaging with past audiences by employing texts of both the past and
present remains a productive avenue of inquiry for Renaissance scholars.
Although Dessen does not take issue with contemporary theory specifically, his caveat
seems intrinsically incompatible with the proliferation of theoretically-inflected
approaches which have come to populate the field of Renaissance studies. Some of the
most innovative and (to my mind) interesting methodologies recently emerging in
Shakespeare and early modern studies involve pairings between modern critical modes
and the early modern period—especially “Shakespeare and Phenomenology,” and
“Shakespeare and Cognitive Science.” The impact of theory upon the study of early
modern drama has been profound, as evidenced by David Kastan’s Shakespeare After
Theory (1999), John Drakakis’s Alternative Shakespeares (first published in 1985 and
reprinted in 2002), Catherine Belsey’s Shakespeare in Theory and Practice (2008), Paul
Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds’ The Return of Theory in Early Modern English Studies:
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Tarrying with the Subjunctive (2011), and many other articles, edited collections, and
monographs. Jonathan Gil Harris’s Shakespeare and Literary Theory (2010) even
suggests that we need not see contemporary theory as external to the modes of thought
found in Shakespeare’s time, since a number of prominent twentieth-century thinkers
explicitly derived inspiration for their theories from the analysis of Shakespearean
works.
With this in mind, I proceed with an eye to the “history of a work’s origins in
the past and the story of its effects in the present” (Weimann, Shakespeare and the
Popular Tradition xiii). As I use evidence from the plays and from original
performance conditions to reconstruct what being a spectatorial witness to staged
violence and bodily trauma in the Renaissance might have entailed, I take Robert
Weimann’s claim seriously that if a critic ignores either the dimensions of the past, or
the current ideologies and cultural models of the present, he or she “is forced to be
either uncritically historical or ahistorically critical” (xiii). Rather than universalizing
or rendering transcendental Renaissance audiences and their engagements with, and by,
violated bodies onstage, I explore and map the productive ways in which the theoretical
orientation suggested by phenomenology can contribute to the extant historical picture
we have of Renaissance theatrical experience. Phenomenology provides a useful mode
of inquiry particularly suited to the study of Renaissance audiences because it describes
human perception of the world in ways that coincide with early modern playwrights’
constructions of spectatorial perception in the theatre. As is elaborated in Chapter One
with reference to internal evidence from King Lear, Henry V, A Midsummer Night’s
Dream, The Old Wives Tale, The Knight of the Burning Pestle, and The Malcontent,
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dramatists of the time both recognized and depended upon the idea that theatrical
objects, people, and places come to life both onstage and in the audience. Time and
again, plays openly profess that at the limit of stagecraft’s illusory potential is to be
found the spectator’s imaginative intervention, supplementing raw theatrical materials
in such a way as to produce the apprehension of what the dramatists envisioned and the
players sought to represent. For example, the Chorus in Henry V famously asks its
audience to “piece out our imperfections with your thoughts” (Prologue 23), and in
Fletcher and Massinger’s The Prophetess, a Chorus similarly requests that “Your
apprehensive judgments will conceive / Out of the shadow we can only shew” (38),
acknowledging that those present can create their own virtual fictional world(s)
different from the mere “shadows” the stage projects.
This process of “imaginative amendment” (a term I borrow and adapt from
Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream) that many plays activate and/or comment
upon characterizes the interface between human beings and their surrounding
environments in a way that resonates with how phenomenologists conceive of
conscious experiences. Like Shakespeare and his contemporaries, founding
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and his successors were interesting in
“describing the subjective experience of a mind engaged in contemplating the world”
(Stephenson, “Uplifted to the View” 41). Under this method, worldly phenomena (i.e.
people, places, and things) acquire or embody precisely the properties the perceiving
mind attributes to them. While objects of perception are not denied an objective
existence, the reality which is customarily thought to exist beyond first-hand
impressions of the world is “bracketed” for the sake of inquiry into perceiving
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consciousness. The setting aside of phenomena in their non-subjective state is called
for precisely because the perceiving subject can apprehend phenomena only
subjectively. This, I argue, is very close to the model of consciousness and perception
that is implied when in Henry V Shakespeare petitions his audiences to transform the
“wooden O” (Prologue 13) into the battlegrounds where the play partly takes place, or
when other dramatists similarly affirm the power of the mind to make and shape its own
world. In such instances, plays acknowledge and seek to further augment a cognitive
process which is already taking place: whether knowingly or not, the spectator in the
theatre is engaged in the process of bracketing off or setting aside the actual qualities of
the “unworthy scaffold” (as Henry V terms it) and its contents in their raw physical
state. Guided by the players’ representation of the story, an audience member instead
experiences stage phenomena according to the properties he or she attributes to them as
the theatrical experience unfolds. A wounded or traumatized body onstage, therefore,
signifies not just in terms of its brute material facticity but in terms of what qualities
spectators assign to the actor’s embodied persona in accordance with how they perceive
the character and the fantasy world to which he or she belongs. While the intricate,
intimate details of these spectatorial experiences are typically beyond reach for us, and
while they are likely to a certain degree quite varied among individual members of the
crowd, the elements which structure the spectator’s responses are made available by
internal evidence from the playtexts—namely, addresses or references to the audience,
and other metatheatrical devices which are analyzed in detail in Chapter One. Although
the subjective responses of early modern spectators contemplating the stage world
before them are not recorded as often as we might wish them to be in surviving
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documents from the period, the early phenomenological approach to spectatorship that
emerges in the metatheatricality of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century playtexts, in
combination with the tools provided by twentieth century phenomenology, allows for
serious contemplation of the experiential register of playgoing at the time.

From Stage to Spectator: Theorizing Early Modern Spectator Response
Empirical investigation of audience experience and response in the Renaissance
and its qualitative evaluation—for example, consideration of the psychological or
subjective dimensions of theatre spectatorship—have both informed this study, the
latter to a greater degree than the former. Although the social composition, attitudes,
and behaviours of playgoers do not explicitly find their way very often into my
discussion, works documenting such evidence were a necessary starting point for my
research, and so I would like to briefly acknowledge that without the contributions of
many theatre historians and critics, the “properly detailed historical perspective” which
“is a necessary component in any analysis of the original audiences and their
contribution to performance” (Gurr, Playgoing 5) would not have been possible here.
Gurr’s foundational monograph Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London (first published in
1987, with second and third editions in 1996 and 2004) is matched by a number of other
influential works which enable us to better understand the material environments of
theatres, the composition of the people that filled them, and the dramatic dynamics that
shaped how fictional worlds became manifest on the London stages. Although there are
too many to exhaustively catalogue here, other studies that have been particularly
indispensible to my research are Jean Howard’s Shakespeare’s Art of Orchestration:
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Stage Technique and Audience Response (1984), Alexander Leggatt’s Jacobean Public
Theatre (1992), Jeremy Lopez’s Theatrical Convention and Audience Response in
Early Modern Drama (2003), Charles Whitney’s Early Responses to Renaissance
Drama (2006), Jennifer Low and Nova Myhill’s Imagining the Audience in Early
Modern Drama, 1558-1642 (2011), as well as much of Robert Weimann’s work, his
collaborations with Douglas Bruster, and Dessen’s work on stage conventions.
While those working in the field of Shakespeare studies and early modern drama
continue to refine the picture we have of the material realities that shaped a playgoer’s
experience at any one of the theatres in early modern London, there nevertheless
remains at minimum a critical hesitancy in exploring the less tangible aspects of a
spectator’s experience, in shifting from the physical, empirically verifiable theatrical
environments and their contents into the kinds of subjective experiences which may
have been occasioned by such locales. Gurr, for example, asserts the importance of
“the complex interactive communication between stage and audience,” and states that
“the hermeneutics of the theatre […] depends as much on the audience’s state of mind
as it does on the author’s and the players’ expectations of what, mentally, their audience
will be prepared for” (Playgoing 6). However, the relevant evidence with respect to the
“mental composition” (Gurr’s chapter subheading) of audiences Gurr admits is
inconclusive and fragmentary “because almost nobody bothers to put down in writing
what they feel about a play while they experience it” (95). Analysis of these documents
must therefore be approached with caution, Gurr asserts, in order to avoid assimilating
individual experiences to those of the entire audience.
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Gurr’s point that limited evidence should not be taken as representative of the
larger “mental composition” speaks to only one of the potential problems in historically
reconstructing Renaissance spectators. Whitney, for instance, claims that the proportion
of written early modern responses to in-theatre experience does not accord with the
emphasis we place on such experience, and that the early moderns were “not generally
interested in performance history” (4). As a result, eyewitness accounts could be
motivated by interests that exceeded or were irrelevant to the goal of recording the
theatrical experience. Whitney also raises the issue that some accounts of performance
may have been influenced by, or wholly reconstructed from reading rather attending the
plays, and finally, that an individual’s responses evolve and change over time. Such
claims are compelling, and a cautionary approach to historical evidence is worth
keeping in mind. As Jenn Stephenson explains, as she details yet another difficulty in
reconstructing early modern audience response, the “frustratingly scant and
fragmentary” nature of “evidence pertaining to audiences and their playgoing
experiences in London of the Renaissance period” has allowed for “critical bias and so
interpretations of the same data have over the last century arrived at a diverse collection
of audience portraits” (“Uplifted to the View” 56). Alfred Harbage, Ann Jennalie Cook,
and Andrew Gurr have all produced different characterizations of “the demographic
character of the audience in terms of their social class” (Stephenson 56), and therefore
caution must be exercised if one is to use the social demography of audiences to infer
anything about audience members’ possible reactions to the plays. With these
considerations in mind, it seems the further removed one is from the scene of
performance, the more difficult it becomes to account for audience response or
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reception, and the number of methodological considerations appear to multiply once
one moves outside of the empirically verifiable domain of audience demography to
discover how theatre attendees processed what they saw. Perhaps, too, the difficulty in
reconstructing the subjective dimension of playgoing may account for the necessity of
foregrounding one’s own methodology, as I have set out to do here, in order to avoid
blithely importing notions of the subject, subjectivity, interiority, and the psyche, into
an era in which these semantic categories were non-existent, nascent, or understood
quite differently.
However, if the fragmentary or potentially unreliable nature of historical
documentation is problematic when it comes to the topic of audience response, it
nevertheless seems appropriate to ask to what extent we ought to allow the gaps in
evidentiary records from the time to delimit critical engagement with the experiences of
Renaissance playgoers. There exists a significant body of scholarship that indirectly or
directly contributes to the discussion of audience subjectivity with respect to early
modern play attendees. One particularly persuasive argument for the existence of the
concept of subjective interiority itself in the Renaissance is Katherine Eisaman Maus’
Inwardness and Theatre in the English Renaissance (1995). Maus treats her topic
historically, responding to the concerns of Catherine Belsey, Jean Howard, and Francis
Barker, who claim that the concept of inwardness is anachronistic because it is an
imposition of the modern reader upon pre-modern texts, and to Peter Sallybrass’s and
Jonathan Goldberg’s sense that the discursive construction of inwardness in the
Renaissance in fact relies on the public, the outward, and the political. Maus is able to
show that “the sense of discrepancy between ‘inward disposition’ and ‘outward
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appearance’ seems unusually urgent and consequential for a very large number of
people, who occupy virtually every position on the ideological spectrum” (13). In
doing so, she not only provides a model for how concepts attendant upon psychic
interiority may be theorized with historical sensitivity, but also makes a case for the
importance of such concepts to both the drama of the Renaissance and its spectators.
Consequently, while Maus’ discussion of inwardness is specifically relevant to
my establishing the terms of a pervasive interest in penetrating the body and charting its
interior(s) in the Renaissance, I am also indebted more generally to the idea that
concepts like inwardness or interiority are applicable to Renaissance culture. In
proposing to theorize audience response to bodies in distress I am in some senses
relying on the foundational work of scholars like Maus, since to explore experience is
undoubtedly to assume that there is an internal, personal, and psychic dimension to
spectatorship, even if all of these terms require the requisite contextualization and
historicization if they are to be used in the context of discussions regarding Renaissance
spectatorship. Having acknowledged that some critics (like those to whom Maus
responds) are uncomfortable with the use of such terms in the context of early modern
experience, I also wholeheartedly agree with Maus that “when one looks at a wide
variety of printed materials produced in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, it becomes
difficult to claim that Hamlet’s boast of ‘that within’ is anachronistic—that Shakespeare
has mysteriously managed to jump forward in time and expropriate the conceptual
equipment of a later era” (3). In particular, the function of the following chapter will be
to suggest with reference to plays by Shakespeare, Peele, Beaumont, and Marston, that
Renaissance discourses related to playgoing and spectatorship contain a sophisticated

19
conceptualization of “that within” the mind—namely, the mind’s cognitive abilities and
also its potential contributions to the way theatrical performance signifies.
While Chapter One establishes the phenomenology of early modern
spectatorship that informs this project as a whole, subsequent chapters deal specifically
with the body and its performed violations as they resonate with original spectators.
Therefore, some introductory remarks here upon the methodology that supports such an
analysis are appropriate. In “The Body of Stage Directions” (2001), an examination
and summary of bodily theatrical vocabulary drawn from early modern playtexts,
Dessen asserts that “ideally, discussion of how the body was presented on the English
stage should be grounded firmly in evidence from both contemporary records (e.g.
eyewitness accounts, Henslowe’s records) and playscripts” (27). Dessen’s focus is on
reconstructing from the available texts what Renaissance playgoers would have seen,
for example, in a play like Edmund Ironside, which instructs a character to take “a dead
man’s head upon his sword’s point holding it up to Edmond’s soldiers” (qtd. in Dessen
31) or in The Bloody Banquet, where a servant enters with “Tymethes’s limbs” (qtd. in
Dessen 32), presenting to the adulterous queen a “banquet” made from the body parts of
her dead lover, whom she must eat as punishment. What is interesting about Dessen’s
statement is that one of the primary sources from which he suggests evidence about
staging should be culled is “eyewitness accounts.” While his aim is to focus attention
upon a fruitful source of hard evidence, Dessen’s suggestion also alerts us to the
importance of the viewer’s role in how the staged body signifies. While eyewitness
accounts can provide a general sense of what was onstage at a given point during a
performance—as for example, Simon Forman’s diary entry on Macbeth at the Globe in
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1610 does—they also attest to what the viewer saw or perceived, which need not be
identical to what was called for by stage directions or implied by playtexts. “How the
body was presented on the English stage” seems to account for only half of the
equation. If, as proposed in the previous section, and argued in Chapter One, spectators
were asked and expected to translate the raw materials of theatre into something more
than a somewhat bare stage and a costumed actor’s body, certainly the body’s
signification in performed violence depended not only upon what was actually onstage,
but also upon what the audience absorbed and created on its end.
Indeed, the phenomenology of spectatorship that emerges in many dramatists’
thematizations of their historical audiences and “the audience” as a concept indicates
that we need to shift the scholarly locus of inquiry from the stage to the audience (and
perhaps back again), if we want to fully account for the performance of the body in
early modern theatres. As argued earlier, drama distinguishes itself from other forms of
representational art by virtue of the fact that it requires an audience to come to fruition.
It is with this in mind that I argue if we are “to read [dramatic texts] not as literary
documents but as scripts for performance…concentrating on what would strike an
audience, immediately, in the heat of performance, and on the script as a series of
opportunities for performers and stage technicians” (Leggatt 2), as many performancecentered approaches do, incorporating the experiential register of spectatorship into
such a reading is essential. To theorize “what would strike an audience” in the
Renaissance requires first, but not only, the forms of empirical knowledge that scholars
like Gurr and Dessen have established. In other words, the “ideal” picture Dessen
would capture of the bodies on the Renaissance stage implicates the bodies in the
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audience as well; the body language present in these original performances is not
wholly reducible to the concrete, material aspects of performance, such as staging,
costuming, mise-en-scène, stage space, acting aesthetic, and theatrical architecture.
Rather, it is what the audience does, perceptually speaking, with these components of
theatrical performance that completes the picture. In the interest of a fully fleshed out
understanding of violently stage(d) corporealities in early modern performances, it
therefore makes sense to inquire about how the performing body was experienced, as I
have set out to do throughout this study. While Dessen’s inclusion of eyewitness
accounts within his reliable and sound sources forms part of his call for contemporary
scholarship to remain firmly and historically grounded within the textual artifacts of the
period, it also suggests the need to consider the audience as crucially implicated in the
body’s theatrical dynamic. The phenomenological approach to the stage-spectator
relationship introduced in the previous section and elaborated in Chapter One is ideal
for this necessary focus upon the spectator’s productive role in transposing the actor’s
body into a virtual realm within which the body takes on those properties attributed to it
by the perceiver.
Up to this point the terms “audience” “spectator” and “viewer” have been used
interchangeably, but elsewhere different nuances have been teased out of these
(relatively) synonymous terms, both by early moderns and modern critics. In Playgoing
in Shakespeare’s London, Gurr makes a distinction between the meaning of “audience”
and that of “spectator,” arguing that the first denotes a collective experience (which
Gurr also equates with seeing the stage from multiple angles rather than head-on) and
the latter a solitary, visually dominated experience (which Gurr associates with two-
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dimensional viewing of many modern theatres). In general, I see the sensory
dimensions of spectatorship as distinguishable but mutually constitutive elements
comprising the total theatre experience, and so do not use the term spectator in the same
way Gurr does, although I later place more stress on the idea of performance as visual
spectacle when I specifically turn to staged bodily violence. As Gurr’s analysis
suggests, while the related terms for “audience” have been distinguished from one
another on the basis of what aspects of human sense perception are primarily engaged
by performance, it has also been noted that there are key distinctions to be made
between individual and collective theatrical experiences. In “Audience and Audiences,”
Low and Myhill argue that an “audience” is a collective entity that dramatists address,
whereas “audiences” are individuals with varying identities and relationships to the
drama. Such distinctions are important, Helen Freshwater argues, because one of the
barriers that prevents a “better understanding of the relationship between theatre and its
audiences” is “the tendency to confuse individual and group response” (5), especially
when “there is so much to suggest that the responses of theatre audiences are rarely
unified or stable” (3). Freshwater goes on to note that the association of “audience”
with “an assembled group” and the assessment of this group as a collective (“it”) “risks
obscuring the multiple contingencies of subjective response, context, and environment
which condition an individual’s interpretation of a particular performance event” (5).
Critics and reviewers run the risk of perpetuating what Elin Diamond refers to as “the
violence of ‘we’” (in her article of the same name), when they adopt the collective first
person to describe their own experiences of performances (Freshwater 5). Although I
never invoke the collective “we” to describe the way performance engages its
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spectators, the kinds of distinctions Gurr and others make at length are not always
possible or necessary within the scope of this discussion. Ultimately, I have chosen to
be flexible with regard to audience nomenclature because even within the early modern
period, the terminology used to denote those who attend the theatre was varied,
suggesting that dramatists conceived of their audiences in a number of ways (as a
collective, as individuals, as viewers, as auditors). As Gurr explains, the term
“audience” was not nearly as prevalent in the early modern period as it is today, and
Shakespeare, for example, uses the term auditor exclusively in the 1590s, but from 1600
onwards refers to playgoers as spectators. Having considered the problems inherent in
applying terminology without regard for its discursive implications, I have ultimately
decided to take my lead from the variation in historical nomenclature and use a variety
of terms interchangeably: spectator, viewer, audience, auditor, witness, playgoer. This
choice, I hope, will speak to concerns like those voiced by Freshwater and Diamond
about the homogenization of “the audience,” by implicitly recognizing the variety of
ways in which theatre attendees engage in play performances.

Corporeal (Re)turns
Since this dissertation develops a model of audience responses within the
context of the body’s theatrical violation, this final section is devoted to introducing the
methodology and hypotheses I employ in reconstructing the body’s significance (and
signification) for early modern theatre spectators. In the wake of the proliferation of
studies involving the body which has now come to define a heterogeneous area of
inquiry loosely termed “body studies” (comprising a range of theoretical approaches
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drawn from psychoanalysis, phenomenology, linguistics, feminism, gender/queer
theory, and cultural studies), many scholars have contributed to what Keir Elam terms
the “corporeal turn” in the field of Renaissance studies (Calbi xiv). The many differing
critical approaches to the body, or bodies, in the early modern period need not
necessarily be seen as competing interests, or even as a sign that the body’s significance
for early modern culture has been exhausted in criticism, but as indicators of the body’s
scholarly importance. The centrality of the actor’s presence on the early modern stage
has been, and continues to be, a salient part of this turn in the field, but as I have noted,
the dual energies of the actor/character’s embodiment have not yet been thoroughly
examined with respect to audiences’ engagements with corporeal trauma. My
contribution to the fields of audience response and body studies lies in revisiting the
place the human body occupies in the Renaissance cultural imaginary, with reference to
stage violence and its potential for double images in the spectator’s phenomenological
experience of theatre.
My discussion of the signifying potential of early modern theatrical bodies is
aided by the analysis of Jonathan Sawday and the many other scholars who deal with
early modern bodies and bodiliness. The body’s appearance in a wide range of topics
dealing with the early modern period means that I cannot exhaustively list my debts to
scholars here. However, one useful catalogue of works that focus in a variety of ways
on the body in Renaissance culture is to be found in Maurizio Calbi’s Approximate
Bodies: Gender and Power in Early Modern Drama and Anatomy (2005). In a footnote
(p. 101), Calbi provides an excellent bibliography of foundational studies on this topic.
Of particular importance to my focus, Sawday’s The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and
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the Human Body in Renaissance Culture (1995) extensively maps out the shifts in
bodily discourse throughout the period. As Sawday’s wide-ranging selection of texts
shows (from poets such as Donne, Crashaw, Spenser, and Shakespeare, to natural
philosophers and scientists such as Bacon and Descartes), contemplation of the body
reached far and wide in the English Renaissance. Sawday moves beyond the dissection
slab to show how early modern culture was infused with a desire to contemplate what
he terms the “body-interior” (12)—a desire which manifests itself in literary, religious,
and philosophical discourses. Sawday’s detailed exploration of bodily inquiry in the
period has become an indispensible source for scholars of early modern body studies, as
has Gail Kern Paster’s The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in
Early Modern England (1993). Another thoroughgoing account of Renaissance
bodiliness is Carla Mazzio and David Hillman’s The Body in Parts: Fantasies of
Corporeality in Early-Modern Europe (1997), which methodologically picks up on the
process of “blazon” embedded in Sawday’s title by dividing itself into fourteen essays
each focusing on a body part. The scholarly value of The Body in Parts in terms of its
wide-ranging scope is matched by its suggestive approach to the topic: in Renaissance
discourses of the body, the relationship between the parts and the whole figures
prominently. Mazzio and Hillman suggest that to some degree, “the early modern
period could be conceptualized as an age of synecdoche” (xiv), a suggestion that I show
to be eminently true when I examine the discursive construction of the body as an
object of knowledge in the Renaissance, whose parts are thought to make up a unified
paradigm that exemplifies, in miniature, larger forms of knowledge. As I return to
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some of the ideas already established by the corporeal turn in Renaissance studies, I use
them to propose new means of looking at the role of violated bodies onstage.
Corporeal “violence” or “violation” can encompass a wide range of acts and
effects, and so further explanation of how I conceive of these terms and their
significance for audiences of the early modern period seems appropriate. It has been
my goal to focus on instances of corporeal undoing that have the potential to be quite
unsettling for audiences in order to examine why that which carries the potential to
disturb spectators is also that which recurs time and again in drama of the early modern
era. To this end, I have adopted a liberal definition of violence that includes a range of
actions perpetrated upon victims’ bodies, from those that threaten to destroy an
individual’s sense of corporeal integrity (as the Tyrant does to the Lady in The Second
Maiden’s Tragedy), to those that have completely dismantled the physical body (as does
another tyrant’s actions in The Bloody Banquet). The depictions of the body in peril in
the plays I have chosen seem to me to be particularly powerful, but the driving question
behind my selection of plays could easily be asked of many other violent texts from the
period: why should the corporeal injury and abuse that appear prominently in early
modern drama be a seductive force for audiences, as the popularity of the revenge
tragedy genre and of violent play motifs suggests? The answer I propose—which I
recognize to be only one facet of the appeal of violent entertainment—is that
Renaissance audiences were encouraged to derive pleasure from the recognition that the
theatrical body in pain was wholly different than those that were victims of nontheatrical violence. More specifically, I argue that the metatheatrical awareness
dramatists entrusted their spectators to adopt allowed for an empowering spectatorial
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experience in the face of damage to the body’s integrity. Whether the embodied
performing self is on the verge of destruction, has already suffered physical damage, or
is struggling to maintain its composure, recognition of the actor’s theatrical doubleness
(as actor and character) allows spectators to occupy a position of authority in relation to
how bodies and their relationship to worldly phenomena are transformed inside the
performance arena. Where non-theatrical bodies might suffer, disintegrate, and expire,
theatrical bodies retain their underlying corporeal integrity (that of the actor’s own
body), and acknowledgement of this fact, whether at the conscious or unconscious
level, is part of what enables spectators to enjoy violent entertainment. When these
same spectators take note of the process of illusion-making, as the drama of
Shakespeare and his contemporaries ensured they did, they are invited to contemplate
the phenomenal creation of the actor’s doubly significant body occurring coincidentally
with the destruction of the character’s represented body. Such contemplation, I argue,
can render the experience of seemingly destructive theatrical violence both enjoyable
and empowering.
Another keystone in my reconstruction of early modern audiences and their
desire for violent entertainment is the potent cultural desire in the Renaissance to access
the interior of the human body, which I establish by recourse to a variety of early
modern texts that take the body as their object of study or fascination. The violent
undoing of the body on London’s early modern stages could, in addition to furnishing
spectators with an authoritative stance on the creation of theatrical illusion, present
spectators with an empowering view of corporeal interiority. I show how early modern
English culture, inspired by the popularized work of anatomists both at home and
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abroad, constructs the body as a vessel of knowledge, both in the sense that it is a
physical vessel, home to important revelations about the nature of human existence, and
a vehicle for knowledge that reaches beyond the boundaries of the human frame. The
status of the body in Renaissance culture as a body of knowledge in turn enables me to
reconceptualize dramatized violence in a way that moves against the grain of critical
tradition. In her seminal analysis of violence in the early modern period, The Shattering
of the Self: Violence, Subjectivity, and Early Modern Texts (2002), Cynthia Marshall
suggests that performed acts of bodily trauma offer the spectator a “shattering” of the
self—the cathartic experience of “psychic fracture or undoing” (1). Yet what if
witnessing that same corporeal violence also presented audiences a related, but
different, possibility? Richard Sugg notes that “from the earliest years of their
appearance in nonmedical English literature, through to the visceral excesses of
Webster and William Davenant, the words ‘anatomy’ and ‘dissection’ are frequently
[…] found either amid, or as a final attempt to outdo, particularly horrific, imaginative,
and bizarre forms of physical torment and death” (13). While the rhetoric of
anatomization was put to aggressive, hostile uses in playtexts of the early modern
period, the violent literary appropriations of medical practices did not cut their ties with
anatomy’s “softer” side—its interest in the wondrous disclosures offered by the body’s
internal systems and structures. If the staging of anatomically-inspired scenes, or
threats, of violence promised to horrify audiences, it also furthered the myriad of (not
necessarily violent) connections spectators might draw between what happened to the
body onstage and what medical dissections sought to achieve (as defined by how the
practitioners of dissection interpreted their findings to the larger public). Whether they
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intended to or not, dramatists could not borrow terminology and procedures from
anatomical science without importing its culturally constructed meanings into the
theatre as well.
Taking this cross-fertilization into account, I propose that the same plays which
could dismantle the composure of spectators could also offer them the potential for
psychic recuperation. Marshall argues that theatrically performed violence belonged to
“an aesthetic of shattering or self-negation” (2) identifiable in the literature and drama
of early modern culture. Part of my aim is to explore the consequences of situating
theatrical violence and audience response in an entirely different cultural context: that
of Renaissance anatomy, dissection, and the wider forms of cultural knowledge attached
to these scientific disciplines. In my view, even when they do not invoke a specifically
anatomical context, staged violations can represent exploratory acts motivated by more
than just the perverse or destructive desire to cruelly “hew” the body to “shreds,” to
borrow a phrase from Ford’s Love’s Sacrifice (1633)4. Drawing upon the work of
Renaissance anatomists and the popularity of their dissection theatres, I conceive of
certain instances of staged bodily trauma as “theatricalized dissections,” a term unique
to this project. While all public dissections of the Renaissance certainly possessed a

4

Ford in fact also relies upon the same language in ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore (see 4.3.58) and Ferdinand in
Webster’s The Duchess of Malfi (1623) uses a strikingly similar expression in his fantasized violation of
the Duchess: he speaks of bequeathing to her bastard child a handkerchief in order “to make soft lint for
his mother’s wounds / When I have hewed her to pieces” (see 2.5.28-31). Some plays I cite make explicit
their use of anatomy’s procedures and its concepts (the dissection of a body in order to gain knowledge
and information), whereas others (like Love’s Sacrifice) more subtly reflect the anatomist’s methods and
ideas in the way violence is characterized. I avoid making claims about whether such anatomical echoes
are deliberate on the dramatist’s part; my aim is to explore their potential resonance for spectators.
However, the way anatomy in the early modern period becomes a popular cultural phenomenon in which
many writers participate leads me to agree with Sugg’s argument that “frequently, anatomy uses writers,
as well as vice versa” (2). Referring to early modern literature in general, Sugg argues, “Often, indeed,
uses of dissective rhetoric appear not merely fashionable but highly compulsive, sometimes lacking an
integral semantic motivation to the extent that the body must be seen as actively invading the English
literary imagination” (2).

30
degree of theatricality, I use the term “theatricalized dissection” to refer specifically to
instances of penetrative violence performed upon actors’ bodies in London’s drama
theatres. The connection between this kind of dramatic violence and dissection arises
from the fact that Renaissance dramatists often construct invasive penetrations of the
performing body as violent enterprises which are mobilized by the desire for
knowledge, much like the increasingly popular explorations of the body-interior
(Sawday’s term) in both published anatomical texts and public dissections of the time.
The relationship between early modern literature and anatomical study has been
taken up in various ways by the recent scholarship of Richard Sugg (Murder After
Death: Literature and Anatomy in Early Modern England, 2007) and Hilary Nunn
(Staging Anatomies: Dissection and Spectacle in Early Stuart Tragedy, 2005), yet in
this dissertation I respond to what I see as the need to map more extensively the
differences, as well as the similarities, between the drama and the science of the early
modern period. Because “the early literature of anatomy and dissection in the
Renaissance provides an entry to both figurative and literal dissection and
dismemberment on the Jacobean stage” (Caldwell 149), it is tempting to see the two
cultural domains, each so focused on the body, primarily in terms of their conceptual
commonalities. Ultimately, however, I will also argue that the dramatic theatre differs
significantly from the anatomical theatre in the way it can offer bodily knowledge to
those present and wishing to absorb such knowledge. The stylistic disparities of these
two theatres—one home to a self-consciously dramatic medium, and the other a
didactic, empirically-oriented forum—turn out to be a critical blindspot in many studies
on the topic to date. It is my contention that while both anatomists and dramatists were
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informed by overlapping and adjacent ideas about the body, because they were home to
a self-reflexively metatheatrical aesthetic the professional theatres of Shakespeare’s day
showcased these ideas in a representational mode unique to the dramatic stage, and
foreign to the anatomy theatres. The performance of the body’s violation in a dramatic
context provided spectators the opportunity to glimpse corporeal interiority while at the
same time remaining cognizant of the theatrical elements upholding the illusion of
corporeal revelation, and of their own participation in the creation of illusion. As key
figures in the creation of theatrical corporealities, early modern spectators could ascend
to a position of authority not offered to non-theatrical witnesses of the body’s violation.
I began this introduction with a performance-related analogy spanning four
hundred years in order to highlight in my approach what I hope will be a productive
methodological conjunction between the past and the present, between historical
investigation and contemporary theoretical insight—binaries that I invoke also with the
sense that they must be left open to qualification and interrogation. Drawing upon the
contemporary theoretical apparatus of phenomenology and upon evidence supplied by
early modern texts and playtexts, I explore how dramatists both recognized and
depended upon the imaginative contributions of their audiences, and I investigate the
implications of the notion that theatrical violence comes to life as much in the audience
as it does onstage. Chapter One, intended in large part to solidify the interpretive
parameters for subsequent chapters, inquires into what Renaissance dramatists and
playgoers might have understood as the spectator’s subjective experience in the theatre.
I show that early modern theatre culture valued highly the psychic and imaginative
dimensions of spectatorship. As King Lear, Henry V, A Midsummer Night’s Dream,
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The Old Wives Tale, The Knight of the Burning Pestle, and The Malcontent suggest, the
way in which spectators mentally process the bodies and spaces set forth before them is
seen to be an integral and powerful component of dramatic performance. Using plays
within plays, or metatheatrical reflections upon the stage, works like those listed above
sketch out a phenomenological portrait of theatrical dynamics that locates live
performance in a virtual space produced by the audience in response to what is rendered
by the actors onstage. Maintaining that the subjective experience of the spectator
significantly contributes to the ultimate effect of staged bodies, Chapter Two narrows
the lens of inquiry to how spectators perceive and respond to the represented violation
of the body in play performances of the period, a focus that sustains Chapters Three and
Four as well. Chapter Two engages the argument that the actor/character distinction
profoundly influences the way audience members absorb and perceive theatrical
embodiments, while using The Second Maiden’s Tragedy to concretize this argument
with relation to the play’s onstage depiction of an exhumed corpse and its troubled
ghost. Specifically, the fissures in time-body-space relationships represented in the play
microcosmically echo—and also further incite—the spectator’s perception of onstage
bodies and space as being (at least) two things at once, a fractured perception that is a
direct result of the presentation/representation divide. I read the play’s treatment of its
heroine’s body, a treatment which bends conventional laws of physics (namely, the idea
that one body can only occupy one spatial position at any given point in time), as an
analogue for the way in which the experience of playgoing can similarly “bend” the
spectator’s traditional understanding of the body and its spatial and temporal
capabilities and restrictions. The violation of the body, which in The Second Maiden’s
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Tragedy stems from grave-robbing and necrophilia (although not to the point of sexual
intimacy), becomes a more prominent focus in the remaining two chapters, which zero
in more closely on penetrative theatrical violence that draws blood and exposes the
body’s physical interiority. In Chapters Three and Four, early modern anatomical
science and its exploration of the body provide a historical backdrop for an analysis of
the spectator’s confrontation with the body’s viscera in The Bloody Banquet (Ch.3) and
The Atheist’s Tragedy (Ch. 4). Chapter Three charts the early modern construction of
the body as repository of knowledge both earthly and divine, to argue that potentially
disturbing or repulsive enactments of corporeal violence can also be seen as
opportunities for epistemological empowerment on the part of spectators. Because a
variety of texts (both dramatic and non-dramatic) in the period invest so much in the
body’s external and internal physical structure, anyone who is witness to the body’s
physical unveiling is also offered a chance to attain expansive knowledge of body, self,
and world—all of which were thought to be paradigmatically represented by the
physical human form. Through its instructive display of a torn apart body, The Bloody
Banquet dramatizes these epistemological investments and the knowledge offered to
those who are present to observe the violent opening of the body or its aftermath.
London’s dramatic theatres, however, offered a different experience of the body’s
internal physiology than the popular anatomy theatres of the day. As plays continually
reminded their spectators in significant metatheatrical moments, the actor’s body
possessed a dual ontological status as both the representer and the represented, the actor
himself and the character himself or herself. As Chapter Four argues, this corporeal
duality, which was not possessed by the lifeless corpses dissected in public anatomies,
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meant that dramatic theatre audiences could enjoy the visceral undoing of the body with
the attendant understanding that the sanctity of the actor’s body is almost never at stake
in fictionally represented violence. The dead-alive or violated-but-intact performing
bodies could therefore fulfill what I show is a fantasy circulating widely among early
modern anatomists, their followers, and Renaissance culture at large: the unmediated
access to an uncorrupted live human body and all of its contents. Unrealizable in
anatomy circles because of the ethical prohibition against human vivisection, this desire
could be approximated in theatrical performances like those of The Atheist’s Tragedy,
which encouraged its spectators to perceive the internality of a penetrated body (in this
case, the exposed brain of the character’s body) which was at the same time undamaged
in the sense that it was also the actor’s body. Providing exclusive access to a
performing entity that seemed, perceptually speaking, to triumph over the moral and
mortal constraints that limited anatomical exploration to corpses which could not reveal
live human corporeality, the theatrical performance of the violated body in the early
modern period facilitated powerful and empowering experiences for its spectators.
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1

“If Imagination Amend Them”: The Phenomenology of

Early Modern Spectatorship

The prologues, epilogues, and bodies of early modern plays often suggest and
reveal information concerning the early modern performances about which so little
documentary evidence survives. Focusing on the prologue itself, Douglas Bruster and
Robert Weimann, for example, assert that “in the absence of extensive records of
contemporary responses to specific plays, prologues offer cultural historicism some of
the most significant characterizations of the early modern theatre” (2) including “some
of our best evidence regarding performance spaces and practice,” and “who the
audience was presumed to be” (159). Choosing a slightly different point of entry into
the internal evidence found in playtexts, this chapter argues that metatheatrical moments
in general—regardless of where they occur in the play—also provide valuable
information about early modern audiences, in that they give us at least a partial sense of
the general terms under which audiences and performers met, in both the literal
(material) and imaginative senses. Specifically, my argument is that early modern
playtexts explicitly characterize spectators of the period as active participants in
performance; they are aware, dynamically engaged, and recognized as such by
playwrights. This argument sets up the more body-oriented chapters that follow, by
establishing the spectator’s lived experience of the stage as a primary means of
assessing how human physicality and embodied selfhood signify in the theatre. The
plays I analyze or refer to in this chapter—King Lear, Henry V, A Midsummer Night’s
Dream, The Old Wives Tale, The Knight of the Burning Pestle, and The Malcontent—
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were selected because they all allude to or call for a performance “contract,” wherein
theatregoers are portrayed as cognizant auditors who understand theatrical convention
and contribute to shaping a performance’s meanings. Although I intend the present
chapter to develop—as its title suggests—a phenomenology of spectatorship, I resort
first and foremost to primary evidence (Renaissance playtexts themselves) and defer
extended use of phenomenological theories to Chapter Two, where I spend more time
surveying a variety of theoretical approaches to theatrical corporeality and spatiality.
Through metatheatricality, dramatists both recognize and encourage the spectator’s
mental (re)construction of stage phenomena as elements belonging to a fictional world,
suggesting that this transaction is fundamental to spectating, whether the represented
subject matter is violent or not. Admittedly, early modern drama is replete with
instances of metatheatre; even if one were to narrow the scope of inquiry to
metatheatrical references to spectators specifically, there exist innumerable
permutations of plays that could be linked together to make the argument I do here.
The plays in this chapter are intended to serve as exemplars of the way drama of the
time attuned playgoers to the process of illusion-making, and prioritized within this
process the spectator’s mental transformations of the stage and the bodies that fill it. A
Midsummer Night’s Dream, The Old Wives Tale, and (especially) The Knight of the
Burning Pestle were selected because of their lengthy metatheatrical nods towards
spectatorial contributions to theatre; King Lear, Henry V and The Malcontent provide
shorter but equally instructive examples of the same. All six plays are representative of
the idea that theatre materializes as much in the audience’s imagination as it does
onstage, enabling powerful and personal experiences for spectators, and (in)forming
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responses that carried over into the more serious, violent, or tragic terrain that I turn to
in the following chapters.
Of course, the model of engaged spectatorship requires qualification in several
ways. The boisterous energies of theatre crowds could offer an equally powerful pull in
the direction of disengagement with the stage5. For one, the social permissibility of
activity within the audience (the sale of food and drink, for example) seems to strongly
suggest fluctuations of attention between onstage and offstage activity (perhaps both on
the part of actors as well as spectators). The structure of early modern theatrical
environments and their conventions also meant that for spectators “the physical
features, the awareness of where you are and what you are doing […] was an invariable
feature of every Shakespearean performance” (Gurr, Playgoing 13), implying that the
idea of audience engagement needs to be extended to include objects of attention
beyond the boundaries of the actors’ performance itself. The multiple ways in which
spectators could participate in theatrical experience suggest that being mentally present
as a Renaissance playgoer meant mediating between various perceptual loci that could
strengthen and/or weaken one’s absorption into the fictional world of the play. As my
reading of A Midsummer Night’s Dream in this chapter suggests, the degree to which
the addressees of a dramatized representation are able to embrace the fictions of the
stage is understood to be variable, their suspension of disbelief understood to be part of
a continuum that allowed for fluctuations between identification with the story and with
the stage as stage. However, these two poles of attention need not be seen as mutually
5

In Jacobean Public Theatre Alexander Leggatt argues that the “the general picture of a rough, vulgar
theatre public needs to be complicated in two ways” (43), noting that rowdy behaviour was not particular
to the playhouse alone, and that some accounts describe attendees treating the theatre experience as an
opportunity to showcase themselves. Nevertheless, as they are in Leggatt’s description, early modern
audiences are frequently described as being large, energetic, and anything but passive.
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exclusive. Rather than wholly privileging one over the other, early modern plays ensure
that both the space of stage-as-stage and the represented space, superimposed upon one
another, become equally likely loci of spectatorial perception. Recently, advances in
the intersection of cognitive science, theatre studies, and phenomenology have
supported this idea with analysis of empirical evidence concerning how the brain makes
sense of the inherent duality of theatrical performance. A leading figure in this hybrid
field, Bruce McConachie asserts that “blending” of the presentational and
representational elements of performance is “the cognitive basis of spectating” (18).
When spectators take in a performance, they “merge together two different mental
constructs” and thus usually “experience ‘actor/characters’ as a blend, not as separate
entities” (18), while perceiving that blended entity to be “simultaneously existing in
both real and simulated time-space” (7). Cognitive blending, McConachie boldly
argues, is not a “socially constructed” phenomenon; it occurs “at the species level”
(18)—that is to say, it is a faculty all human beings exercise.
With respect to stage space, the “Dover Cliff” scene from King Lear vividly
illustrates how the recognition of stage signifiers can occur alongside something akin to
what has typically been called suspension of disbelief. As Gloucester stands on the
edge of the imaginary “cliff” that Edgar has falsified, Edgar describes to him a series of
scenic images that trick Gloucester into “seeing” (in his mind’s eye) what is not truly
there, either in the fictive world of the play, or in the performance space of the early
modern English stage. Not only do Edgar’s representational strategies analogize the
dramatist’s use of convention to conjure up a fictive scene, but as Steven Turner notes,
the scene “draws our attention as much to the devices used to represent the space as to
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the final effect of that space itself” (166, emphasis in original). When Edgar asserts
“how fearful / And dizzy ’tis, to cast one’s eyes so low” (4.6.11-12) from such a height,
audiences are reminded that, given the difficulty of physically producing a steep cliff
with the stage’s resources, this would be the same descriptive language Edgar might use
to project to Shakespeare’s audience the impression of a cliff were the narrative truly
taking place at Dover. Shakespeare encourages spectators to take note of Edgar’s
linguistic trickery, and therefore to straddle (perceptually) the fictional world of King
Lear and the stage standing in for that world. In performance, once the disjunction
between the “extreme verge” (4.6.26) Edgar represents through speech and the flat
performance space becomes clear, Edgar’s ruse can sustain involvement in the narrative
at the very same time it metatheatrically highlights how Shakespeare’s dramaturgy
produces the impression of that which is not actually seen. This is because Edgar’s ruse
is also Shakespeare’s; in this moment, spectators are alerted to how Shakespeare
transforms space with language by virtue of the fact that they recognize that Edgar’s
character is performing a similar transformation. Since the stage has its representational
limits, in many descriptive evocations of fictional locales, “language would tell us to
see [the space] otherwise” than it appears (Goldberg 539), a convention dramatists rely
upon for performance effects. If spectators recognize the dramatist’s strategy here it is
only because they have invested themselves in how Edgar’s character uses a similar
strategy in the fictional world of the play. The similarity between Edgar’s and
Shakespeare’s “storytelling” demonstrates how dramaturgical choices can direct a
spectator’s focus to both the “story” and the process of dramatically “telling” it, without
spectators having to lose sight of or abandon allegiance to either. Spectatorial
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engagement, then, was far more complex than a consistently maintained suspension of
disbelief; as I elaborate below, to engage with a performance could also mean to
simultaneously participate in the deconstruction of theatrical illusion frequently
encouraged by the plays themselves.
Additionally, as noted earlier, although the social composition of early modern
theatre crowds and their degree of heterogeneity has been the subject of debate, critics
have nevertheless warned against homogenizing the behaviours and experiences of
theatre attendees. In response to these concerns I would argue that the portrait of active
spectatorship the plays in this chapter delineate can reasonably be seen as a structuring
matrix within which an array of theatrical experiences is manifest. Therefore, despite
the diversity in playhouses and playgoers, it can be argued that there were “deep
continuities in not only theatrical fashion and generic preferences, but also the overall
experience of playgoing” (Bruster and Weimann 43). Bruster and Weimann cite the
commonalities among prologues they analyze (including trends in costuming, rhetoric,
and stage practice) as one kind of evidence for such continuity, asserting, “if not a
uniform set of experiences, then at least an open unity of shared assumptions and
feelings relating to attendance at plays must have underwritten the average playgoer’s
relationship to and understanding of playgoing” (43). Anne Ubersfeld and Keir Elam
have both proposed that spectators are unlikely to isolate themselves from the audience
en masse in the way they evaluate a given performance, and Susan Bennett describes
Elam’s argument as follows: “There is a tendency towards integration, the surrendering
of the individual to the group for the duration of the performance” (76). Drawing upon
cognitive theory in her analysis of the prologue to Henry V, F. Elizabeth Hart
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convincingly argues that Shakespeare uses a “cognitively fundamental” concept of
“things that encircle” (42) to “achieve the goal of unifying his audience’s vision” (43).
While acknowledging that “no two audience members’ embodied experiences will ever
be exactly alike […] even in circumstances such as watching the same performance in
which individuals respond cognitively to the same stimulation,” Hart argues that the
spectator responses generated by invocations of fundamental concepts “may in fact be
sufficiently alike to promote an isomorphism or structural similarity between different
individuals’ imaginative constructs” (43, emphasis in original). The plays in this
chapter provide internal evidence to corroborate what Bruster and Weimann, Ubersfeld,
Elam, and Hart claim, in that the playtexts themselves suggest the existence of a flexible
but traceable set of shared spectatorial experiences which both dramatists and playgoers
acknowledged. In characterizing audiences as participatory collaborators in a
performance’s meaning, the drama of the period did not seem to be proposing anything
radical or even out of the ordinary. Rather, depictions of playgoing, and other
metatheatrical references to theatre audiences acknowledged the cultural availability
and circulation of an extant model of spectatorship based on the premise of an
informed, participatory audience, and also further encouraged the continuation and
proliferation of the kinds of audience engagements these plays modeled.
In returning to a topic that has already received considerable attention from
scholars of early modern drama, the goal of this chapter is not to retread familiar terrain,
but rather to build the foundation for my assessment of audience responses to corporeal
violation, which I argue are structured by the way plays train their spectators to adopt a
metatheatrical awareness of the stage. This last point about early modern spectators’
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self-conscious understanding of drama as a representational medium has become
somewhat commonplace, but I have proposed that the relationship between metatheatre
and violence is as yet underexamined, possibly because metatheatricality emerges more
forcefully in scenes that fall outside the context of dramatized violence. Indeed, “given
that there is something undeniably playful when the theatre takes itself as its chief
subject” (Puchner 104), the seriousness of violence and the playfulness of what is
conventionally thought of as metatheatre might seem a strange pairing. However,
definitions of metatheatre need not necessarily be restricted to overt self-reflexivity on
the part of the stage; whenever stage action guides spectators towards recognition of the
presentational and representational dimensions of performance, which as I show in
subsequent chapters also occurs in and through the body’s violation onstage, a meta
awareness of theatre is invoked. One might even assert, as Jenn Stephenson does, that
there is something inherently metatheatrical about theatre itself—that it is “prone to
self-reflexivity, more so than any other art form” (“Meta-enunciative Properties” 118)
because spectators are always engaged in a process of mediating between phenomena
belonging to their own world (including, for example, their own bodies, actors’ bodies,
and the bodies that surround them in the audience) and to the fantasy playworld they
participate in constructing. This mediation between the poles of the actual and the
fantastical is an inalienable part of the spectatorial experience, persisting long after a
play concludes its metatheatrical winking at the audience and resumes a deeper fidelity
to the fictional world. The examples in this chapter attest to early modern culture’s
endorsement of what might literally be termed a bi-polar model of spectatorship, but the
most compelling (because explicit) proof for this view of audience response is not
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typically to be found in scenes that depict tragic violence. In order to substantiate my
forthcoming claims concerning the dually-inflected nature of spectator responses to
corporeal violation, it has therefore been necessary to cull evidence from early modern
plays outside the ultra violent revenge genre, and to turn to examples where I find the
most convincing support for the way early moderns conceived of the phenomenology of
spectatorship. For this reason, the primary texts I closely analyze to substantiate my
reconstruction of audience response are not specifically focused upon the body’s
violation, but they provide the necessary methodological foundation for the subsequent
chapters that move deeper into the body.
The “unworthy scaffold” which is proffered by the Chorus as the stage upon
which the play Henry V is to take place has received considerable critical attention, and
like many scholars, I find Henry V’s appeal to its audience to be a good example with
which to begin a discussion of Renaissance audiences. One standard critical
interpretation is that the Chorus’s apology for raising “so great an object” (Prologue 11)
upon so meager a stage is an indicator of the inadequacy of theatrical mise-en-scène,
which would necessitate a great leap of faith into the fictive world of the play in order
to overcome the discrepancy between actual and imagined events and locales. Bruster
and Weimann point out that early modern dramatic prologues are frequently
“supplicatory” in this way, featuring expressions such as “only we entreat you think,”
“our begging tongues,” and “we shall desire you of patience” (2). While it is certainly
true that the Chorus adopts a traditional topos of humility, calling upon the audience’s
“humble patience” and requesting the audience “kindly to judge” the play (Prologue
34), I would like to suggest that such an entreaty be read in an affirmative light, in the
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sense that I believe the Chorus’s appeals to the audience constitute a vote of confidence
for the imaginative capabilities of spectators. Rather than simply establishing the
“inadequacy of [Shakespeare’s] medium” (Taylor 55), as, according to Gary Taylor,
some critics have argued, the Chorus constructs the members of its audience as integral
collaborators in “piece[ing] out [its] imperfections” with their “thoughts” (Prologue 23).
If Taylor is right that the topos of modesty veils the Chorus’s “considerable confidence”
(Taylor 56), then a great deal of this assuredness is derived from the expressed belief in
the audience’s ability and willingness to invoke its own “imaginary puissance”
(Prologue 25). The argument that the Chorus seeks to supplement the story by
activating the power of imagination is one that Robert Weimann also makes in Author’s
Pen and Actor’s Voice: Playing and Writing in Shakespeare’s Theatre (2000); he notes
that to ask the audience to supply the remainder of representation is to “express
considerable confidence in, even to bestow authority on, the signifying capacities of
ordinary people” (77). Although crediting the “energies” of both audiences and actors,
Taylor’s argument that the Chorus uses such energies to “express the magnitude of an
historical achievement” (56) also inadvertently acknowledges the play’s dependence
upon its spectators to bring to life the “vasty fields of France” (Prologue 12) or spaces
and places that exceed the physical environment of the stage. In this sense, to borrow
Edward Casey’s words, in the early modern theatre “space is no longer situated in the
physical world but in the subjectivity of the human mind that formally shapes this
world” (qtd. in Weimann, Author’s Pen 252). This conceptual revision of the meaning
of space has consequences for the bodies that occupy it too, as I show in Chapter Two;
theatrical embodiment is similarly constructed in and through the mental efforts of
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spectators who use their thoughts to flesh out the stage’s projected representations.
While Taylor and Weimann do not specifically focus on the audience as an imaginative
resource upon which a play may rely to “piece out [its] imperfections” (Prologue 23) in
the mise-en-scène, their readings suggest at least one of the ways in which Shakespeare
conceived of his audience members: as creators in their own right, bringing to the
theater their capability to flesh out in an undefined, subjective, and imaginative realm,
the bodies and spaces that were only partially suggested and realized by the players and
the stage itself.
Indeed, in other key dramatic moments, Shakespeare’s characters address and
invoke the help of the audience, or participate in metafictional frames (a play within a
play, for example) and self-reflexive commentaries on performance, all of which
provide us with a sense of how early modern dramatists conceived of the spectator’s
involvement with what was transpiring onstage. One such moment is the performance
of the mechanicals’ production of Pyramus and Thisbe in A Midsummer Night’s Dream,
although admittedly serving to comically highlight the naïveté of the “rude”
mechanicals who botch the play within a play. Despite its status as satirical comedy,
the performance of Pyramus and Thisbe in front of the Duke and his company also
provides a model of audience-actor relationships that I argue situates the play’s
representations in a collaborative space between those watching and those performing.
Quince’s prologue offers the first delineation of this space in its comical and heavyhanded recitation of the play’s dramatis personae, which directly addresses, and thus
implicates, the play’s audience in the mechanicals’ attempt at character representation.
Quince explains that
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This man is Pyramus, if you would know;
This beauteous Lady, Thisbe is certain.
This man, with lime and roughcast doth present
Wall, that vile wall which did these lovers sunder;
And through Wall’s chink, poor souls, they are content
To whisper; at the which let no man wonder.
This man, with lantern, dog, and bush of thorn,
Presenteth Moonshine. (5.1.128-35)
Quince’s explanation is followed by Snout’s additional statement that “in this same
interlude, it doth befall, / That I, one Snout by name present a wall […] This loam, this
roughcast and this stone doth show / That I am that same wall; the truth is so” (5.1.15461). Rather than assuming their audience’s intelligent involvement with the process of
dramatic characterization—the fact that Theseus, Hippolyta, and the lovers do not need
to be led through who presents whom and how—the mechanicals hyperbolically bring
into focus the means by which representation occurs. In a sense, their well-meaning but
misguided “tour” through the representational strategies by which the cast of the play
embody their performed identities/entities amounts to an overly literal algorithm for the
process of dramatic representation itself. The interjections of “if you would know” and
“let no man wonder,” when taken together with their direct address to the Duke and his
fellow audience members, overemphasize the fact that theatrical representation and
embodiment depend upon the intellection and engagement of those watching.
Moreover, because the mechanicals’ preamble registers as comedic, in that it
explicitly sets out what every playgoer would take as axiomatic—“this man is
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Pyramus,…this beauteous lady, Thisbe”—it implies that to discount the audience’s
involvement in the scene of representation would be naïve, to such a degree that this
misapprehension becomes comically ludicrous. To explain to spectators one of the
fundamental aspects of theatre, the idea that persons and things stand for characters and
objects which they are not, is as humorously ridiculous as Quince’s mispunctuated
prologue (discussed below). The comedic effects of Pyramus and Thisbe suggest that
unlike the mechanicals, Shakespeare at least expected his audience to understand and
participate in such basic operations of dramatic representation as mentally transforming
actors into the characters they embody. Along with Andrew Gurr, Bernard Beckerman
and Robert Weimann have discussed the wide range of theatrical techniques for
producing fictional illusions (notably, the use of unlocalized and localized space,
simultaneous staging, and cueing of locale with props) with which Renaissance
dramatists expected their audiences to be familiar. The mechanics’ hyper-literal miseen-scène elicits critical jibes from the audience within a Midsummer Night’s Dream,
because it breaks radically with these early modern theatrical conventions, and
misestimates its spectators’ comprehension of, and resulting contribution to, such
conventions.
Accordingly, the audience within Shakespeare’s play takes the mechanicals to
task not only because the actors employ crude representational strategies, but because
they insist on providing belabored explanations of such strategies. When Moonshine
explains, “This lantern doth the hornèd moon present. / Myself the man i’th’ moon do
seem to be” (5.1.235-6), Theseus and Demetrius criticize his logic, objecting that in
order for this literally-interpreted prop to succeed as representation, the man, his thorn
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bush, and his dog should all be inside the lantern/moon. The grounds of their objection
arise not from a refusal to imagine Starveling as moonshine, for Theseus has already
delineated and argued forcefully for the power of the imagination in his prior speech
about lovers, poets, and lunatics. If, as Theseus asserts, a bush can easily be “supposed
a bear” (5.1.22) with the aid of “strong imagination,” then a human body bearing a
lantern can equally be “supposed” a moon by willing viewers. Rather, Theseus,
Demetrius, and their peers are overly literal in their critique of the play’s mise-en-scène
because the actors have encouraged them to be; the mechanicals have created a
hyperbolically literal staging of Pyramus and Thisbe that refuses to recognize its
audience as intelligent collaborators who need less instruction than has been provided—
if any at all—to participate in the act of bringing a fictive world to life. In dramatizing
a fictional audience’s critical response to a representational aesthetic that denies or
wildly misconstrues the role of spectatorial imagination, Shakespeare works by negative
example to establish the terms by which the offstage spectators (those of A Midsummer
Night’s Dream) are encouraged, indeed expected, to interact with onstage
representations. The play within a play thus produces a fictional performance
environment which serves as a foil by which Shakespeare highlights the established and
desired audience-actor relations of his own theatre. In contrast to those of the
mechanicals’ performance, these relations work within a set of theatrical conventions
understood and shared by spectators and actors alike, wherein an audience’s
imaginative engagement with the stage is seen as definitionally built into the process of
dramatic representation itself.
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While the mechanicals’ bumbling attempts may be the “silliest stuff” Hippolyta
“has ever heard” (5.1.207), Bruster and Weimann are right to note that production of the
play within a play is one of “staggering complexity” (50) with respect to issues of
representation, performance, and fictional layering. Even as it implies the engaged role
of the audience to be axiomatic in the process of dramatic representation, the
performance and reception of Pyramus and Thisbe within A Midsummer Night’s Dream
also paints a complex portrait of just how such engagement might take place, endowing
the spectator’s imaginative capabilities with the power to mold the meaning and effect
of the mechanicals’ staging choices. Prior to the performance of the play within a play,
Theseus muses upon the “seething brains” and “shaping fantasies” (5.1.4-5) of lovers,
madmen, and poets, highlighting the human mind’s capacity for producing and shaping:
“As imagination bodies forth / The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen / Turns
them to shapes…Such tricks hath strong imagination” (5.1.14-18). Although Theseus’s
description is tinged with playful denigration, the inclusion of the “poet” within the
ranks of the other “frantic” figures serves to anchor the fancies of the imagination to a
respectable personage (for example, Shakespeare, or any other playwright who
simultaneously identified as a poet) and activity (authorship). Moreover, in this speech
the mind is seen to interact with and extrapolate from the material world: the poet looks
from heaven to earth and back again for inspiration, while the lover sees “Helen’s
beauty in a brow of Egypt” (5.1.11), imputing to the imagination the same kind of
transformative power that Theseus will shortly suggest is possessed by spectators of the
play, or auditors of any performance.
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Following Theseus’s speech, the Duke and his company are first introduced to
Pyramus and Thisbe by Philostrate’s report, which acts as a prologue in its own right,
and foreshadows in Philostrate’s harsh denunciation of the mechanicals’ efforts the
forthcoming centrality of personal, subjective responses to the play. In reference to the
play, Philostrate comments to Theseus, “it is nothing, nothing in the world / Unless you
can find sport in their intents” (5.1.78-79). The term “sport,” by which perhaps the
critical Philostrate means only a mocking enjoyment of the “hard-handed men,” appears
again, but slightly modulated, when Theseus urges Hippolyta to receive the
performance with kindness. Theseus proclaims that the spectators’ “sport shall be to
take what they [the mechanicals] mistake” (5.1.90), suggesting that to him, the “sport”
involves a serious and respectful effort on the part of those watching, an endeavour
which promises to rectify the “mistakes” of the performance by judging it upon its
efforts rather than its execution. To illustrate his theory of reception, Theseus offers a
personal example. He recalls a fearful clerk whose well-intentioned and rehearsed
greeting to Theseus falls flat, but whose failure to perform his speech successfully
Theseus does not denounce because it demonstrates “the modesty of fearful duty”
(5.1.101). Out of this botched attempt at expression, Theseus is able to “pick” out a
welcome from the clerk in the same way that he now urges his wife to utilize her own
faculties to supplement the anticipated “wretchedness” (her word) of the forthcoming
play. What Theseus advises is no less than an intangible, yet profoundly important,
transformation of the play at the level of imagination. When he promises Hippolyta that
she will not witness in the performance what she calls “wretchedness o’ercharg’d, / And
duty in his service perishing” (5.1.85-86) he proposes she change the way she sees, and
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thus what she sees; his assurance that she “shall see no such thing” repositions the
play’s representations within an interpretive space that he argues can be significantly
manipulated by the spectator’s “shaping fantasies.”
In response to Hippolyta’s dissatisfaction with the mechanicals’ performance,
Theseus asserts that “the best in this kind are but shadows, and the worst are no worse,
if imagination amend them” (5.1.208-9). Hippolyta’s retort, while denigrating the
ability of the performers, inadvertently argues even more powerfully for the
significance of audience engagement: “it must be your imagination then, and not theirs”
(5.1.210), she says to Theseus, to which he responds, “if we imagine no worse of them
than they of themselves, they may pass for excellent men” (5.1.211-12). The
imaginative supplement Theseus proposes surfaces intermittently in verbal interjections
of his that affirm the events and characters intended by the players, aspects of the
performance which are represented in a manner that the other spectators find risible.
Theseus verbally reiterates Wall’s exit (“now is the wall down between the two
neighbours”) and the lion’s and Pyramus’ entrance (“here come two noble beasts in: a
man and a lion”) (5.1.204, 212-13), supplying the remainder of what is left to be desired
by staging and costuming, and performatively affirming his own engagement in the
fictive world of Pyramus and Thisbe. The ostensible inadequacies of the mechanicals’
dramaturgy offer Shakespeare, through the character of Theseus, the opportunity to
develop a model of spectatorship wherein the creative faculties of the human mind may
be seen to supplement the shortcomings of any performance, as is similarly urged by the
Chorus in Henry V.
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In essence, Theseus proposes that spectators meet the actors halfway, so that the
play become a collaboration of materiality (the performance’s mise-en-scène) and
immaterial imagination (the spectators’ ability to subjectively augment what the
mechanicals present). The actor-audience relationship Theseus models suggests that the
play—or, by extension, any dramatic performance—assumes its meaning and effect not
simply onstage, but in a phenomenologically designated space where what one “sees”
or hears is subject to one’s own desires and imaginings. When spectators attend a play
they do not simply watch; they create, perceive and experience the onstage personas
that actors body forth, and they do so in part according to their own judgment. Quince’s
malapropistic prologue, which offers the Duke and the lovers their first chance to
participate in the play’s representations in this active manner, adds further weight to the
idea that spectators contribute to the creation of theatre in a variety of situations. His
well-intentioned yet flawed address only serves its self-satirical effect if recognized as
faulty, that is, as incorrectly delivered, and this recognition belongs not to the actors of
Pyramus and Thisbe, but to its audience members, those both within and outside the
fictional frame of A Midsummer Night’s Dream. As the responses of Theseus,
Lysander, and Hippolyta indicate, Quince’s oratorical errors are recognized for what
they are, and his speech is not taken at face value; although they deride Quince’s
delivery, the listeners show they know that the players do not truly “come but in
despite” and “offend” with their “good will” (5.1.108-12) as Quince unintentionally
suggests. In the verbal articulation of this recognition, these spectators demonstrate
their active involvement in the play’s signification, as they mentally “copy-edit” (the
term is Bruster and Weimann’s) and reconstruct in their minds what should have been
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the correctly executed speech. Their unoffended (although critical) reactions to
Quince’s statements demonstrate that Theseus and the others see through Quince’s
superficial errors and glimpse his orthographically obfuscated but earnest intentions.
Only by virtue of creatively working back through Quince’s mistakes to a materially
non-existent (because not tangibly present in the play) correct version of the prologue
are they thereby able to recognize that Quince’s “speech was like a tangled chain—
nothing impaired, but all disordered” (5.1.124-25). In effect, Theseus and the other
spectators produce an imagined, but not presented, originary prologue that depends
upon their own faculties and subjective interventions for its existence.
Admittedly, some of Theseus’s peers are not as charitable as he is; as is the case
with The Knight of the Burning Pestle, the attitudes of fictional audience members also
suggest how spectators might interfere with or ruin a play, and so it may be that in
comparison to some members of the Quince’s audience, Shakespeare’s own audience is
expected to respond “with a difference” (Bruster and Weimann 48, emphasis in
original). However, what I would like to stress is that Theseus and his peers at least
encourage their offstage counterparts (Shakespeare’s audience at large) to likewise
recognize what elements of the mechanicals’ performance have become disordered and
how. In recognizing unintentional disorder—both in Quince’s prologue and in the
mechanicals’ bumbling execution of their play—these two audiences also demonstrate
some understanding of an underlying, ordered meaning which may be “impaired” but
not inaccessible. With their own good will, spectators like Theseus are capable of reordering in their minds the material representations of the stage, actively contributing to
what these representations come to mean, and how.
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The mispunctuated prologue echoes, albeit on a smaller, linguistic scale, what I
have argued is the “negative example” strategy Shakespeare uses to suggest how his
own spectators can reasonably be expected to engage with theatrical conventions of the
time. The prologue provides the “wrong” model (the “tangled chain” of Quince’s
delivery) in order to suggest what might be the right one (the copy-edited speech to
which the spectators in the play allude). While Quince misreads his prologue, his
fellow actors also misread their audience on a larger scale, and yet both misreadings are
accompanied by an implied or imagined “correct” mode of address. If Shakespeare
presents his audience with a tangled chain, he also suggests how this chain may be reordered, both in gesturing towards an imaginatively corrected (but not realized) version
of Quince’s speech, and in promoting a model of actor-audience relations based on a
mutual understanding of spectatorial engagement, rather than the actor-audience
dynamic the mechanicals clumsily create. While also establishing a
microcosm/macrocosm relationship between the performance of the play within a play,
and the larger performance of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, both deployments of the
“photo-negative” approach achieve the same effect of suggesting the centrality of
audience engagement in dramatic significations. Quince’s prologue “demands
attentiveness” (Bruster and Weimann 47) from the audience, who Shakespeare expects
will repunctuate the speech correctly in their heads in order to get the joke, and the
mechanicals’ play as a whole reaches beyond its fictional frame to propose a
collaboration between early modern spectators and players, one which the performance
of Pyramus and Thisbe falls short of for the most part. In “amending” (as Theseus puts
it) or editorially emending the materiality of stage signification with their imaginations,
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Shakespeare’s fictional and theatrical audience members become integral collaborators
in dramatic performances and their meanings.
As suggested by both Henry V and A Midsummer Night’s Dream, early modern
drama expects that its spectators are capable of engaging their creative mental faculties,
and supplementing the players’ efforts to create meanings that are only partially bodied
forth by the material representations of the stage. If Shakespeare stresses the
supplementary abilities of the human imagination in his projected, or desired, audience
members, other dramatists similarly characterize their audiences in terms of mental
participation and imaginative engagement. This understanding of the supplementary
ability of spectator perception, and the emphasis on how performance seems in the
minds of those present will be crucial to the way I analyze audience response to stage
bodies and stage space in the forthcoming chapters. Although not specifically dealing
with the body, a contemporaneous play, George Peele’s The Old Wives Tale (printed
1595), provides further evidence of the idea that spectators participate in theatrical
meaning-making, and thus possess authority when it comes to how staged corporealities
signify. Peele’s play employs a metatheatrical device reminiscent of A Midsummer
Night’s Dream’s play within a play, using a fictional audience and performance within
the frame of the play to take up issues of audience response and involvement which
extend to and implicate Peele’s playgoers.
The eponymous wife of Peele’s play is Madge, who, in the presence of wayward
guests her husband has rescued from the forest, narrates a fantastical story during the
course of which her characters materialize and enter her cottage to perform her
narrative. The tale with a life of its own creates an unintentional play within a play,
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whose content and performance context provide the viewers of Peele’s own tale with
the opportunity to metatheatrically muse upon their own engagements with fictional
representations. That Madge’s listeners are named Franticke, meaning “having a lively
imagination” (Viguers 220) and Frolicke, connoting fun and merriment (OED adj. 1.a),
seems appropriate to a play that characterizes spectators of drama as active, and integral
to the creation of illusion. Early on, Franticke and Frolicke self-identify as members of
Madge’s audience, situating her narrative within the realm of performance rather than
textuality, and establishing a link between the play’s fictional audience and the larger
audience outside the fictional frame. In addition to Franticke and Frolicke’s active
identification as spectators of Madge’s story, they agree to “say hum and ha” (B1v)
intermittently throughout Madge’s narration (her stipulation), to demonstrate and
continuously confirm their conscious participation in her oral performance. When
Madge recedes into the background as narrator, letting her own tale go around “without
a fidling stick” (B4r), her audience members, who have now become spectators of a
fully dramatized performance, continue to interject and comment upon the action,
displaying their adherence to the original “hum and ha” agreement. Peele’s fictional
audience members thereby model a mode of participatory spectatorship that abides by a
mutually agreed upon creator-spectator contract, one whose largely sympathetic
portrayal in the play encourages Peele’s own audience to positively consider a similarly
congenial and collaborative relationship to the drama they are witnessing.
In general, Peele affirms the centrality of spectator participation in drama
through the characters of Franticke and Frolicke, but, like Shakespeare, he also affirms
the audience’s role in perceptually responding to the representations aimed at by
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theatre’s material phenomena. Peele does so by creating resonances between the outer
frame of the play and the interior realm of Madge’s tale. In “The Hearth and the Cell:
Art in The Old Wives Tale” (1981), Susan Viguers explores the parallels between
Madge (also a magician or conjurer, etymologically suggested by “mage”) and Madge’s
character Sacrapant, noting each creator’s lack of total control over his or her creations.
Part and parcel of this lack of creative sovereignty is both characters’ dependence upon
the active presence and perception of others, meaning that the creation itself, whether
Madge’s tale or Sacrapant’s magic, does not function autonomously, but rather
proceeds successfully only by means of striking up an interdependent relationship with
(an)other. Madge’s characters materialize in her presence and influence or determine
the details of her narrative, and the power she relinquishes to their interventions is
matched by her expressed dependence upon her audience. Of course, Madge retains a
modicum of control over her tale and its reception, at one point warning Frolicke and
Franticke, “either heare my tale, or kisse my taile” (B1v) in response to their
overzealous and interruptive commentary. However, her reliance on the presence of an
attentive auditor is suggested by her ultimatum that the tale cannot proceed without a
“hearer”; Frolicke and Franticke must listen, or the act of storytelling is rendered moot.
Similarly, Sacrapant’s magical art loses its potency once Eumenides is rendered blind
and deaf by Jack, and is thus no longer a participant in or spectator of Sacrapant’s
illusions. Jack defeats Sacrapant and shatters his spell by robbing him of a seeing,
hearing audience, suggesting his creative power ultimately hinges upon the perceptual
engagement of others. Viguers asserts that “as creators of illusion, both Sacrapant and
Madge demand or even depend on audience perception and response […] Sacrapant’s
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art is, in fact, so completely dependent on his audience that a lack of response can
destroy him […] Madge’s art similarly requires her audience” (213). Illuminating
further parallels between the “inner” and “outer” plays, Viguers persuasively connects
the illusions of sorcery (Sacrapant’s) with those of dramatic representation (Madge’s),
demonstrating the play’s double stress on the centrality of audience in the success or
failure of fictional or illusive creations.
Since Sacrapant’s illusions are expressly characterized as evil, however, Peele
must also importantly guard against a total assimilation of Sacrapant’s art to Madge’s,
for the reason that Madge also doubles as a figure for the playwright, and her tale as a
kind of playtext. To unreservedly ally Sacrapant’s evil conjurings with Madge’s
dramatized representations would be to invoke the terms of anti-theatrical discourse
whereby performed plays are seen as “sinful, heathenish, lewd, ungodly spectacles and
most pernicious corruption,” possessing, like Sacrapant, the ability to “empoyson,
endanger, and depraue the Auditors” (Prynne 70). While anti-theatrical attacks upon
the early modern theatre were fueled by many concerns, key among these was a
discomfort regarding the nature of reality versus illusion, and the potential dangers of
representation. Appropriately, these issues are those by which Peele chooses to
differentiate Sacrapant’s art from Madge’s. As Viguers notes, despite their similarities,
there also exists a significant difference between the two creators: Sacrapant’s art
depends on deception, the utter conflation of illusion with reality, whereas Madge’s tale
is self-reflexively illusionistic, aware of its own status as a fictive creation, despite the
reification of its characters in Madge’s own dimension. In fact, the manifest appearance
of Madge’s characters explicitly plays with the way in which text (Madge’s narration)
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becomes performance, suggesting we might think of Madge’s tale as a kind of playtext
providing a blueprint for performance. The immediate transformation of her story into
performance, and the conflation of Madge’s story world with her own, does not so
much suggest that in Peele’s play fiction is reality, as it highlights the means by which
fiction can come to be perceived as an alternate reality for a period of time.
This idea will have significant ramifications for the kind of audience response I
theorize in the following chapters, where I argue that spectators’ understanding of the
body’s capabilities and limits can be temporarily revolutionized by the alternate
versions of reality theatre instantiates. Acknowledging the way actual realms translate
themselves into virtual realities as theatre comes to life, Madge’s tale dramatizes drama
itself, in the sense that her “play” comments upon exactly what Sacrapant’s art seeks to
conceal: the creation of illusion itself. It is my own contention that in this willingness
to allow the process of representation a place within the representation itself, Madge’s
creative aesthetic aligns itself with that of the Renaissance stage in several ways. As
many dramatists of the time do, Madge openly acknowledges, bargains with, and
depends upon her audience because she does not seek to produce an unfractured veneer
of illusion, as Sacrapant does. Sacrapant “pretends his art is not a fiction” (Viguers
221) whereas, like Madge, Renaissance dramaturgy and performance consistently
reminds its spectators of its own status as a creative representation. As Shakespeare and
Peele demonstrate, this dramatic aesthetic enjoins the imaginative engagement of
audience members who offer to bring to life the illusions of a stage that nevertheless
refuses to forget its status as unworthy scaffold, or as the vehicle of fictional tales.
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Madge’s and Sacrapant’s two different approaches to creative artifice, which are
contradistinctively defined by whether each creator attempts to recognize or disguise
fictions and illusions, encourage Peele’s audience members to identify more closely
with Madge’s audience. Like Madge’s audience, who witness the process by which a
narrative becomes a performance, early modern spectators are put in a deliberately
knowing position with relation to theatrical illusion. Capitalizing upon this aspect of
early modern theatrical aesthetic, Peele constructs a further affinity between his own
audience members and Madge’s by affording both a privileged relation to Sacrapant’s
art: they are not within his illusory world and totally subject to it like Eumenides, but
are rather objectively distanced from it through various layers of fictional framing.
Consequently, Peele’s playgoers can acutely perceive their own role as auditors,
because they see themselves modeled in Franticke and Frolicke, with whom they share
similarities, and because like their fictional counterparts, they have the ability to see
Sacrapant’s art for the deception it is. This identification with Madge’s listeners is
made possible both because Madge is portrayed sympathetically in opposition to
Sacrapant, and because the non-illusionistic aesthetic of her tale is closer to that of
Peele’s stage.
Even if the early modern spectators of The Old Wives Tale did not
wholeheartedly embrace the roles the play imagined and projected for them, they were
encouraged at least to become aware of the different modes of fictional creation and
performance that Peele’s play models. The framing device thus first of all allows Peele
to characterize his own audience as responsive contributors who are indispensable to
performance, by suggesting an affinity between Madge’s performance aesthetic and his
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own culture’s, and thus between the two audiences. Furthermore, the negotiation
between Sacrapant’s and Madge’s differing relationships to their creations, particularly
in terms of how their craft depends upon the active presence and perception of others,
also affords Peele the opportunity to immediately encourage his spectators to be
responsive in determining their own relationship to the (performed) art and fictional
illusions of the play as a whole. Finally, the stylistic diversity of the play, drawing upon
folktale, romance, folk ritual, and farce (Marx 118), calls for an additional level of
intellectual engagement with the multiple modes of representation Peele moves through.
The homologies between the two fictional worlds, and the mixing of genres within the
play, mobilize metatheatrical reflection upon the nature of illusion, artistic creation (if
we follow Viguers in seeing Sacrapant’s magic as art), and the participatory role of
those implicated in such conjurings. The play’s resulting complexity encourages early
modern spectators’ participation in, if not allegiance to, Peele’s exploration of audience
response.
While Peele indirectly addresses his audience via a removed setting infused with
magical elements, other dramatists directly engage with the specific theatre audiences of
their time by bringing contemporaneous people and places into the compass of their
dramatic worlds. Such is the case with Francis Beaumont’s The Knight of the Burning
Pestle (1613) and John Marston’s The Malcontent (1604). Both plays portray
fictionalized or historically recognizable audience members who suggestively represent
the playgoers of their time, more directly enfolding early modern spectators within the
performance world of the play than in Shakespeare and Peele. I conclude my analysis
with these two plays because they suggest not only that dramatists keenly recognized
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their spectators’ contributions to performance, but that many spectators did the same.
The plays give us good warrant to believe early modern spectators responded to or
internalized as part of their playgoing identities and experiences the kind of interpretive
agency Shakespeare and Peele attribute to their audiences—even to a degree that could
present itself as problematically intrusive. And yet it is precisely this portrayal of the
contestatory side of stage-spectator relationships which also provides a counterbalance
to the Shakespearean model of congenial audiences willing to imaginatively amend a
play’s performance, thus rendering in fuller detail the spectrum of potential audience
responses to the drama. These plays balance out the idealism of Theseus’s approach to
spectator-actor relations, by demonstrating the potential for disruptive intervention on
the part of playgoers. Peele’s play partly gestures towards such potential, in making the
verbal interjections of fictional spectators desirable only to a point, after which the
performance’s authorizing figure (the playwright-like Madge) retaliates to recalibrate
the power dynamic between spectator and performance/performer. In Beaumont and
Marston, the spectators presume to know more about a performance than the actors
themselves, and physically impinge upon the stage space, while also laying claim to a
confident, self-authorized knowledge concerning the play’s aesthetic and artistic value.
By highlighting spectators’ manipulation of stage business, Marston and Beaumont
indicate the degree to which spectators’ contributions to the fictional world and its
contents matter. The outspoken spectatorial intervention in these two plays acts as a
hyperbolized metaphor for the less obtrusive kind of imaginative amendment
Shakespeare attributed to his audiences, further substantiating my claim that playgoers’
manipulations of the fictional world (whether voiced or not) help to define the objects
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and bodies that plays offer up for interpretation. The kind of spectators depicted in
these two plays are insistent upon forging a place for themselves in the drama, both
literally and creatively, and although unsolicited, their interventions result in what I
argue is a productive dissonance between players and playgoers—one which endows
the spectator with an inalienable power to shape the playtext’s performance and
meaning.
In Beaumont’s play, written for the Blackfriars theatre (see Hattaway ix),
historically inspired spectators, tellingly named Citizen, and Citizen’s Wife, hijack a
play about a London merchant by demanding the players present something “notably in
honour of the commons of the city” (Induction 26). The Citizens forcefully insist that
their man Rafe—a putative spectator turned player—depict a grocer who “shall do
admirable things” (Induction 34-35), and for the remainder of Beaumont’s text, Rafe’s
attempts at lofty exploits are forcibly spliced into the fabric of the play that was
originally to be presented. The Induction to The Malcontent, a play intended for
Blackfriars but later transferred to the Globe (see Cathcart 43-44), casts two members of
the King’s Men company (William Sly and John Sinklo) as spectators who sit on the
stage, and three others (Richard Burbage, John Lowin, and Henry Condell, playing
themselves) as actors about to perform the play6. The interactions between Sly and the
players draw upon the custom of stage seating in indoor theatres like the Blackfriars to
suggest how such a theatrical environment granted authority to its patrons. Not only
does Sly occupy the players’ stage space without invitation, he claims to possess an
6

Q3 (1604) of The Malcontent is the only version which features the Induction, and it attributes
authorship of newly added material (comprising the Induction and eleven new sections of dialogue) to
both Marston and John Webster. Charles Cathcart argues that “a certain consensus has been reached”
which posits Webster as the author of the Induction (43). Because the issue of authorship is not directly
relevant to my claims here, I continue to refer solely to Marston for simplicity’s sake.

64
authoritative familiarity with the play that gives him the right to advise the players on
its execution: “I am one that hath seene this play often, & can give them [the players]
intellegence for their action” (Induction 9). More than using their imaginations to
amend the performances they witness, the spectators in Beaumont’s and Marston’s
plays use their voices and bodies to materially intrude upon stage traffic, claiming for
themselves the authority to contribute to and shape the nature of the plays they attend.
As I intend to show, however, the tensions between spectators and players commented
upon in these fictional frames continue to affirm the seminal contributions of playgoers,
and the validity of their subjective experiences in bringing dramatic texts to life,
establishing a model of spectatorship that I will argue holds true for the experience of
bodies in pain as well.
As ostensible intruders into the plays they have come to see, the fictionalized
spectators in Beaumont and Marston seem to transgress the limits of desired spectatorial
participation of the kind depicted in Henry V. It is clearly suggested that both Sly and
the Citizens have taken their influence as spectators too far. Yet I would argue that this
transgression does not totally condemn participatory spectatorship, but rather
acknowledges its centrality to playhouse environments, and its contribution to the plays
of the time, even if this contribution is constituted by dissonance or by a redistribution
of power between players and audiences. Admittedly, there are other factors that
influence the depiction of playgoers in these two plays. The critique of overzealous or
unwanted audience involvement is informed by larger satirical aims which target the
very audiences and circumstances of production that form a salient part of early modern
playgoing (although The Malcontent does not extend its framing device beyond the
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play’s Induction, and is less satirical than it is jocular in its allusions to playhouse
practices). The Malcontent facetiously references the commercial rivalry between adult
and boy companies and between different theatrical venues (Rasmussen 546), while The
Knight of the Burning Pestle alludes critically to the repertory of the Blackfriars theatre,
which Beaumont’s Citizen seems to find displeasing for its continued “girds at citizens”
(Induction 8). Nevertheless, I argue that the metatheatrical elements in both plays
provide important information concerning historical theatre practices, and especially
relevant to the present discussion is how the dramatic representation of early modern
actor-audience relations suggests an interdependence between the drama and its early
modern spectators, one wherein collaboration is produced through conflict or
difference. Although satirical, the depiction of audience behaviour and its relation to
playhouse dynamics demonstrates the tangible way in which early modern spectators
could have an effect upon the contents of the plays they attended, and could occupy a
position of empowering authority, however fleeting or tenuous.
According to Michael Hattaway, The Knight of the Burning Pestle draws in part
on the tradition of “revels”—a “hybrid category” of performance associated with
seasonal or carnival festivities where spectators took part in festive games, and where
drama was also imbued with the celebratory atmosphere associated with folk revelry,
seasonal entertainments, and the figure of the Lord of Misrule (xvii). Hattaway notes
that in the revels context, spectators are almost on equal footing with the players
themselves, and are expected to “take pleasure in and share the theatrical sports” (xiii),
a role that George and Nell take to the extreme. In light of such traditions, it would be
reductive to interpret George and Nell simply as ill-mannered, self-entitled spectators
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whose tastes and behaviour are the target of wholesale censure and satire on the part of
Beaumont. Rather, the revels traditions upon which they draw in their directions to
Rafe validate the model of the active spectator, and suggest that there may be a
cooperative pleasure to be derived from audience participation. Although the fictional
players object to George and Nell’s interruptions, the Prologue demonstrates a sustained
patience with the Citizens’ requests to change the play, continuing to address the unruly
spectators in a tone not far from that adopted by the Chorus in Henry V. Calling upon
George’s “sweet favour” and “understanding” nature (Induction 15, 24), the Prologue in
effect enters into negotiations with George and his wife as to the content and nature of
their desired play, providing both objections and suggestions in response to the
Citizens’ belligerent requests. In one instance, this relationship is markedly
collaborative: when the Prologue asks George to name his newly inspired play, his
proposed title, The Grocer’s Honour, is passed over with everyone’s agreement in
favour of the Prologue’s suggestion, The Knight of the Burning Pestle (Induction 9195). That this is also the title Beaumont adopts for the larger play speaks to the
collaborative aesthetic that informs the whole drama; The Knight of the Burning Pestle
is not just George and Nell’s play; it is Beaumont’s play as well. In this larger sense,
Beaumont’s The Knight of the Burning Pestle is a marriage of two plays whose crosspurposes form a dialectic between differing theatrical aesthetics, and whose
contestatory union is the structural and semantic heart of the play early modern
audiences experienced as a totality. Read in light of Shakespeare’s more congenial
portrayal of actor-audience relationships, Beaumont’s hybrid play brings into sharp
focus the range of negotiations which could occur between early modern players and
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spectators. Despite its satirical edge, however, and despite the fact that George and Nell
effectively ruin the play they had come to see, Beaumont’s representation of engaged
spectatorship affirms the mutual dependency of stage and spectator in the production of
dramatic performances and their significations, regardless of whether or not the players
solicit audience involvement. Like Madge’s magically reified tale, The Knight of the
Burning Pestle literalizes a process of representation which is suggestively linked to the
representational parameters of the early modern stage. In Beaumont’s play, that process
is the reciprocal negotiations between a particular audience’s subjectivity—its desires,
motivations, and interpretive tendencies—and the dramatic offerings of a particular
stage, neither of which possesses complete authority over the effects of a theatrical
event.
In an important sense, however, The Knight of the Burning Pestle tempers its
portrayal of dissonant but collaborative audience-stage relations by attributing to Nell
and George spectator responses that the text clearly indicates are fallible and misguided.
The play indicates that the Citizens’ distasteful and indecorous interventions and their
responses to characterization and plot are to be seen as foolish. In passing, Hattaway
notes that the play “recreates us as an audience” and “makes us aware of our roles”
(xix), an effect I would argue Beaumont generates by encouraging audience members to
define themselves in contradistinction to the satirized Citizens. While I agree with
Bevington and Hattaway that Beaumont’s satire extends beyond the citizen class (see
Bevington 1072-73 and Hattaway, x, xix), so that the tastes and tendencies of “high”
culture are also the subject of “girds,” in several key ways the Citizens’ reactions stand
out as a focal point against which audience members are encouraged to identify.
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Beaumont is able to suggest what should be his audience’s reaction to the play George
and Nell watch, by making the Citizens into what Bevington calls the “antichorus”
(1070). In other words, many of George and Nell’s reactions to the play they witness
are depicted as the inverse of expected, conventional audience responses. For example,
Beaumont draws upon tradition in casting Venturewell as a “blocking figure” (the
controlling father) and Humphrey as the undesirable arranged suitor—both identifiable
types whose generic function should render them largely unsympathetic characters for
early modern audiences, especially in comparison to the young, thwarted lovers, Jasper
and Luce. The Citizen and his wife, however, side with Humphrey (see 1.200-205, and
2.8-15) and condemn Jasper and Luce as “infidels,” directing their sympathies against
the grain of convention. By drawing upon recognizable character types in The London
Merchant, and showing the Citizens’ unconventional sympathies to be misdirected,
Beaumont implicitly endorses a particular kind of audience response—one which is
defined in contrast to that of George and Nell.
It would seem, then, that in encouraging his spectators to reject the mode of
response exemplified by the citizens, Beaumont makes it less likely that these same
spectators would feel encouraged to adopt any aspects of George and Nell’s behaviour,
which is in general predicated upon an all too forceful engagement with performance.
Yet in his satirical critique of such engagement, Beaumont nevertheless persuasively
appeals to his audience members to involve themselves in the tangled authorities and
episodes of the two conflated plays. If Beaumont conditions his audience to distance
themselves from the active mode of spectatorship represented by the Citizens, in doing
so he nonetheless invites another kind of active response from his spectators: the
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resolution not to be hyperbolically involved like the Citizens. In addition to their illmannered interruptions and inverted sympathies, on occasion Nell and George engage
with the play in a nonsensical way—i.e. they mistake plot events for real happenings—
encouraging Beaumont’s audience to be attentive and aware of their own engagements:
to be involved, but also to judiciously delimit that involvement. Oddly enough for
audience members who tamper with the fictional boundaries of drama, George and Nell
at times evince a hyperbolic suspension of disbelief in that they forget that the action
unfolding onstage is scripted, or feigned. Out of genuine concern for Rafe’s well-being
they pay his tavern bill and seem elsewhere to want to jump into the action to break up
potential tussles, which they fail to perceive as performed acts with a representational
valence. It might therefore be argued that the Citizens are Henry V’s desired audience
gone wrong; they “work” their imaginations so forcefully that they lose sight of the
difference between Rafe the character and Rafe the actor, between what is story and
what is not. On the other hand, perhaps this means they do not imagine enough, since
they seem to take the stage action (and those it involves) literally. In either case, the
Citizens’ ill-advised use of their imaginations forms part of a model of injudicious
spectatorship which serves as a negative example for Beaumont’s spectators, whose
resulting assessment of their own responses is thereby central to the total effect of The
Knight of the Burning Pestle. In critiquing transgressive audience involvement through
his fictional audience members, Beaumont nevertheless ironically asks for a certain
degree of involvement from his own audience members. The intellectual and selfreflexive responses of Beaumont’s spectators, as encouraged by the spectators they in
turn watch, help to realize the play’s ultimate commentary upon audience-stage
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relations, and locate the significance of this commentary not only in the satire which
transpires onstage, but also in the subjectivities of those responding to this satire.
As critics have noted, dramatized spectatorial interventions in Beaumont’s play
expand the theatrical “playing space beyond the on-stage stools for the gallants out to
the auditorium and the audience themselves” (Hattaway xii), an effect generated by The
Malcontent’s Induction as well. However, as George and Nell pry open the fictional
boundaries of the intended play about a London merchant to splice in a narrative of
their own desire, they do more than simply become performers in kind with the players
onstage. In their occupation of the enlarged playing space, Beaumont’s Citizens claim
authoritative status for the early modern spectators they shadow, becoming part authors
and creators of dramatic performance, like Peele’s Madge. Although brief, Marston’s
Induction similarly features a spectator with the ability to amend and participate in stage
representation, using the historical persona of actor William Sly to impersonate an
audience member who confidently inserts himself into the onstage performance space.
Both plays challenge the notion that theatrical space and dramatic performance are the
sole purview of the early modern acting companies. Instead, onstage and offstage
spaces are shown to be fields of shared authority, where negotiations occur between
players and spectators, an identity distinction which in itself becomes unstable as actors
portray audience members and vice versa. The elasticity of the fictional frame and the
performance apparatus in both plays enacts on a material level within the world of the
play what Shakespeare’s Theseus proposes might occur in the spectator’s mind: a
dialogic and collaborative relationship between actor and spectator, between stage and
audience. The fictionalized negotiations Beaumont and Marston depict in turn
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anticipate and depend upon spectators whose awareness of themselves and the
performance form a constituent part of the play’s meaningful enactment. More than
simply acknowledging the specific experiences of their audiences, Shakespeare, Peele,
Beaumont, and Marston reproduce the subjective, experiential register of playgoing
within the confines of the drama itself, simultaneously playing upon and taking
seriously the desires, interpretations, and imaginations of their early modern spectators.
I have closely explored these dramatists’ engagements with, and of their audiences to
demonstrate the importance of audience participation to early modern drama in general,
and have argued for the indispensable contributions of spectators who engage their
imaginations and intellects in multiple ways to bring significance to performed acts and
performing bodies.
The most forceful and analytically-rich examples of the engaged role early
modern dramatists ascribed to their audiences are not to be found in enactments of the
body’s destruction or desecration, but on the other hand the internal evidence from
plays suggests that regardless of the represented subject matter, spectators are
continually immersed in a mental (re)construction of what is transpiring onstage.
Metatheatrical examples from plays of the early modern era support the notion that
spectators are easily capable of “executing the slip in perception from the fictional
world to the actual world” (Stephenson, “Meta-enunciative Properties” 118), and in
both non-violent and violent dramatic contexts, early modern spectators are encouraged
to move between immersion in the drama’s fictions and cognizance of the theatrical,
performative nature of physically enacted fiction. The dual spectatorial stance is more
subtly acknowledged and activated by events surrounding the body’s violation than it is
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in those scenes and moments that have featured more prominently in criticism, and so I
have returned to some of those pivotal audience engagements in this chapter (and to
some that have received less attention) to provide a segue into the corporeal territory
that has not yet been covered in studies of early modern metatheatre and audience
response. Whether wholly immersing themselves in the stage-as-world or casting a
critical eye upon how the stage becomes such a world, early modern spectators are seen
as vital participants in dramatic representation, and their first-hand perceptual
experiences of the stage are no less important in helping to bring forth violent
representations than they are to the more explicitly audience-centered examples I have
covered in this chapter. In arguing that early modern dramatists and spectators mutually
recognized and validated the subjective experience of spectatorship, I have sought to
preface a question about dramatized violence which the remainder of my study seeks to
address: if performances mobilized important, sometimes powerful psychic
engagements with represented acts, what was the nature of responses when spectators
were confronted by horrific or visceral bodily violence? If Shakespeare and his peers
enjoined his audiences to imaginatively amend the performances they watched, what
would be the nature of their participation in a performance of Titus Andronicus, for
example? In Peele’s The Battle of Alcazar, or in Beaumont’s The Maid’s Tragedy? In
what way did violent plays such as these call upon spectators to collaborate in their
corporeal significations, and in what ways might early modern audiences have
responded to this call?

73

2

Double Images: Phenomenological Duality in the Early

Modern Theatre

“Even when attention is directly called to the stage-as-stage, stage-as-fictional world
still remains. In such moments the audience experiences a double image.”
—Bernard Beckerman (1962)

How early modern spectators were encouraged by the plays of their time to see
the “double-faceted” (Beckerman, Theatrical Presentation 101) nature of the theatrical
body’s capabilities is the focus of this chapter. As has been suggested by the previous
chapter, a defining characteristic of early modern theatrical technique was its
willingness to deal openly with aspects of the theatre experience that cannot be strictly
confined within the ambit of the drama’s fictional world: spectators, stages, actors,
other plays. These metatheatrical reminders of the non-fictional aspects of performance
ask audience members to recognize that their experiences in the theatre are structured
by two co-existent realms (the presentational and the representational) that are blended
by perception, imagination, and the psyche. As I will show, this phenomenology of
spectatorship comes to bear upon spectators’ experiences of the body, especially when
the actor/character’s body is pushed to—and past—its conventional limits by way of
corporeal violation. Having established that the audience’s mental constructs are
crucial contributions to the production of the performance’s meaning, I move this
argument forward in the present chapter by defining the double awareness activated by
plays as one which offered spectators a potentially empowering vantage point with
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respect to theatrical embodiment. Plays like Middleton’s The Second Maiden’s Tragedy
(1611), the core play-text I analyze in this chapter, solicit the involvement of the
playgoer’s perceptive capabilities by underscoring the distinction between the ordinary
ontology of the actor’s body and the extraordinary qualities of his character’s body.
Middleton’s play exemplifies the means by which early modern dramatists offered their
audiences the chance to act not only as collaborative participants in performance, but
also as confidant(e)s that could be made privy to the process of theatrical embodiment
itself. By calling upon spectators to engage their imaginative and perceptual faculties,
these dramatists authorize playgoers to assume a privileged position in relation to the
construction of theatrical illusion and its transformations of the body. In short,
playgoers are summoned to participate in defining the capabilities—and limits—of
theatre itself. This position of privilege is enabled by plays that foster in spectators an
awareness of the performing body, and by extension, the performance space, as
double(d)—at once purveyors of represented fictions and embodiments of fiction itself.
I begin this chapter with a short discussion of stage space and then move into a
close reading of The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, which I see as a striking example of the
way in which plays of the early modern period seek to attune their spectators to the
phenomenology of theatre. Specifically, I argue that through the violation of the
body—in this particular case, a corpse—the play dramatizes for its audiences the way
theatre can play with body-space relations. The way fictional bodies and the doubly
constituted bodies that represent them relate to space and time in the theatre oftentimes
promises to provide spectators with an entirely novel experience of embodied spatiality.
The decision to analyze space and the body alongside one another stems from my sense
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that it seems difficult to develop an argument about violated bodies in the theatre
without also attending to the space that surrounds, or, as I argue, brings into being those
bodies. While it is certainly true that, as Albert Cook claims, “the body orients space”
and “space is perceived from the body outward” (554), space is not merely the product,
or, as it is in Cook’s phrasing, the (grammatical) object of the body7. Indeed, the
dialectical partnership between space and the body, a central tenet of important
phenomenological works such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of
Perception (1962), is one that The Second Maiden’s Tragedy highlights, as I argue
below. Because in the following chapter I focus more exclusively on the relationship
between onstage bodies and audience response, I have found it helpful in this chapter to
first account for the spaces in which the performing bodies of actors, and the performed
bodies of characters, come to signify for the audience.
While in this respect, the present chapter looks forward to Chapter Three, it also
draws upon my argument in Chapter One: that early modern dramatists often construct
their audiences as collaborators in an imaginative partnership with actors, wherein
spectator subjectivity joins together with stage business to produce meanings that are
not entirely determined by what is taking place on the stage itself. This partnership
involves “the audience’s agency in creating an affective imaginative space through
which dramatic performance is realized” (Whitney 7), but it also involves the creation
of an imaginative geographical or environmental space. A salient part of the
interpretive “space” dramatists enjoin their spectators to establish with actors is the
locale in which action occurs. In imagining the “unworthy scaffold” posing as “the

7

This reference to Cook’s argument is taken from Weimann’s Author’s Pen and Actor’s Voice (see p.
214), but Weimann cites Cook without the same disagreement I voice here.
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vasty fields of France,” (Henry V Prologue 10, 12) or “fair Verona, where we lay our
scene” (Romeo and Juliet Prologue 2), spectators help to establish the way theatre space
signifies, which is almost always connected to the way performing bodies occupy and
move within that space. With this in mind, my discussion of The Second Maiden’s
Tragedy brings into sharp focus the spaces the actor-character’s body inhabits, and the
dialectical relationship between these spaces and spectator subjectivity.
The work of Beckerman and others I briefly survey below provides an important
conceptual framework to my reading of the play; however, the trajectory of my
argument moves beyond simply identifying the presence of, or possibility for, a double
image effect in the play’s performance. Building on the concept of the spectator’s
double perceptual commitment to both the presentational and representational
dimensions of theatrical performance, I argue that The Second Maiden’s Tragedy does
more than merely activate in its audience members a dual vision of the stage. The
unusual body-space relations depicted in the play suggest a further consequence of the
unique theatrical dynamic Beckerman identifies. They reproduce within the fictional
world of the play the very same dislocative effects generated by the tension between the
“stage-as-stage” and the “stage-as-fictional world” (Beckerman, Shakespeare at the
Globe 66). As I will show, these effects throw into question normative assumptions
about embodied subjectivity and the human body’s relationship to space, and they
mimic theatre’s inherent potential to do the same. The Second Maiden’s Tragedy
dramatizes in miniature the larger capabilities of the theatrical medium and its bodily
transpositions, suggesting “what it is possible to do, theatrically, with what exists”
(States 37).
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Laying the Scene: Space and the Presentation/Representation Distinction
When theorizing theatrical space, theatre historians, performance scholars, and
drama critics have referred to the presentation/representation distinction in varied ways;
however, they have nonetheless agreed that theatre spaces operate on at least two
different, but interlaced, levels. Notable among theories of space and theatre are those
provided by Patrice Pavis, Anne Ubersfeld, Gay McAuley, and Jean Alter. Although
not necessarily isolating theatre’s treatment of the body, many of the multiple
designations these scholars provide for onstage and offstage space are informed by the
sense that theatre space can do two things: it can present (e.g. an actor’s body, a stage)
and represent (e.g. a character, a place). Furthermore, scholars have agreed that the
essential duality of theatrical performances is a structuring force for spectators,
implying that the duality of the actor/character’s body is similarly important. In his
pioneering semiotic study of theatre, Dictionary of the Theatre: Terms, Concepts and
Analysis (translated from French in 1998), Patrice Pavis sums up the properties of stage
space in a way that closely echoes Beckerman’s interpretation of Shakespeare’s stage
almost twenty years prior. Pavis writes, “because it acts like a sign, space oscillates
constantly between tangibly perceptible signifying space and the external signified space
to which the spectator must refer in the abstract in order to enter the fiction (dramatic
space). This essential ambiguity of the theatre space […] gives the spectator a dual
view” (360, emphasis in original). Whether responsible for a “dual view” or a “double
vision,” the presentation/representation distinction has persisted in scholarship in
diverse fields, and has recurred in many approaches to early modern drama. In addition
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to Bernard Beckerman, whose “double image” continues to remain a foundational
touchstone for my discussion, S.L. Bethell, Anthony Dawson, Henk Gras, Michael
Shapiro, and Robert Weimann have influenced my treatment of the way actors’ bodies
signify under the presentation/representation duality characterizing Renaissance stage
dynamics. Like Beckerman, these scholars have all identified ways in which the drama
of the early modern period might generate in spectators a dual consciousness8. These
wide ranging studies of space and the theatre (from the historical to the semiotic) either
explicitly or implicitly characterize onstage space as dynamically doubled, and as
therefore offering the spectator a chance to perceive actors as both themselves and/or as
a product of the playwright’s imagination.
Weimann’s locus/platea argument has been, and continues to be particularly
influential9. He argues that stage action can either buttress the fictional world of the
play (producing a “locus effect”), or emphasize the authority of performance and the
actor (producing a “platea effect”). Rather than methodologically compartmentalizing
these theatrical dynamics as Weimann does, I focus on how both the performed picture
and the process of performance are layered on top of one another for the audience. This

8

Dawson credits William Archer with the first usage of the term “dual consciousness” (Dawson and
Yachnin 20), but to my knowledge, Bethell is the first to use the term in a way that substantially informs
the subsequent works of Shapiro, Dawson, and Gras. (See Bethell’s Shakespeare and the Popular
Dramatic Tradition (1944) and “Shakespeare’s Actors” (1950), and Shapiro’s acknowledgment of his
debt to Bethell in Children of the Revels: The Boy Companies of Shakespeare’s Time and Their Plays.)
Although she doesn’t trace the phrase back to Archer, Erika Lin provides a more extensive, and
somewhat different, genealogy of the evolution of “dual consciousness” in writings on theatre (see
“Performance Practice and Theatrical Privilege: Rethinking Weimann’s Concepts of Locus and Platea,”
p. 296, footnote 30)
9

Weimann borrows his terminology from medieval dramaturgy, wherein the locus referred to a scaffold
in a circular theatre, or a throne or hut on the pageant stage, and the platea referred to the “place,” a
platform-like acting area. When he adapts these terms to the Renaissance stage, Weimann proposes we
(more loosely) interpret the acting area closest to the audience (the “downstage”) as a platea-like space,
and the space which is at a remove from the audience (the “upstage”) as a locus-like space.
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is not to say that Weimann’s work in any way denies that presentational and
representational aspects of performance overlap; in fact, throughout his writing he
intermittently stresses that Shakespearean drama instigates a perpetual “coming to terms
with what (dis)continuity there was between the imaginary world-in-the-play and the
playing-in-the-world of early modern London” (Author’s Pen 12). However, his
analytical interests lead him away from exploring this dis/continuous layering of
presentation and representation as a simultaneous juxtaposition, whereas I make this
idea of superimposition one of my core focuses. While acknowledging the importance
of Weimann’s scholarship, and approaches inspired by his, I structure my analysis
around a different set of issues that can further illuminate the actor-audience dynamic.
Where Weimann engages with ideological issues—whose authority is foregrounded in
any given moment or scene, that of the actor or the character? the performer or the
text?—I pose a phenomenological question: what perceptual effect is activated by the
convergence of actor and character in one body? Of the stage and fictional locale in one
space at once? In the next section, I build upon the notion of dynamic engagement
between the stage and the spectator established in Chapter One by using an extended
close reading of one play to complement the range of playtexts I have already used to
better understand “the lived theatrical experience” (Marshall 95) of early modern
audiences and their engagements with performatively doubled bodies. Having asserted
that a salient component of this experience is the activation of an empowering double
vision on the part of spectators, I now turn to Middleton’s The Second Maiden’s
Tragedy to corroborate my claims.
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“I Am Not Here”: Seeing and Being Double in Middleton’s The Second
Maiden’s Tragedy
Among the critics who use the drama of the period to flesh out the limited
picture of audiences given to us by first hand spectator accounts, a good deal focus
primarily or exclusively on Shakespeare’s plays10. The remainder of this chapter probes
internal evidence from a less often studied play with the aim of complementing the
excellent work of scholars who focus first and foremost upon Shakespeare’s plays and
their audiences. The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, usually now attributed to Thomas
Middleton, provides a concrete instantiation of what I have identified is the insistent
phenomenological duality of the early modern stage. Although the text features
moments of self-reflexivity where actors are given the opportunity to remind audiences
they are watching a play, Middleton also moves beyond the usual world-as-astage/stage-as-the-world brand of early modern metatheatricality. As is characteristic of
contemporaneous plays, through the mouths of secondary characters Bellarius and
Leonela, The Second Maiden’s Tragedy uses the language of performance (“actor,”
“play”) to call attention to the fact that “every show of illusion is a double-faceted
presentation. The actor is himself and simultaneously ‘another’” (Beckerman,
Theatrical Presentation 101). Bellarius and Leonela begin to see themselves as actors
and spectators in a “play” of their own making (in a plan designed to test the Wife’s
fidelity to Anselmus). Their use of performance rhetoric—as in Bellarius’s comment,
“I am an Actor too, and neuer thought on’t” (2125)—metatheatrically acknowledges
10

See, for example, Jean Howard, Shakespeare’s Art of Orchestration: Stage Technique and Audience
Response (1984); Ralph Berry, Shakespeare and the Awareness of the Audience (1985); Michael
Mooney, Shakespeare’s Dramatic Transactions (1990), Thomas Cartelli, Marlowe, Shakespeare, and the
Theatrical Experience (1991); and Michael Shurgot, Stages of Play: Shakespeare’s Theatrical Energies
in Elizabethan Performance (1998).
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that the actors and the stage space they move within are representational vehicles,
encouraging spectators to remain aware of the actor/character’s dual embodiment. As I
have suggested, this bifold awareness on the part of the audience members contributes
not to a stable privileging of either the act of performance or the product of
representation, but produces a privilege nonetheless: spectators are encouraged, indeed
authorized by the playwright and the players, to see double, and to thereby occupy a
position of authority with respect to stage phenomena. With audience focus being
directed to elements within and outside the dramatist’s fiction, the spectator is enabled,
empowered even, by his or her double vision.
However, the play is self-reflexive about its own status as theatrical performance
in typical as well as markedly unusual ways, expanding the repertoire of metatheatrical
devices commonly shared among plays of its time. In exploring these margins of
metatheatricality, I read Middleton’s depiction of his heroine’s ghost, on which I center
my analysis, as a significant departure from depictions of ghosts in other plays
(famously, Hamlet, Macbeth, Richard III, Julius Caesar, The Spanish Tragedy, The
Duchess of Malfi, The Changeling). While ghostly apparitions are common in both the
Shakespearean canon and in the work of Shakespeare’s contemporaries, it is rare for a
ghost to occupy the same stage space as its corpse. In the later chapters of Hamlet in
Purgatory (2001), Stephen Greenblatt provides an incisive analysis of when, where, and
how “ghosts turn up onstage” (Greenblatt 151) in Elizabethan and Jacobean theatre,
focusing largely on Shakespeare’s plays, but establishing the wide variety of ways
ghosts or ghost-like entities can make their presence felt in drama. On the Renaissance
stage, “ghosts make frequent appearances” (152) Greenblatt writes, and yet none of the
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examples Greenblatt cites from either Shakespeare or other dramatists feature the
temporally simultaneous depiction of a ghost and its former bodily form. This rare
pairing occurs in Philip Massinger’s The Duke of Milan (1623), where a female corpse
is rejuvenated with cosmetics so as to appear lifelike (as is the case with Middleton’s
play); however, the simultaneity in Massinger’s play is not spatial, as it is in
Middleton’s. While both Middleton and Massinger keep their female heroines’ corpses
artificially “alive” and present in the narrative, only Middleton’s play requires the ghost
to accompany its body. By appearing onstage alongside her corporeal remainders, the
ghost of the Lady in The Second Maiden’s Tragedy does what most other ghosts on the
early modern stage do not. In addition, even when her ghost appears alone onstage, the
Lady-as-ghost maintains an intense, remarkably perplexing bond with her corpse, a
connection which arises in part from the post-mortem violation of her body. These two
aspects of the play, I will argue, form the nexus of Middleton’s invocation of the
presentation/representation distinction evoked by more conventional forms of
metatheatre.
Although Middleton revitalizes the potential for ghosts to participate in selfconscious theatre by unconventionally depicting the ghost/corpse coupling, ghosts in
drama—and not just early modern ones—harbour the intrinsic capability to speak
to/about elements of theatricality in a number of ways. In his analysis of Old Hamlet’s
ghost, Samuel Weber associates ghosts with theatre by way of a dynamic which
resembles that between actor and audience: “if a ghost is compelled to appear and to
return to the same place, that is also because it requires a particular audience […] the
haunts of ghosts inevitably have a theatrical quality” (182). Although in The Spanish
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Tragedy, the ghost of Andrea does not explicitly rely upon an audience, Kyd endows
Andrea’s ghost with a theatrical quality nonetheless. In an interesting reversal of the
requirement Weber identifies, the ghost of Andrea remains onstage as an auditor
throughout the duration of the play, becoming a metatheatrical synecdoche for Kyd’s
offstage audience. Itself connected to the concept of illusion, a ghost can also invite
reflection upon how drama’s illusions are produced from the theatre’s material
resources, a reflection I argue involves registering the difference between presented and
represented orders of the theatrical experience. A ghost’s presence may spark interest
in the same constellation of ideas or problems that characterize the relationship between
actor and character, or between stage space and imagined place—namely, the likeness
between the material and the immaterial, the tangibly present(ed) and the illusory.
When Horatio, for example, apprehends the ghost of Hamlet’s dead father, he struggles
to understand the relationship between the form he sees before him, and the dead body
it resembles but cannot be: “What art thou that usurp’st this time of night, / Together
with that fair and warlike form / In which the majesty of buried Denmark / Did
sometimes march? by heaven I charge thee, speak!” (1.1.46-49)11. Horatio charges the
ghost to explain itself, because it looks like what it is not, or does not look like that
which it is, producing a troubling indistinction not unlike the instability characterizing
both the actor playing the ghost and the playing space standing in for Denmark12.

11

As Greenblatt argues, witnesses of Hamlet’s father’s apparition know that what they see is not the
actual dead body of the King reanimated by supernatural energy. Greenblatt hypothesizes that they
perceive what early modern demonographer Pierre le Loyer (1550-1634) calls a “phantasmal body.”
Loyer insists that souls cannot re-occupy and bring to life the body, but they can appear in a phantasmal
body to the viewer; men who believe the body is truly (re)materializing are deceived (see Greenblatt
212).
12

There is a linguistically similar moment in Julius Caesar (4.2.329), which I discuss below. As if to
pre-emptively answer the question of identity, the ghost of Andrea in The Spanish Tragedy provides at
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If it is the case that a ghost on the page engages these slippery indeterminacies
for the reader, who is prompted by the way in which characters observing ghosts
interrogate the ontological status of what they see, then a ghost in performance injects
the same interrogation with even more force. If a ghost forces the question “what art
thou?” for characters who are witness to its visual presence (and by extension, for the
reader who encounters this presence in reported, textual form) then so too does the actor
playing the ghost invite serious contemplation of the very same problem. Stanton
Garner writes that “theater ‘stages,’ ‘puts into play’ variables and issues that have
comprised the special province of phenomenological inquiry from its inception:
perception and the constitution of meaning, objects and their appearances, subjectivity
and otherness, presence and absence, body and world” (Bodied Spaces 3). It is
precisely these phenomenological concerns that are highlighted in the way ghosts take
shape both in the fictional world of plays and in their stage incarnations. Or, put
differently, adopting the phenomenological line of inquiry allows us to illuminate the
way ghost characters can function metatheatrically, and can invite reflection upon the
presentational and representational registers of performance. The structuring concepts
of phenomenology enable us to explore how in performance, “what art thou?” is likely
to propose itself not just as a question to be asked of the ghost, but of the actor/character
too.
This is a question intimately linked to human perception, and the way objects
present themselves to the human sensorium as it makes sense of the phenomenal world.
the beginning of the play an eighty-five line narrative of his past life, his journey through the underworld,
and his return to the court of Spain (1.1.1-85). The issue of a ghost’s relationship to the material world,
which has the potential to provoke metatheatrical reflection upon the ontology of the actor/character’s
body, may have provided a precedent for similar explorations in subsequent revenge tragedies (like
Hamlet) that take Kyd’s play as a foundational model.
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When Horatio relegates Old Hamlet’s ghost to the realm of “fantasy” (1.1.21), he
reminds us of the role of human imagination in “shaping fantasies” (the language used
by Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream), whether these fantasies are apparitions, or
actors who present themselves as such onstage. Shakespeare’s use of the same word in
these different contexts suggests that the mental processes Theseus argues can
transform a bush into a bear, or a poor player into the character he attempts to embody,
are also those that can produce the impression of a fantastical spectre in Horatio’s
world13. Moreover, as Theseus implies, these are transformative powers belonging not
just to Shakespearean characters but to their audiences (the claim I make in Chapter
One). Although the mind’s capability to perceptually shape objects and their
environments is celebrated to a certain degree by Theseus, and as I have argued, by
Shakespeare, it is also seen to be potentially dangerous and misleading, the province of
madmen and frenzied poets. The darker side of “shaping fantasies” is what early
modern drama’s ghosts unearth when they present themselves to characters, and to
spectators. When the boundary between that which is fantasized and that which is not
becomes blurry, as it does with the spectral encounter and as it does in the theatre,
“what are thou?” is posed with immediate and complex urgency: “Ha! Who comes
here? / I think it is the weakness of mine eyes / That shapes this monstrous apparition
[…] Art thou any thing? […] Speak to me what thou art,” implores Brutus to the “evil

13

Although Horatio’s initial assessment of the ghost as only a “fantasy” of the other guards is replaced by
his true belief (based on the “sensible and true avouch” of his eyes), Shakespeare has already made clear
that the possibility of ghosts as mere fantasy is one available viewpoint on the matter. With regard to my
point here, it matters little whether the ghost is found to be a genuine apparition; Shakespeare establishes
through Horatio’s initial disbelief the capacity for ghosts to be psychological projections of the mind.
Lady Macbeth also professes the view that ghostly apparitions can be “a false creation / Proceeding from
the heat oppressèd brain” (2.1.38-39) when she compares the dagger Macbeth hallucinates to Banquo’s
ghost.
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spirit” that refuses to identify itself as Caesar’s ghost (Julius Caesar 4.2.326-32). In
these moments, a fictional character’s confrontation with the ontological indeterminacy
of Old Hamlet’s ghost, Caesar’s ghost, and others of their kind, is also the spectator’s
opportunity for reflection upon the phenomenology of theatre and the double status of
performing bodies and their stage environments. Theatrical representations ask the
human imagination to participate in defining theatre’s objects and events by translating
what is presented into what is represented. By probing the relationship between how
and what we see, the ghost encounter in drama persuades audiences to take note of how
theatrical translations involve the spectator’s perception and interpretation—a process
which finds its ghostly analogue within the play itself.
Even if the ghost does not inspire its fictional witnesses (characters) to grapple
with its ontological identity, it may still inspire in performance reflection upon some of
the phenomenological questions Garner cites—namely, the relationship between objects
and their appearances, between the actor and the actor-as-ghost. Stage directions in The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy, for example, tell us at the first appearance of the Lady’s
ghost that “Rich Robinson” (as he is named in the text) enters as the Lady (1928-29),
meaning that in performance a young male actor presents himself onstage and
represents a ghost resembling a female body14. In this moment, and in the other scenes
where Robinson presumably also acted the part of the living Lady, spectators are
brought face to face with the presence of a physical body that introduces itself as
14

In the introduction to the Malone Society reprint of the play (the edition I cite throughout), Greg
attributes the stage direction at line 1928, and other stage directions similarly inserted in a different hand
than the author’s, to a “prompter or playhouse corrector” (Greg x) who “added notes necessarily
originating in the playhouse” (viii). From these we can reasonably infer, as Greg does, that it was
Richard Robinson, a young actor in Shakespeare’s company who played the role of the Lady. Robinson’s
talent at playing female parts was remarkable in his day, according at least to Jonson, whose The Devil is
an Ass (1616) praises “Dick Robinson” for his ingenious ability to impersonate women.
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radically other than what it is. If the transvestite convention calls attention to the
friction between the form the actor’s biological body presents and the form it assumes,
so too does the performance of the ghost, in which the material actorly body butts up
against the ostensibly immaterial ghostly form. Ghosts “raise problems of definition”
(S. Wells 50) in their indeterminate ontological status, and so do actors in their
actor/character blend, especially when there exist perceivable differences between the
actor’s and the character’s physicalities. When actors haunt the stage as ghosts, in the
contrast between the physicality of the body and the (represented) ephemerality of the
ghost, the performance signals, in a self-conscious way, its reliance on the spectator’s
perceptual shaping of the theatrical event. Ghosts, spectators are reminded, can be
sculpted from the same mental resources that give shape to actorly impersonations. By
virtue of its intense link to the theatre’s negotiations between the actual and the virtual,
a staged ghost harbours the intrinsic potential to serve as a metatheatrical device, one
which affords spectators the opportunity to ruminate upon their own involvement in
shaping theatre’s fantasies.
In Ghosts: Death’s Double and the Phenomena of Theatre (2006), Alice Rayner
notes the ghost’s close connection to “theatre and the issue of the double,” writing,
In theatre since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the double has been connected to
discussions of mimesis and imitation: What is original or authentic, what is real,
what is false? What is the image, what is the real ‘thing’? Theatre has fostered
that model of the double through its skill in creating illusions. Indeed the skill in
conjuring the illusions of ghosts has long served to equate ghosts with illusion
and illusion with the stage. (x)
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Greenblatt implies something similar in his reflection upon Shakespeare’s use of ghosts:
“what there is again and again in Shakespeare, far more than in any of his
contemporaries, is a sense that ghosts, real or imagined, are good theater—indeed that
they are good for thinking about theater’s capacity to fashion realities, to call realities
into question” (200). Yet if “Shakespeare seems to have staged ghosts…in a spirit of
self-conscious theatricality” (195), he is not alone in doing so. Having established what
I take to be the metatheatrical energy of conventional hauntings in Renaissance plays, I
now wish to turn to Middleton’s expansion of the boundaries of that convention. In The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy, Middleton capitalizes upon the ghost’s intrinsic
metatheatrical energies and amplifies them by pairing a ghost with her corpse,
extending the metatheatrical resonances of this unusual relationship to the Lady’s
interactions with other characters in the play as well.
Because Middleton unconventionally depicts the Lady’s ghost with her corpse
he is able to simulate and explore in the play the phenomenon of being a divided
persona (two entities instead of one) or being in two places at once, tapping into what
Rayner identifies as a historically persistent triangulation between theatre/theatricality,
ghosts, and doubles. Before explaining the metatheatrical significance of Middleton’s
choice, I need to differentiate between the kind of “doubling” that I will refer to in The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy and the kind that occurs when one actor plays two parts, for
these two scenarios necessitate almost opposite theatrical practices. Until the final
scenes of the play the Lady’s ghost is absent when her corpse is in view onstage, and
vice versa, but their culminating reunion makes it impossible for the same actor to play
both corpse and ghost throughout the play’s performance. Greg surmises that “the point
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of the note at ll.1928-9 (“Enter Ladye Rich Robinson”) seems to be that the spirit of the
Lady was to be played by the same actor as the lady herself, the corpse being
presumably represented by a lay figure” (x). The particulars of staging raised by Greg’s
hypothesis is an issue to be discussed in more detail further on, but the point I would
like to stress at present is that The Second Maiden’s Tragedy in a sense reverses the
traditional meaning of doubling as typically used in discussions of theatrical practice. If
it is the case that the corpse is acted by a human being and not a dummy, which is a
possibility that cannot be ruled out, despite Greg’s supposition, then here two actors
must play what is essentially only one character, the Lady. When I refer to “doubling”
in my analysis I am referring to the splitting of the Lady’s character into ghost and
corpse, or to aspects of the play that relate more generally to the themes of doubleness
and duality. Despite the potential for confusion, I retain this concept of doubling
because it emerges so powerfully within the play, and because it metatheatrically
gestures towards the doubleness of stage representation (as comprised of elements that
both present themselves and represent others) and the duality of possible responses to
such representations.
My reading of The Second Maiden’s Tragedy uses the concepts of spatial duality
and the distinction between performance and representation to argue that the play both
activates and analogizes a spectatorial double vision. When I invoke the concept of
“analogy” I refer to the way in which this double vision—which I have proposed is
fundamental to the early modern spectator’s theatrical experience—is modeled within
the confines of the text itself. The simultaneous presence in the narrative of a ghost and
its corpse (the remainders of the unnamed “Lady”) allows for a range of effects within

90
the play that simulate, or fictionally reproduce, the audience’s perceptually divided
attention. For example, the way the Lady perceives and refers to herself (both her spirit
and her body) after she is dead, and the way others respond to her spirit generate the
impression that she is at once one entity and yet two, both alive and dead; this
impression that she is singular and yet doubled analogizes the paradoxical status of the
actor playing her ghost (and, if Greg is wrong, the actor who perhaps plays her corpse),
and the possible audience responses to this alive-but-dead actor/character dichotomy.
The Lady’s perplexing doubleness calls attention to the presentation/representation
aspect of theatricality, and what the text portrays as her perceptual fracture within the
fictional world operates as a metatheatrical device in performance.
As I will show, The Second Maiden’s Tragedy sets itself apart from other plays
that engage the metatheatricality of ghosts not just by keeping its ghost’s corpse in the
picture, but by problematizing the connection between the ghost and its corporeal
remains. The dramaturgical norm, it seems, is to clearly segregate the ghostly figure
from the body it resembles and once was; Richmond, for example, says of his ghostly
dreams “methought their souls whose bodies Richard murder’d / Came to my tent”
(Richard III 5.5.184, emphasis added). To a degree, Middleton’s play adheres to this
convention in its division of the Lady into a soul and a body that seem to exist
autonomously from each other in certain moments in the text, as in the Tyrant’s reaction
to the Lady’s corpse: “Since thy life has left me / ile claspe the bodie for the spirrit that
dwelt in’t” (1851-52). An early interaction between Govianus and the living Lady
articulates a similar viewpoint. Imprisoned with Govianus, the Lady contemplates
death in order to avoid being “ceazd vpon / and borne wth violence to the tyrants bedd,”
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her body “there forc’st vnto the lust of all his daies” (1279-81). Both she and
Govianus—who responds to her request with, “hast thow no waye to scape em, but in
sowle?” (1266)—plan her suicide under the impression that the soul definitively leaves
the body behind when the body expires. Even the Tyrant, who desperately attempts to
reinvigorate the Lady’s corpse with cosmetic artistry realizes the futility of his pursuits;
in trying to artificially “force” the “lyving fire” back into her pale, cold, deathlike body
(2335, 2325) he can only momentarily convince himself that the corpse has regained
something like an animating spirit (2342). In this respect, although the play’s choice to
have the Lady’s “bodie” appear alongside its “spirrit” in the final scene is unusual in
terms of staging, the text chooses in places to participate in a more conventional
body/soul separation in the way living characters view dead bodies and the afterlives of
their spirits.
However, the play also pushes the boundaries of the convention it partially
heeds by connecting the Lady’s consciousness in its spirit form to that which the spirit
ought to have ostensibly left behind. Middleton attaches his Lady’s ghost to its corpse
via a psychic umbilical cord which causes the Lady at times to refer in the first person
to herself the ghost and herself the body. This residual attachment—the refusal to let
the body go—seems to illustrate the spiritual ramifications of the Tyrant’s
bodysnatching and necrophilia, in and of itself a violation of the body’s right to “sleep
in the graue” after its funeral (2361). While the play seems to partially participate in the
conventional body/spirit division, it does so in order to explore the consequences of
transgressing the ethical and religious practices associated with that norm. Indeed,
Govianus puts a name to the postmortem violation of the body upon which the play
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focuses when early on he threatens Helvetius (the Lady’s father) with a pistol for siding
with the Tyrant: “o hadst thow bin any thinge beside her father / I’de made a fearfull
separation on thee, / I would haue sent thy sowle to a darker prison / then any made of
claye, and thy dead bodie / as a token to the lustfull kinge thy master” (754-58,
emphasis added)15. Beyond simply the fear of death and hell (the “darker prison”),
Govianus’s statement draws its power from the loathsome possibility that the sanctity of
one’s corpse might be disrespected, resulting in a body/spirit division that is to be
feared, not only because the spirit has gone to hell but because the body has been denied
a proper resting place. His hypothetical threat chillingly anticipates the Lady’s
forthcoming “fearfull separation,” which is catalyzed by the fact that the Tyrant
exhumes her dead body and retains it as a fetishized love object, leaving her “sowle”
deeply unsettled. In order to stress the egregiousness of the Tyrant’s transgression,
Middleton makes the Lady’s fearful separation quite literal; her spirit does not entirely
part with its “claye” prison (its bodily container) but remains half-tethered to her body,
and she expresses herself as though she suffers from a disturbed split consciousness. In
performance, the Lady’s split sense of self has the potential to register the violation of
religious and ethical mores even more powerfully than does her split persona in the
play’s text. Onstage, the Lady’s internalization of her violation becomes powerfully
evidenced in visual, embodied form by the two aspects of her fractured identity (ghost
and corpse) that physically appear before the audience—a palpably present reminder of
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The Malone Society edition (the text cited here and throughout) indicates that this passage has been
marked for omission in the original manuscript. Anne Lancashire’s edition of the play (1978) includes
Govianus’s speech, and Julia Briggs prints both the uncut and cut versions alongside each other (in
Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works, 2007).
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the subjective divisiveness the Lady is experiencing and expressing through her
dialogue.
By having the Lady’s character self-identify as both spirit and corpse, both of
which coexist simultaneously in the drama, Middleton is able to play with the
relationship between self, body, and space, with particular metatheatrical resonance.
This theatrically self-conscious process of playing mimetically aligns itself with the
disjunctive aspects of a spectator’s perceptual experience of the theatre. More
specifically, Middleton’s fictional experimentation with the corporeal and spatial
components of perception is able to suggest an affinity between what the divided Lady
experiences in relation to her two incarnations and what the spectator is enjoined to
experience: a frame of mind that perceives a double image instead of a singular one.
Where the Lady’s doubled image is her self-image, which flickers between selfidentifying as her spirit and/or as her corpse, the spectator’s is his or her bisected view
of the stage, oscillating between the dual registers of presentation and representation.
This is not to say that those present in Middleton’s audience are necessarily made to be
consciously aware of themselves as spectators mediating between the two poles of
fiction and actuality (although this is certainly a possibility), but rather that through the
character of the Lady the drama performs a kind of double awareness centered upon two
bodies that are conceptually also one, enacting a process of perceived corporeal
conflation that echoes the way spectators cognitively blend the actor/character’s body16.
This process does not depend upon whether spectators are cognizant of their mental
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For more on cognitive blending as a constituent part of the theatrical experience, see Chapter Two of
Bruce McConachie’s Engaging Audiences: A Cognitive Approach to Spectating in the Theatre (2008). I
am indebted to McConachie’s work for introducing me to the term “cognitive blending,” which is a core
concept in cognitive studies.
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activity or not at any given point in the play; the presentation/representation component
of theatrical performance guarantees that spectators will engage on some level
(consciously or unconsciously) in the process of fusing and unfusing the actor’s
presented body with the character’s represented body. The tension between the Lady’s
one, live human form, and her two dead forms, and between the actor’s one underlying
physical form and his two embodied personas (actor and character) initiates a conflict
between the concepts of twoness and oneness as they relate to embodiment. This
fundamental conceptual tension links what is occurring onstage in the drama with what
is transpiring offstage in the audience’s cognitive engagement with the stage, regardless
of where spectators fall on the spectrum of what has traditionally been termed
suspension of disbelief—that is, regardless of how much they are invested in the story
and its characters, or, conversely, in the process of theatre bringing to life such fictions.
In what follows, I employ a phenomenological approach to argue several linked
claims. I isolate moments in the text that indicate how Middleton’s treatment of the
Lady’s relationship to space and to her own body produces within the drama an effect
of split subjectivity. I continue to argue that this fictional fracture mimics, and further
encourages, the bifold spectator subjectivity encapsulated by Beckerman’s “double
image” statement. I do so by way of analyzing how the Lady’s self-reflexivity, which is
voiced by her ghost and thus seems to emanate from the location in which that ghost
appears, is also intensively mediated by and expressed in relationship to her body, when
it is elsewhere. It is my contention that the play asks us to be attentive to the way
subjectivity is attached to the body, and it does so by insisting upon the strangeness of
the Lady’s partially detached subjectivity; she still perceives herself as a subject with a
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body after that body is long deceased. For this reason, it matters little that the Lady is
dead and thus not exactly the analogue of those who watch the play; without simply
being the spectator’s double, the Lady exhibits a twofold perception of body and space
that runs parallel to the perceptions her audience members are encouraged to adopt.
As if to indicate how the living might internalize and manifest the Lady’s
mentality, the play portrays Govianus as being in sync, if only temporarily, with her
radical view of body-space relations. Reflecting the Lady’s unconventional state of
mind, Govianus greets the Lady’s adorned corpse in the Tyrant’s chambers by noting,
“tis straunge to me / to see thee here at Courte, and gon from hence” (2274-75,
emphasis added). What is so compelling about Govianus’s choice of words is not so
much that he divides the Lady’s body (at court) from her spirit (which he encountered
away from court, emerging from her tomb), but that he directly addresses both the body
in front of him and the spirit which should be absent in one breath. The word “thee”
acts zeugmatically, uttered only once by its speaker but governing both parts of the
sentence (“here at Courte” and “gon from hence”), and thus suggesting the addressee
referred to in “thee” is differently manifest in two places but yet wholly present to
Govianus. He speaks to her body in a manner that implies he sees in this very moment
not just the Lady’s corpse in front of him, but her spirit as well, and the grammatical
logic of his speech paradoxically positions the Lady as simultaneously here and gone.
This strangely doubled but singular presence is characteristic of the way the Lady
perceives her ghostly and bodily selves. When we take note of this strangeness, the
metatheatrical effect comes into full view: bodies in the theatre—that is actors onstage
impersonating other selves, signifying both as one and two—present themselves to their
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witnesses in a way that is strange indeed, providing opportunities for spectators to
experience the perceptual divide dramatized in the Lady’s own situation.
In arguing for this particular metatheatrical effect, I am primarily using The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy as a detailed complement to what I have already argued in
more general terms: that early modern plays tend to promote spectatorial double vision.
I have set up the play as offering internal evidence for my characterization of the
Renaissance stage and its audiences as participants in double-sided theatrical
experiences, but I also see the need to push the argument further. In retrieving the more
nuanced aspects of the Lady’s dramatization—how Middleton bends the ghost figure’s
metatheatrical potential to see it from a new angle— I am proposing some further
consequences of what has already been said about spectatorial double vision. I devote
the remainder of this chapter to exploring how Middleton’s play itself “ghosts” the
theatre’s potential to overturn the way phenomena—specifically, bodies in space—
customarily take shape for the perceiving human subject. Through this action of
“ghosting,” the play reveals what is made possible by a performance medium that
attunes spectators to the partnership between presentation and representation. Offering
a metatheatrical awareness of the stage’s bodily manipulations, the play enables a
theatrically privileged subject position for its spectators to occupy. Although
sometimes departing from typical metatheatrical devices, The Second Maiden’s Tragedy
is an exemplar of the way in which plays both expect and encourage audiences to
become epistemologically empowered. This dynamic process of epistemological
empowerment, I argue, involves bringing spectators closer to “the activity of theatre
making itself out of its essential ingredients: speech, sound, movement, scenery, text”
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(States 1, emphasis in original). What I ultimately propose is more than just the
activation of the spectator’s dual consciousness of the actual playing space juxtaposed
against the fictional, represented locale. As States emphasizes in his phenomenological
approach to analyzing theatre and its effects, being aware of the difference, or gap,
between “pretense and pretender” (States 20) is not quite the same as possessing an
awareness of how the pretense (of characters and fictional spaces) is made in the
theatre. Contained within the dual consciousness The Second Maiden’s Tragedy both
simulates and activates is a suggestion regarding the process of rendering empirical
phenomena into dramatic representations. What can happen inside the theatrical arena,
the play suggests, is a marked change in the relationship between bodies and space.
This change occurs not just in the fictional realm of alternate orders of reality—that is,
in a Denmark where an apparition can appear “in the same figure like the king that’s
dead” (Hamlet 1.1.39), or in a Scotland where buried men can “rise again / With twenty
mortal murders on their crowns” (Macbeth 3.4.79-80). These represented realities do
not merely swallow the performance space whole; they compete with that space, the
materiality of which demands also at times to be recognized in its own right, as a stage,
as an actor. The friction produced by these competing significations is what
Middleton’s ghost illuminates for its viewers.
Although Shakespeare’s plays often appear in the work of critics like Alice
Rayner, Simon Shepherd, Bert O. States, and Samuel Weber, who have drawn upon
phenomenology in analyzing theatre space and the body, the body-space relations in
Middleton’s play also lend themselves particularly well to the issues at stake in these
types of critical discussions. Particularly important to my focus is spatial embodiment
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in the theatre, and the (not necessarily theatrical) interconnectedness of space and
“being” as we perceive it, the latter of which I establish in terms similar to those
Merleau-Ponty uses in his theory of perception. The driving logic behind
phenomenological methodologies affirms what Middleton’s play had already suggested
centuries prior: that one way to understand human existence is in terms of a structural
matrix comprised of space, the body, and perception. Merleau-Ponty, for example,
proposes that the human subject’s consciousness of his or her body is defined by a
corporeal schema, within which the individual’s systematic, bodily relationship to space
is key17. In discussing the concept of a corporeal schema, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes
how space produces the body, and vice versa, creating a chiasmatic and interdynamic
relationship which influences how the subject perceives and exists in the world. His
work, therefore, is important to my argument that the properties of theatrical space can
influence the spectator’s perception of the bodies that occupy that space.
As Alphonso Lingis (Merleau-Ponty’s translator) explains, a corporeal schema
“gives the body to itself as an ‘I can,’ as a system of powers organized according to
transposable schemes for movement” (The Visible and the Invisible liv). In short, the
subject understands its body in terms of a collection of possible movements in space
that link the body to the world around it. Merleau-Ponty himself states the matter more
forcefully: “To be a body, is to be tied to a certain world…our body is not primarily in
space: it is of it” (Phenomenology of Perception 148). In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the
17

The concept of a body schema or body image is not unique to Merleau-Ponty. Henry Head (18611940) and Paul Schilder (1886-1940) are among the early pioneers of the term, and scholars in the fields
of psychoanalysis and phenomenology have continued since the early twentieth century to develop the
concept in significant ways. In Volatile Bodies: Toward A Corporeal Feminism (1994), Elizabeth Grosz
provides a useful chapter-length discussion of the genealogy of the corporeal schema in the work of
Head, Schilder, Freud, and others. (See Chapter Three, “Body Images: Neurophysiology and Corporeal
Mappings.”)
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body is structured, indeed created in a sense, by a spatial matrix that defines our
capabilities for action in any given environment. Simon Shepherd similarly asserts that
“a sense of where and how we are in space plays a part in shaping our identity. As
space is reshaped, the relationship to it changes—there are new points of focus,
different hierarchies between spatial axes and domains, a newly positioned centre” (63).
What Shepherd alludes to, and Merleau-Ponty makes explicit, is the fact that these evershifting spatial domains exist in relation to a body. There can be no human
understanding of space without a body to anchor that understanding, and, conversely,
without space, there can be no body, and no body image. In short, human subjectivity
owes something of its sense of being to its spatio-corporeal location at any given time.
It therefore seems appropriate to ask what might happen to a spectator’s impression of
body-space relations when he or she is confronted by a spatial domain—the theatrical
stage—that performs double duty as site where the presentational and the
representational merge. While this dual quality of theatre space might not necessarily
affect the personal corporeal schemas of spectators (the way they perceive their own
bodies), it most certainly affects the audience’s understanding of how other bodies (as
represented by the actors onstage) can move and exist in space for the duration of the
play. I propose that, just as Middleton’s Lady enacts the seeming paradoxes of seeing
and being in two places at once, the performance of her play harbours the potential to
make the paradoxical possible: to radically reorganize, through the body’s relationship
to space, what the audience may take for granted as the body’s “I can.”
How, then, can we first define what corporeal-spatial relationships might
constitute the “I can” of everyday life? Despite the fact that an individual’s body-space
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positioning is constantly in flux (as Shepherd points out), I would argue that it is
possible to define a set of spatial-corporeal relationships which are thought to be
axiomatic—that is, what might be called the ground rules for human ontology “as we
know it” from everyday, lived experience. These rules comprise what I will call an
ontological “schema,” which I define as a collection of body-space permutations that
are thought to be physically possible or impossible according to the governing logic of
the schema. I do not wish, however, to universalize or transhistoricize “the human
subject” and his or her ontological schema. A historically and contextually specific
starting point, then, might be to consider what kind of ontological schema governs the
use of early modern stage space and the performing bodies that occupy this space. I
would like to suggest that early modern theatrical conventions produce, or adhere to, a
spatial logic which defines itself in opposition to the schema(s) that prevail outside
fictional worlds and performance spaces. How else could Romeo and company “march
about the stage” (1.4. s.d.) 18 and bring the Capulet ball to them, instead of marching to
it?
Alan Dessen uses this example (along with many others) to illustrate the
flexibility of Elizabethan stage space; he notes that “rather than exiting (thereby
signaling a change in locale),” Romeo and the masque attendees stay onstage while
“‘Servingmen come forth with napkins’ (thereby establishing the new locale as the
Capulet house)” (Elizabethan Stage Conventions 86). One of Dessen’s claims earlier in
the book is that Elizabethan dramatic conventions like these require the participation of
audience members who “agree” to meet under certain terms (10-11, 18); as the fluid
staging of the Capulet ball suggests, part of this audience contract includes the
18

As Dessen explains, the original text does not provide a scene division here.
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acceptance of a specifically theatrical use of space. To be visibly present on the
Renaissance stage entailed occupying a space which may not have been sharply
delimited, explicitly designated, or singular at every point in time: spaces bleed into one
another, places are vaguely designated, and two different locales can be simultaneously
staged, as in Kent’s and Edgar’s concurrent occupation of two disparate fictional spaces
on one stage in King Lear. (2.2.-2.4). As Kent sleeps onstage, Edgar enters, makes a
speech, and then exits. The two men are clearly not in the same fictional place even
though they share the stage for the duration of the scene. As this scene exemplifies, the
flexibility of space and locale characteristic of early modern stage conventions
generates a spatial schema which departs from the non-theatrical sense of what it
means—that is, the conditions that are necessary—to be somewhere. This different,
more flexible body-space matrix is one that The Second Maiden’s Tragedy explicitly
highlights, as the Lady’s seeming ability to be simultaneously present but partly absent
distinctly echoes the theatrical spatial conventions the stage requires, or at least asks, its
audience members to accept. Like so many other plays of its time, The Second
Maiden’s Tragedy establishes a fictional world whose representation in the theatre
depends upon a treatment of space and bodies unlike the possibilities of non-dramatic
life in at least one significant way. What early moderns understood as the ontological
possibilities of the world as defined by the dramatist’s imagination and those belonging
to the spectator’s life are different, because the concept of convention itself implies a
difference between the two. Convention, by definition, involves an agreement between
spectators and actors about a specific mode of representation, a set of standards that
belong primarily to the theatre. The mere need for such an agreement indicates that the
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theatrical spatial schema, and the possibilities for bodily movement within it, differs in
a significant way from the non-theatrical schema that Renaissance audience members
must abandon when they “agree to meet” as participants in the play’s performance. The
representational conventions that define the spatial logic of the theatre in and of
themselves indicate the existence of a norm involving the movement and capabilities of
bodies in space—whatever its specific qualities may be—from which the theatre
departs.
“Current debates about the historicity of space” have stressed that pre-modern
senses of space and place are “subtly different from our own” (Giles 107), suggesting
the need to consider how early moderns might have differently understood the
relationship between body and space that prevailed in everyday life outside the theatre.
Yet research in this area has also suggested that “during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries the idea that an individual occupied a fixed point in the cosmos was replaced
by an understanding that the individual’s centre of perception was wherever he, or she,
stood” (Giles 107), and studies on human spatiality today have continued to affirm “that
self and place are interrelated [and] that the living-lived body is the central mediating
phenomenon between them” (Schatzki 698). Despite the many subtle—and perhaps not
so subtle—ways that early modern bodily sensibilities differ from those of subsequent
eras, one commonality seems to hold: subjectivity (or what Giles calls “the individual’s
centre of perception”) is typically experienced as being tethered to the body, which
itself occupies one concrete place or space in time19. Both the medieval and the
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Further reading on the way corporeality was experienced in the early modern period could encompass a
vast array of scholarly works depending on how one defines the parameters of such an inquiry. Aside
from the studies revolving around early modern anatomy cited at the end of this dissertation, other
entrypoints into the topic might be the work of Gail Kern Paster on the humoral body, Elizabeth Harvey’s
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Renaissance senses of embodied spatiality seem to imply that under normal
circumstances an individual’s body—and therefore his or her perception of the world—
must be rooted in a singular location. In his influential The Fate of Place: A
Philosophical History (1997), Edward Casey writes, “whatever is true for space and
time, this much is true for place: we are immersed in it and could not do without it. To
be at all—to exist in any way—is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in
some kind of place” (ix). Of particular note in Casey’s assertion is the singularity of
“somewhere” and “some kind of place”; unlike what Middleton renders possible within
The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, non-theatrical understandings of being-in-the-world,
whether early modern or modern, do not allow for the self to simultaneously occupy
more than one “somewhere.”
Before continuing to explore how the body’s corporeal schema might change
when spectators enter the distinctive spatiality of the theatre, it seems appropriate to
briefly deal with some potential critiques of the phenomenological angle I am pursuing
in the present discussion. In identifying a contrast between theatrical and non-theatrical
experiences of space and the body in the early modern period, I am attending to “the
world as it appears or discloses itself to the perceiving subject (the phenomenal world)”
(Garner Bodied Spaces 2). By placing the self-as-perceiver at the core of its concerns,
phenomenology has risked or promoted, at least in the eyes of its detractors, an
essentialist view of its topic. As Garner notes, Elin Diamond and Bertold Brecht are
among notable critics who see the specific, discursive or material constitution(s) of the
historical subject becoming marginalized by phenomenology’s focus on the perceiving
anthology, Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early Modern Culture (2003), and the special issue of
Renaissance Drama on “Embodiment and Environment in Early Modern Drama and Performance”
(2006).
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subject. Concerns that phenomenologists have sought to “dispense with history”
(Garner 8) have forced some phenomenologists to address the question, “How can
phenomenological approaches be historically grounded?” Yet as the recent
development of historical phenomenology (a mode of inquiry first proposed by Bruce
Smith in 2000) has demonstrated, phenomenological and historicist approaches can be
productively combined. The “study of sense experience during a specific historical
past” has been particularly influential for “scholars of Shakespeare and his world” in
reconstructing the “tactile, aural, olfactory, and emotional dimensions of early modern
culture which might otherwise resist critical engagement” (Curran para. 3). To Curran’s
point I would add that the corporeal-spatial dimensions of Renaissance culture are also
opened up by the historical-phenomenological approach, which allows me to propose
the existence of an ontological schema shared by spectators of Middleton’s play,
without suggesting that embodied being has a transhistorical or undifferentiable
essence. What I propose is already intimated by Middleton’s treatment of the body’s
relation to space: that the possibilities for an early modern spectator’s experience and
perception of embodied being have a spatial dimension—one which could be
profoundly altered in the theatre, by the way in which early modern plays like The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy play with space. The body-space relations prevailing over
theatrical and non-theatrical early modern experiences constitute “fields of variability”
(Garner 12), a term I borrow from Garner’s excellent defense of phenomenology.
Indeed, I am indebted to his claim that “to speak of the structures of embodiment […] is
not to posit a body (male, female, or indeterminate in terms of gender, race, or other
categories) whose experience subsumes difference, but to posit a set of terms in which
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experiential difference is manifested” (Garner 12). For my purposes, to assert that early
modern theatre can alter or influence a spectator’s ontological schema is to “posit a set
of terms” that provide a historically situated context within which more than one
spectatorial experience could become manifest.
One such “term” I have already posited is the insistent doubleness of early
modern stage space and bodies, which, in The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, becomes
woven into the thematic, fictional fabric of the play. Like the conventions of the stage
that brings her to life, Middleton’s heroine seemingly possesses the ability to defy the
laws of physics, to show no predictable “respect of persons, place, or time” (Twelfth
Night 2.3.79) in her doubled persona. Middleton characterizes the Lady’s subjectivity
so as to produce the impression that she is split in two and yet in some ways still
unified, present to herself as both a ghostly entity and a fleshly corpse that are in two
different places at once. In essence, the character of the Lady pushes further the
inadvertently metatheatrical significance of Malvolio’s comment from Twelfth Night
(above); just as the stage uses convention to form its own theatrical definition of what it
means to be a person in a place in time, the Lady “disrespects” the non-theatrical logic
that would ontologically prohibit a subject being in two places at one time. When, in
the tomb scene she utters, “I am not here” (1923), she instantiates in the extreme what
Malvolio unintentionally reminds spectators is the stage’s dismissal of the customary
logic governing the relationship of persons, place, and time. The dynamic splitting of
the Lady’s presence and subjectivity both reflects and produces the splitting of stage
space, staged bodies, and spectators’ perceptions that I maintain would have been part
of the early modern theatrical experience. Remarkably, the Lady is able to create a
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seeming ontological paradox, and her ability to do so stems from the material presence
of the actor who plays her. “I am not here” is spoken by a palpable body (the actor’s)
that facilitates the fantastical state of “not being here” by giving a shape and presence to
a ghostly apparition which clearly appears “here” before the audience’s eyes, even as it
claims to be “not here.” Spectators who recognize the enabling body behind the
paradox are given yet another opportunity to contemplate the materiality of theatrical
representations, and how represented space-body relations are manufactured from the
actor’s given, inevitably human body, but obey a different logic20.
As I have suggested, a specific valence of this notable difference is the body’s
relationship to being in any given place at a particular time, and here Casey’s
conceptualization of being and space is again useful. Casey notes that, under everyday
circumstances, “my here depends on my body: if I am sitting at my desk, then my here
is the desk, if I go to the fridge […] then the fridge, or perhaps the kitchen, is my here”
(qtd. in McAuley 85). As Casey’s description suggests, our prevailing ontological
schema (the one that governs non-theatrical, quotidian life) is predicated upon clear,
transposable relationships between the body and spatial referents like “here” and
“there.” The body, and its position within a singularly defined environment, helps to
define what it means to be “here” or “there.” On the stage, however, the
correspondence between a body and the referential space it produces, or is produced by,
is destabilized, in part because “the not-here [the fictional world] is here” (McAuley
20

The possibility exists, of course, that in denying her own presence, the Lady might have provoked a
less than serious response from viewers who clearly see a body before them. While the playtext does not
aim for comedy at this moment, might audience members have found the proclamation “I am not here”
absurd enough to respond with laughter? If this were the case, the impetus might have been even stronger
for spectators to self-consciously reflect upon the stage and actors as such, since the absurdity of the
situation derives from the extreme contradiction between what the fictional character claims, and the
actor’s presence asserts.
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86), or “here” (the non-fictional world) is not the only “here,” a phenomenon The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy recognizes acutely. If “here” were a stable term of reference
for the characters within the play, it would be impossible for a subject to state “I am not
here.” Alan Dessen’s chapter “The Logic of ‘This’ on the Open Stage” (in Elizabethan
Stage Conventions and Modern Interpreters) describes the indeterminacy that confronts
a reader in cases where “gestic terms like this, there, here, yon, and thus” (53) require
an accompanying theatrical gesture to clarify what is being referred to. While Dessen’s
point is about the ambiguity that attends a readerly experience of the text, I would argue
that such an ambiguity also persists in performance. Clarity as to what is meant by
“this,” “there,” or “here” is not always available onstage. In a non-performance
context, these kinds of demonstrative pronouns create an indefinite space by gesturing
towards “a referential point that refuses to materialize, and seems suddenly not to
capture a location but to resist any correspondence,” as Turner argues in his discussion
of how Lear’s line “Give me the map there” (1.1.35) signifies for a reader (Turner 171).
Yet in these instances, both Turner and Dessen focus on an uncertainty which is
readerly, assuming that performance makes “obvious” (Dessen, Elizabethan Stage
Conventions 54) what the printed text leaves undecided. I would argue, however, that
Turner’s comment equally applies to the space-body relations of the stage, since the
“referential point” (or in fact any object of representation onstage) can resist
materialization (does Macbeth’s dagger actually appear before the audience?), and need
not be easily “captured.” Furthermore, the logic that underpins both Dessen’s and
Turner’s treatment of gestic terms is that a body on stage referring to an object or space
can and will clarify what a text cannot. The implication of this logic is the assumption
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that embodied theatrical spatial relations divide space neatly into categories that can
distinguish “here” from “there” and “this” from “that.” However, The Second Maiden’s
Tragedy demonstrates just the opposite: unfixed referentiality is not just a characteristic
of disembodied texts; spatial indeterminacy occurs in performance as well. Indeed it is
a phenomenon made possible by the very properties of theatrical space, and one which
the early modern stage and its playwrights exploited to the fullest degree.
Consider the scene in The Second Maiden’s Tragedy where Govianus
encounters the Lady’s ghost at a tomb. Before the ghost appears to Govianus, he hears
its voice speak the line “I am not here” (1923), which he locates vaguely as “idle
sowndes the beaten vaults sende forth” (1925). Setting aside for the moment the added
complexity of being “not-here,” although it is clear the voice emanates from somewhere
within the “vaults,” the demonstrative pronoun “here” is likely not anchored to a
specific onstage site visible to the audience. Admittedly, we cannot say for certain to
what degree a vault or tomb-like structure was or was not visible to the audience. Alan
Dessen considers the possibility that the King’s Men might have possessed and
employed a tomb set piece; however he also provides strong evidence for the possibility
that tombs such as the one in Middleton’s play can be “a product more of the playgoer’s
imagination than the property master” (Recovering 259). As Dessen notes, the evidence
concerning the “category of tomb monument scenes” in early modern plays is “highly
problematic” (176) because “clear indications about staging are rare” (177). With
reference to The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, Dessen suggests that, despite the
“unusually elaborate” stage directions regarding the tomb (see especially lines 1926-31,
which describe the tomb doors spontaneously opening with a gust of wind to reveal a
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strong light radiating from within the tomb), the “designated effects” could be achieved
with a stage door, a coffin, and a stone (182). I would like to entertain the possibility
that both Govianus’ lines and the speech prefix “from within” (accompanying the line
“I am not here”) indicate a tomb-like space that need not be fully present or represented
onstage with verisimilitude. Moreover, regardless of whether the stage was decorated
with a realistic tomb or not, the playtext suggests that for the moment, at least, the
interior of the tomb-like set is not visually accessible to the audience. Therefore,
whatever space or place is the specific referential object of “here” is not fully visible for
the audience since the stage directions clearly indicate that the voice emanates “from
within,” and belongs to a body that is hidden to some degree by whatever structure may
have represented the exterior of the tomb. Importantly, attached to the gestic pronoun
“here,” is a speaking entity—that is, an actor’s body, which in a moment will be
revealed as the Lady’s ghost—and yet this performing body still does not definitively
clarify what is meant by “here,” because when this statement is uttered, its speaker is
hidden from sight. The text suggests that whatever space is occupied by the actor
speaking this line is most likely inaccessible visually to the audience. By consequence,
the audience is forced to contend with an indicated “here” which is not truly present—
that is to say, somewhere precise and wholly material. In Turner’s terms, the
“referential point refuses to materialize”; moreover, the audience cannot make it
materialize because wherever here is, it belongs to a visually imperceptible space in the
tomb which can only be imagined, but not perceived. In this subtle but suggestive
instantiation of unfixed spatial referentiality, The Second Maiden’s Tragedy mimics on
a small scale the re-organization of typical (non-dramatic) spatial-corporeal relations
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that becomes constitutive of the theatrical experience. The indeterminacy of “here”
both belongs to and creates the logic of an environment in which spectators can
experience, quite literally, the extraordinary.
The play further stretches the limits of the ordinary by presenting its audience
with an ontological paradox: “I am not here.” The Lady’s insistence that she is “not
here” throws into question the very meaning of the concept “here” and how it functions
in relation to being, a destabilization that is enabled by the spatial conventions and
possibilities of the stage. Linguistically speaking, “here” belongs to a class of words
that are deictic; these words convey meaning by recourse to referents which are
immediately perceptible in the context of their utterance. More importantly, deictic
words depend on a referred-to context that is almost always spatial and/or temporal (the
exception being words that refer laterally to other words in a linguistic context), and
which is situated in relation to the person who utters the word. The spatial concept
designated by the deictic “here” is wholly dependent upon a subject being in a specific
place that corresponds with the signified of “here.” Casey’s phenomenological
definition of “being-here” (in relation to a fridge, a kitchen), along with the logic that
deictic words disclose, explains why the line “I am not here” is so haunting, since the
idea of being itself—I am—is seemingly inextricable from place—I am here. How can
the Lady assert “I am” if she is not present to Govianus (and the audience) here, in the
place from which she asserts her being? The question persists without resolution unless
the presentational level of the drama is factored in, for it is the actor’s body that renders
the impossible possible. Indeed, how can the Lady even speak to tell her witnesses she
is not here? This speech act is not simply facilitated by the fact that her spirit appears in
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order to report the violation of its body; if this were only the case, the Lady might say
without disturbing her viewers’ sense of normative body-space relations, “my body is
not here.” Instead, she refers to this absent body as herself—as “I”—and in order to do
so she must present herself somehow to her interlocutor(s) even as she insists she is
absent. To represent a condition of being which seems to deconstruct itself once
verbalized, the actor’s body must make itself present and body forth her speech, all the
while attempting through this speech to deny the physical actorly presence which
verbally attests to, but physically contradicts, the character’s professed absence. Such is
the complex verbal and corporeal logic disclosed by the Lady’s speech, “I am now at
Courte / in his owne priuat chamber, ther he woes me / and plies his suite to me […]
foldes me wth in his armes and often sets / a sinfull kisse upon my scenceles lip” (195864). Delivering these lines, the actor’s body makes itself known to the spectator’s eyes,
at the same time as it describes itself in detail (as the character’s body) existing
elsewhere. In this deeply metatheatrical move, Middleton engineers a fictional
ontology so striking it urges spectators to take note of what renders the paradox
representable: the actor’s authority to stand (in) for an entity it does not fully embody.
Important to the Lady’s metatheatricality is the idea that “being here”
definitionally allows for the possibility of a “there.” Casey calls this conceptual pairing
of “here” and “there” the “primal placial dyad” (Getting Back Into Place 50). The
“placial dyad” clearly structures relations and categories of space via the subjectivity of
a body which occupies or does not occupy a certain space. Granted, The Second
Maiden’s Tragedy conforms to Casey’s dyad to a certain degree; witness, for example,
the page singing “ther she sleepes and here he weepes” (1903-04) at the Lady’s tomb,
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which places Govianus in a visible place “here,” in contrast to a “there.” However, this
line only serves to accentuate the subsequent dissolution of the here/there dichotomy. It
is as if this citation of the dyad “here versus there” sets up a norm that closely echoes
non-theatrical conditions for embodied being, in order to contrast the Lady’s remarkable
departure from that norm. To be “not-here” or to be “here” in a place which is also
“there” constitutes a state of being that is seemingly impossible, but is ontologically
possible within the theatre, as the Lady demonstrates. In violation of the primary
placial dyad, the Lady’s ghost reports her location to Govianus, and the audience, in a
way that suggests she is not just here or there, but both here (in front of Govianus) and
there (at court) at once. The Lady’s dual occupation of two disparate spaces at once is
of course made possible by the severance of her spirit and body; her spirit has left her
body, and her corpse is with the Tyrant. Yet Middleton uses this plot point to create a
striking relationship between body, subjectivity and space—one which has the effect of
calling the spectator’s attention to the possibilities of the non-realist aesthetic governing
the early modern stage. By referring to an absent space (the court) in a way that
suggests it should be present (for if the Lady is at court and she is present to the
audience, should not the court be present as well?), the Lady reminds audience
members of the set of flexible spatial conventions they have agreed to accept. The
Lady’s use of the first person to refer to her body—“behold I’me gon” (1950) and “I am
now at Courte” (1958)—purposefully confounds everyday bodily-spatial referents, and
demonstrates the theatre’s potential to significantly, if only temporarily, change how
spectators conceive of, and even experience, being in relation to space.
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Furthermore, the Lady’s sustained reference to an offstage space, the court
where she claims she also “is,” invites the audience to oscillate between the perceivable
(the scene in front of them) and the momentarily intangible (the scene the Lady
describes but the play does not depict). The invocation of these disparate locales carries
the effect of potentially intensifying a divided spectatorial engagement with the stage
that I have argued is already embedded into the early modern playgoer’s experience. If
in general these spectators are confronted by a space that claims to be what it
fundamentally is not, in that the stage stands for a fictional locale, they are also further
challenged to relate to an absent space they cannot visually or tangibly confront. In
effect, Middleton is building into the play an opportunity for his audience members to
experience a split relationship to space(s) that arguably mimics the Lady’s own
experience of being in two places at once. If the Lady herself is peculiarly “not here,”
so too are those who choose to commit themselves to imagining where she is
(simultaneously here and not here). In addition to calling the audience’s attention to the
dialectic partnership between presentation and representation in visible stage space(s),
Middleton’s play fosters a dialectic between absent and present spaces. In doing so, he
begins to inculcate the engaged spectator into the ontological schema of the play,
extending the bodily and spatial possibilities of the stage to the spectator herself. Just as
spectators are encouraged to oscillate perceptually between the play’s presentational
and representational registers, so too is the audience invited to redefine absence and
presence in terms of their relationship to each other and to spatiality. In fact, this
spectatorial experience might be more aptly described not as one of oscillation, but one
of double commitment to two (or more) spaces that can only just be held in the
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spectator’s consciousness at once. No longer is being restricted to “being-here” or to a
rigid dichotomy between here and there, absence and presence; rather, spectators are
offered the chance to pursue a metamorphic relationship to space and being inspired by
the stage events in which they imaginatively participate.
Finally, however, the Lady’s two halves meet in a singular locale, and
Middleton closes the play with her spirit accompanying her body offstage. This
convergence of the Lady’s split persona seemingly promises to unify the divided
energies of the play, the reunion between the Lady’s spirit and her body ostensibly
allowing for the “weary, much abusde and toilde” (2321) spirit of the Lady to achieve
the rest it has sought. While the Lady’s “fearful separation” seems to be resolved, the
performance of this scene complicates this potential sense of closure and unification,
and continues to fuel the division and doubleness that has characterized both the
narrative and its performance possibilities. When the Lady and her corpse appear
onstage at the same time they cannot possibly be represented by only one actor. The
final scene thus calls for a staging choice that also deliberately engages the viewer’s
perceptual fluctuation, and his or her metatheatrical awareness of the acting body’s
material capabilities and limits. The spatially simultaneous appearance of ghost and
corpse creates an unavoidable lack of continuity between these two manifestations of
the Lady’s body, which clearly cannot be both played by Rich Robinson. As Susan
Zimmerman describes, an analogous situation in Philip Massinger’s The Duke of Milan
was orchestrated differently so that it “allowed for the same actor who played the living
woman to represent her corpse, thereby providing continuity of image” (122). This
crucial difference, I would argue, situates the performing body in The Duke of Milan—
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even if necessitating that a dead body be played by a living actor—more firmly in its
fictional register. In the case of Massinger’s play, the illusion of playing dead (which is
not without its complexities, as Zimmerman and others have pointed out) is not ruptured
by having two different entities or bodies represent what should appear as differing
manifestations of the same fictional person.
However, by necessitating the use of Rich Robinson and another person or
dummy in the dual appearance of the Lady’s corpse and her ghost, The Second
Maiden’s Tragedy creates a visual and perceptual relay in which Robinson’s status as
actor and character remains at the forefront of the spectator’s consciousness. If
Robinson’s body shares with another body, or a dummy, the singular fictional persona
of the Lady, when the audience sees Robinson as the ghost, since the ghost also belongs
to the corpse, Robinson’s body is metonymically aligned with whichever body
(artificial or human) plays the corpse. In this final scene, then, the corpse becomes a
problematic locus of attention. In terms of the fictional world, the corpse seems to be or
should be played by Robinson—the stage directions read “Enter the Ghost in the shame
[sic] form as the lady is drest in the Chayre” (2386)—and yet must be represented by an
entirely different body or a non-human entity (a prop). The continuity of image
explicitly necessitated by the text is shattered by virtue of Middleton’s instructions for
staging; Robinson needs to be two—representing the Lady’s substantial and
insubstantial forms—when he can clearly only be one. Here, the human body’s
representational capabilities are brought face to face with their presentational limits; in
her world, the Lady can be what Rich Robinson himself cannot represent in this
moment. In engineering the necessity for what can in the end only be an imperfect,
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unidentical “body double,” Middleton directs his spectators to recognize a salient aspect
of theatrical embodiment:
there are limits to the extent of the embodiment of which the actor is capable.
As a perceptual phenomenon, the character is granted abilities which are beyond
the representational power of the actor […] the confining body of the actor
cannot be fully shed. On the other hand, the character is noema only […] and so
there are objects and actions which when portrayed on the stage, it is not
possible (or extraordinarily unlikely) or desirable that they be identical to the
equivalent real-world actions or objects. (Stephenson “Uplifted to the
View”148)
Stephenson goes on to argue that “death is the ultimate example of failed embodiment”
because “when a character dies, the audience can be within a hair’s breadth of absolute
certainty that the actor portraying that character is not truly dead, that in fact she is only
feigning” (148-49). I would argue that the performance of Middleton’s ghost/corpse
pairing, while likely to trigger the metatheatrical consequences of simulated stage death
in general—namely, that spectators are likely to take notice of the actor/character
distinction—also takes an extra step beyond mere death to accomplish just that.
Admittedly, the possibility exists that any given audience member may be so intensely
invested in the fictional register of the performance and captivated by the story and its
spectacle that the opportunity for critical reflection upon the ontology of theatre is
diminished. However, as I have just noted, in The Second Maiden’s Tragedy what is
performed is not just the death of the character while the actor lives on; together, the
lady and her ghost exacerbate and thus highlight the failure of embodiment Stephenson
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remarks upon, by presenting the audience with an additional fictional entity (a ghost)
which is a separate manifestation of a dead character. Spectators are thereby confronted
with two distinct entities that, as designated by the stage directions, should assume the
“same form” and should be portrayed by the same actor in order to uphold the fictional
illusion that the corpse and its ghost are both the Lady. Yet this cannot possibly be
achieved by the actor’s singular body, which, unlike its character, is capable only of
being in a singular place at any given point in time. By orchestrating a visual conflict
between the represented and the representing, Middleton prepares spectators to
experience and take note of an illusion which is designed to fail in some degree. As I
have argued, this is a consummately metatheatrical decision. Without speech, the actorcharacter’s body bespeaks its own participation in theatricality in and through this
failure, offering spectators a glimpse of how far theatre can push the body’s everyday
limits.
The performance of The Second Maiden’s Tragedy promises to direct its
audience to identify with a variety of fictional and non-fictional spaces that at once
differentiate between and conflate the stage (including its actors) and the fictional realm
these material phenomena represent. Middleton taps into the possibility of spectatorial
double vision by incorporating into the play’s plot an extended metatheatrical nod to the
representational strategies of the early modern stage, wherein bodies and spaces are
inherently doubled or even multiplied by virtue of their ability to present themselves,
and represent others. In the Lady’s embodiment of fracture and doubleness, the play
embraces themes and effects that, in performance, can steer the spectator towards selfreflexivity about the stage as representational apparatus, and about his or her own role
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as a participant in the process of representation. Moreover, this self-awareness is
centered upon the splitting of perception both inside and outside the fictional world; the
appearance and actions of the Lady’s ghost are accompanied by dialogue that calls
attention to the fact that she is strangely localizable as two-but-one inside the fictional
world, as she self-identifies both as ghost and corpse, perceiving herself/herselves
doubly. In this sense, the Lady reproduces in miniature the way the early modern stage
calls upon audience members to recognize their own doubled perception of what is
theatrically presented and represented. Her addresses to Govianus, which urge him to
recognize her duality, also act as a call to the play’s audience to do the same, and to
imagine her absence as well as perceiving her presence, a seeming paradox that is
rendered possible by the decidedly unordinary spatial logic of the theatre. The
perceptual component of the Lady’s extraordinary relationship to being-in-space is
extended as a possibility to her spectators, who participate in a performance within
which no singular space or body aims to claim exclusive hold over the audience’s
perceptual focus for any length of time. Rather, the spectators who have “agreed” to the
theatre’s conventions and thereby engaged their imaginations are offered the
opportunity to themselves become analogues of the Lady, and experience a similarly
fantastical relationship to space and being.
Much as the Lady in The Second Maiden’s Tragedy is partly present and partly
absent, “in theatre the spectator is regularly in a state of being only partly here”
(McAuley 86). Tangible stage space and actors’ bodies put “into motion a vibration
between actual presence and the supposed (imagined) action” (Beckerman, Theatrical
Presentation 22), a vibration that depends upon the mobile perceptions of spectators
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attuning themselves to what is both present and absent, presented and represented. In
The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, the potential for spectatorial double vision is wrapped
into the play’s aesthetic, which depends not only upon a tension and interplay between
being here/there, being one/two, seeing/not seeing, but also upon the early modern
theatre’s destabilization of these dichotomies. Just as the Lady’s subjectivity is shared
between her body and her spirit, enabling her to paradoxically utter “behold I’me gon,”
her beholders are paradoxically divided (in their perceptions of the stage) and yet one.
The Second Maiden’s Tragedy exemplifies how the individual in the theatre might be
“no longer simply here, but here and there at once” (Weber 41, emphasis in original),
participating in an experience which is markedly altered from that of life outside the
theatre.
The duality of the theatre—as a site of presentation and representation—means
that to immerse oneself in the theatrical experience is to expose oneself to a space
wherein the everyday constraints that govern bodies and spaces are dramatically recircuited. The Second Maiden’s Tragedy attests to the potential for theatre to radically
change, even if only temporarily, the way embodied human subjectivity functions.
Anthony Dawson writes that in the theatre “the actor’s body is obviously present, but
the ‘presence’ of the character’s body is more ambiguous because it depends on
representation in the person of the actor” (38). Middleton’s play takes this ambiguity as
its starting point, and demonstrates how the stage can become a place where fictional
possibilities are grafted onto ontological impossibilities—being in two or more places at
once, being here and there— which are in turn revealed to be possible within the set of
conventions that spectators and actors jointly uphold. That the early modern theatre
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encourages its audience’s dual participation in the representational and presentational
layers of the play suggests that dramatists like Middleton and his peers exploit the
radicalizing potential of a stage that fosters a double image effect in the spectator’s
engagement with the stage, even if experiencing that splitting entails a certain degree of
alienation from oneself and the space one’s body occupies. Audience members of
Middleton’s play are thus not simply passive witnesses to a stage environment that
remains at a remove from their sensorium. Rather, like the audiences of Shakespeare,
Peele, Marston, Beaumont, and other dramatists, Middleton’s spectators find
themselves implicated in the various ways in which stage space can come to life and
can rearrange the perceiving human body’s relationship to the material—or fictionally
immaterial—world.
The strange spatiality and otherworldly bodily experiences characteristic of The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy present us with a way of thinking about the mostly bare
Renaissance stage that runs counter to Jonson’s and Sidney’s famous critiques of early
modern theatrical illusion21. Instead of critiquing the incommensurability between
“Asia…and Affrick” (Sidney, qtd. in Gurr 181) and the stage that would attempt their
representation, Middleton’s play suggests we embrace the opportunity theatre offers, the
promise of straddling the gap between the actual and the virtual with a knowing eye as
to how theatre does its job. The play that in a breath “wafts” its spectators over wide
seas and presents radical alternatives to the “deeds, and language, such as men do use”
(Jonson, Prologue 15, 21) is also one that affords those willing the chance to access the
space between presentation and representation—the place where theatre is at its most

21

See Sidney’s An Apologie for Poetrie (1595), and Jonson’s Prologue to Every Man in His Humour
(1616)—two oft-cited examples in discussions of early modern staging.
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transformative. Far from being “th’ill customs of the age” (Jonson, Prologue 4), the
fictionally ambitious conventions of the early modern stage, and the plays that bring
these conventions into plain sight, attest to the phenomenal possibilities of the theatrical
medium itself. In negotiating the distance between what is “straunge” (Middleton
2274) and what is familiar—between the presented image and its representational
double—spectators affirm the potential of drama to transmute the ordinary, at the same
time as they take up their own important role in this transformation.
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3

Exploring the Interior: Corporeal Knowledge and

Epistemological Empowerment

“Man is a little world, and contains in himself the seeds of all those things which are
contained in the most spacious and ample bosom of this whole Universe.”
—Helkiah Crooke (1615)
“Anatomization takes place so that, in lieu of a formerly complete ‘body’, a new ‘body’
of knowledge and understanding can be created.”
—Jonathan Sawday (1995)

In the previous chapter I argued that the theatre constitutes an arena within
which actors and audiences can mutually participate in remoulding the parameters that
structure everyday, embodied being. Most importantly, I have tried to show that
spectators are integral agents in this process; they power the process of representation
just as it empowers them. I have also claimed that, for Renaissance spectators, central
to this experience is the early modern theatre’s deliberate foregrounding of the stage as
stage and “the physical act of histrionic delivery,” in conjunction with “the imaginary
product and effect” (Weimann, Author’s Pen 11) of such delivery. Middleton’s The
Second Maiden’s Tragedy offers us just one instantiation of the complex ways in which
the double vision of the early modern theatre informs the experiences of its spectators.
By doubling or splitting a spectator’s focus between presentation and representation,
and concomitantly collapsing the absolute distinction between embodied spatial
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presence and absence, plays like The Second Maiden’s Tragedy demonstrate the
theatre’s potential to quite literally change, if only temporarily, some of the structuring
concepts that inform human perception of bodies in the world. Samuel Weber goes so
far as to assert that in the theatre the “scope of life and death is altered” (41), and if one
takes into account the notorious violence of many Renaissance plays, it would indeed
seem as though exploring the scope of life and death within the theatre was a
fascination shared by dramatists and playgoers alike. In citing Weber’s reference to life
and death, it is my intention here to preface the more visceral territory of this chapter.
Shifting emphasis from space-body relations to the body itself, the present chapter
further examines the relationship between staged violence and the
presentation/representation distinction in terms of audience engagement. In the
forthcoming analysis, I continue to argue that this distinction is central to how early
modern plays prepare their spectators for unordinary, uniquely theatrical experiences of
the body.
As is suggested by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the corporeal schema and
Edward Casey’s analysis of place (both discussed in the previous chapter), one way to
define space is in terms of bodies, and vice versa. This chiasmatic relationship implies
that if performance critics seek to “define theatre as a particular mode of spatial
organization” (Ubersfeld, qtd. in McAuley 19), as I have done up to this point, we must
also carefully attend to the body’s specific role in rendering the performance space
meaningful, or even possible. As Stanton Garner writes, “bodied spatiality is at the
heart of dramatic presentation, for it is through the actor’s corporeal presence under the
spectator’s gaze that the dramatic text actualizes itself in the field of performance”
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(Bodied Spaces 1). Gail Kern Paster similarly asserts with respect to a specifically early
modern context that, “as the material body’s fictional embodiment, what and how the
actor’s body signifies is always at issue” (20). Of course, the ways in which the actor’s
body can signify are manifold; Paster’s emphasis on humors and Renaissance humoral
theory differs from the way in which I will conceive of the body as a site of knowledge,
both in terms of its place in Renaissance discourse and as a performing body onstage.
Central to my argument that penetrative theatrical violence tantalizes spectators with an
empowering look into human interiority is the way in which anatomical science of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries influenced early modern culture at large. For this
reason, interwoven into my analysis of plays are non-dramatic examples from texts that
establish how the unprecedented popularity of anatomists’ discoveries promulgated the
discursive construction of the body as a storehouse of knowledge and ultimate truth, as
Helkiah Crooke’s Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man (1615) and
other lesser-known texts I discuss in this chapter exemplify.
Pursuing the implications of audience engagements with violent acts, the present
chapter also moves towards the goal of distinguishing between the semiotic force of
scientific dissections and fictional, staged violence. The difference between the corpses
on the dissection slab and the lively bodies that projected representations of death and
decay in the dramatic theatres prompts us to consider the vital issue of how theatre of
any kind (including the anatomical) functions as a medium, relating meaning to
spectators in a way that is determined not just by what is performed, but how. In
anatomy theatres dissections are performed upon dead bodies, whereas in playhouses
the violence that echoes and draws upon anatomical contexts is perpetrated upon live
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bodies. Granted, in terms of subject matter, non-dramatic, scientifically-oriented texts
that reflect upon the form and function of the human body demonstrate the same
epistemological investments in anatomical structure as early modern plays do. Whether
fantasized or realized, bodily explorations and penetrations in medical and dramatic
texts dramatize a desire that I argue both early modern theatre audiences and
Renaissance anatomists share: the attainment of empowering knowledge thought to be
revealed by the body’s interior anatomy. And it is indeed true that the bodily
excavations early modern culture executed, hypothesized, fantasized, and wrote about
found a particularly powerful outlet within Renaissance playhouses. However,
regardless of how suggestive the links are between violent drama and early modern
anatomical science—a fact that drives Hilary Nunn’s Staging Anatomies: Dissection
and Spectacle in Early Stuart Tragedy (2005), one of only a few monographs on early
modern English theatre and anatomy—“it is important to recognize that what takes
place in the anatomy theatre at the presentational level is re-enacted at the
representational level in the theatre” (Hillman 43). I argue that the potential for the
“double image” effect, generated by a theatrical dialectic between presentation and
representation, provides excellent grounds for considering how and why “early modern
drama and the practice of anatomy cannot be seen as simply analogous” (Hillman 43)22.
In their ability to present and represent bodies, early modern plays make available to
audiences a unique experience of the violently dissected body. Onstage, the actor’s
body submits itself to represented corporeal invasions, all the while sustaining its own
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Along with Hillman, Sugg also stands out in his expressed reservations about the unqualified
assimilation of dissective science and dramatic violence, Sugg warning against construing staged
bloodshed and dismemberment as “anatomical” without sound reason. Hilary Nunn is cited in his
critique (see p. 223, note 18, and p. 232, note 131).
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physical integrity. Because the ostensible victims of these acts perform their own
violations within a representational field, they are able to enact the body’s perforation
while still protecting it, “disabling” the body through a display of performative skill that
in and through this display paradoxically affirms the body’s liveliness and ability.
These antipodal semiotic energies are able to offer spectators a means by which to
satisfy the desire for transcendent knowledge without destroying the human subject that
would reveal that knowledge. Such a feat, I argue, is effected exclusively by the early
modern theatre’s complex double vision.
The spectator’s experience of the body, as well as the dramatist’s treatment of it,
is nevertheless informed on a conceptual and ideological level in the period by the
advancement of scientific knowledge concerning the human body. Setting aside for the
moment the question of representation versus presentation—that is, how the sometimes
architecturally similar theatres of the anatomists and of the acting companies produced
different performances of the penetrated body23—there remain significant similarities
between the work of anatomists and dramatists. Nor are these similarities confined to
non-performed output (anatomy textbooks and playtexts). While the anatomy halls and
the playhouses treated the bodies that occupied their stages quite differently, both
arenas shared the view that the body enclosed something of value in discovering. Thus
despite the significant differences between dissections of corpses and dramatic
renderings of fictional bodily violations, there also exist important conceptual overlaps
between the fields of dissection and drama. Knowledge and discovery are driving
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On the structural congruence between these two early modern venues, see especially Christian Billing’s
“Modelling the Anatomy Theatre and the Indoor Hall Theatre: Dissection on the Stages of Early Modern
London,” in Early Modern Literary Studies 13 (2004): 1-17.
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forces behind anatomists’ and dramatists’ dealings with the body. This commonality
does not give us the whole picture, as Hillman contends, but it is my argument that in
order to understand how early modern drama and the discipline of anatomy are not
wholly analogous, one must chart where and why this analogy breaks down. For this
reason, the present chapter is structured around two related arguments. The first claim
is devoted to tracing how anatomical modes of thought insinuate themselves into
Renaissance playwrights’ depictions of violent fantasies and acts, and the remainder of
the chapter develops an argument which is also the subject of Chapter Four: how, and to
what effect, the theatre’s double vision sets its violated bodies apart from those on the
dissection slab.
In addition to the critics I have cited above, Andrea Carlino, Andrew
Cunningham, Roger French, Devon Hodges, Howard Marchitello, Charles O’Malley,
Katherine Park, Grant Williams, and Luke Wilson have all contributed to shaping the
field of inquiry within which this chapter situates itself. The work of these scholars has
significantly enlarged our understanding of both the literary and scientific contours of
the “anatomical Renaissance” (the title of Andrew Cunningham’s monograph) of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is my intention only to briefly revisit select
aspects of this body of criticism; rather than working principally from secondary
sources, I seek out a range of primary sources (both dramatic and non-dramatic) from
the period. The plays cited in this chapter range from the canonical, to the less
frequently studied, to the marginal. These primary dramatic materials I place in
dialogue with non-fictional, contemporaneous evidence that has received far less
attention from literary critics than, for example, Crooke’s Mikrokosmographia, which
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Michael Neill calls “the most Vesalian of English anatomical textbooks” (176), or the
visually seductive anatomical drawings of Andreas Vesalius, Andreanus Spigelius, Juan
Valverde, Jacopo Berengario da Carpi, Charles Estienne, and other famous anatomists
of the European Renaissance24. Because the more frequently referenced and reproduced
texts are so influential to early modern English culture (and to current scholarship on
the anatomical Renaissance), they are not entirely omitted from my analysis; however,
as is the case with the playtexts I have chosen, I aim to move from works that are at the
center of critical discussion to those that have been displaced to its margins. I isolate
and bring together certain claims that have already been made within the purview of
extant scholarship, in order to establish for my own purposes how the human body,
inside and out, is thrust forth into the public eye as an entity that can and should be
intimately explored. I will suggest that in turn, the radiating influence of this “will to
discover” informs the theatre’s violent manipulations of the body, but that spectators’
confrontations with these corporeal penetrations are structured in an entirely different
way inside the playhouse than they are inside the anatomy theatre. In the playhouse
environment, the actor/character’s intact but representationally victimized body is able
to offer spectators the seeming experience of an idealized mode of corporeal discovery
that does not destroy its subject—an accomplishment that early modern culture deeply
desired but could not achieve in and through scientific practice.
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Besides Crooke’s work, some of the texts which have occupied a central position in criticism are
Vesalius’s Fabrica Corporis Humani (1543), Juan Valverde’s Historia de la Composicion del Cuerpo
Humano (first published in Spanish in 1556, translated into Latin in 1560 as Anatomia del Corpo
Humano), Adriaan van de Spiegel’s De Formato Foeto (1626), William Harvey’s public lectures on
anatomy (later transcribed and published as Prelectiones Anatomiae Universalis in 1886), and his De
Motu Cordis (published in Leiden, 1628)

129

Knowledge of Bodies, Bodies of Knowledge
In early modern constructions of the body, bodily knowledge metonymically
becomes a more powerful form of epistemological mastery that can reach far beyond
the self. Evidencing this desire for totalizing knowledge, characters like Lear,
D’Amville (Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy), and Cameleon (Shirley’s The Wedding)
fantasize about dissecting and anatomizing in order to understand other bodies and
selves. Lear’s wish to “anatomize” Regan to see what makes her heart so hard is one of
the references to anatomy critics most often cite: “Let them anatomize Regan; see what
breeds about her heart. Is there any cause in nature that makes these hard hearts?”
(3.6.70-72). Although Lear does not extend this reference to dissection beyond Lear’s
passing remark, the function of the dissective comment is clear: a father fantasizes
about unmediated access to his daughter’s interiority that would ground her “hard”
(unsympathetic) nature in an empirically verifiable, naturally-given “hard heart”. The
slippage between emotional and physiological attributes is in keeping with the period’s
attitudes towards corporeality (as demonstrated, for example, in Paster’s work on
humoral physiology and more recently in Hillman’s Shakespeare’s Entrails) and
suggests that Lear could demystify Regan’s immaterial self (her disposition) if only he
could see to the depths of her material composition. That the fantasy of anatomical
knowledge arises during Lear’s vulnerable, disturbed state is indicative of what the
fulfillment of such a fantasy promises: the ability to wholly understand—and thus
master, at least epistemologically—the other whose psychological and physiological
interiority is either unavailable or incomprehensible.
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A few images in John Ford’s plays also link knowledge of internal anatomy to
knowledge of the whole person, embedding this linkage within a scenario of corporeal
violation which would grant the possessor of such information a much-desired form of
power. The several references to hearts in’Tis Pity She’s a Whore and Love’s Sacrifice
pick up on Shakespeare’s treatment of the anatomized heart in King Lear. In Love’s
Sacrifice, Bianca and Fernando exchange verbal vows that enact the physiological
literalization of emotion much as Lear does. First, Fernando swears that “if, when I am
dead, you rip / This coffin of my heart, there shall you read, / With constant eyes, what
now my tongue defines: / Bianca’s name carved out in bloody lines” (2.3.98-101).
Later (2.4.93-95), Bianca repeats the same phraseology back to him, substituting herself
for Fernando, thereby encouraging spectators to take note of the dissective image. Ford
also uses a closely related image in’Tis Pity, when Giovanni instructs Annabella to “rip
up [his] bosom,” promising, “there thou shalt behold / A heart in which is writ the truth
I speak” (1.2.210-11). Just as Lear had hoped to find some index of Regan’s character
lodged in or “about” her heart, Fernando, Bianca, and Giovanni all imagine the
evidence of their emotional bond in terms of what is ontologically verifiable via
dissection. In the scene following Fernando’s vow, Bianca confesses, “in my heart /
You have been only king; if there can be / A violence in love, then I have felt / That
tyranny” (2.4.18-21) subsequently promising to “write / This love within the tables of
my heart” (2.4.83-84). Having already posited a violent physiology of affect in
Fernando’s speech—the idea that the heart registers love as a physical, bloody
inscription—Ford attunes us to the possibility that the imagery in both of Bianca’s
references to her heart is not simply metaphorical. So too, does Giovanni’s final
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dissection of Annabella’s heart suggest that these characters are not thinking and
speaking figuratively; when he presents the skewered organ as evidence of his triumph
in love (and triumph over Soranzo), he urges the men at the banquet to “look well
upon’t” in order to see that it is a “heart […] in which is [his heart] entombed” (5.6.2628). In a perverse echo of an anatomist addressing his spectators, Giovanni acts as
though by close inspection the onlookers could detect something in the physical
structure of the bloody heart that would verify what he verbally claims. In Ford’s plays,
love assumes an ontological life in the body’s viscera, as the heart registers in flesh—an
effect frequently figured as a form of writing or inscription—what is felt and verbally
professed. It is no wonder, then, that another of Ford’s characters quite literally dies of
a broken heart (Calantha in The Broken Heart)25.
By having his lovers construct their anticipated and actualized dissections as a
confirmation of what they already know and claim to feel, Ford makes the fleshly body
itself—especially its internal structure—into a material repository for knowledge. One
gets the sense that if Calantha’s body had been autopsied, within the Fordian economy
of physiological literalization the substance of her heart would have tangibly
corroborated her emotional state at the time of her death. With its ability to testify
physically, the body becomes the focal point of investigation for characters who find
their access to information otherwise blocked. When Soranzo (whom Annabella is
designated to marry) confronts Annabella about her illegitimate pregnancy, she refuses
his violently articulated requests to tell him who the father of the baby is. In an almost
perfect echo of Giovanni’s pledge to Annabella (cited above), and of Bianca and
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Calantha has at least one historical analogue: Elizabeth I’s maid of honour Margaret Ratcliffe, “whose
corpse was opened before the Queen to reveal the unmistakable proofs of her broken heart” (Neill 124).
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Fernando’s language in Love’s Sacrifice, Soranzo threatens to “rip up [Annabella’s]
heart” (4.3.53-54) and find the name of her lover there. In keeping with the way these
other characters have described the physiologically inscriptive effects of love, Soranzo
refers to the body as if it could provide him with the concrete piece of knowledge he
needs to target his revenge at the right man, and to thereby recover some modicum of
power in a situation which has effectively cuckolded him.
Soranzo and Lear are not alone in their conceptualization of the interior body as
a site of ostensibly empowering knowledge. The Duke in Love’s Sacrifice exultantly
confronts Fernando with what he believes is undeniable proof of Fernando’s adultery
with Bianca (the Duke’s wife), claiming to have obtained by piercing Bianca’s breast
“the bloody evidence of [Fernando’s] untruth,” which is now “written” on the Duke’s
sword’s point in blood (5.2.29-30). In The Duchess of Malfi, Cariola defends herself
against the accusation that she is responsible for Ferdinand’s entrance into the
Duchess’s bedchamber, by locating the proof of her innocence in the interior of her
heart: “when / That you have cleft my heart, you shall read there / Mine innocence”
(3.2.147-49). In The Atheist’s Tragedy, D’Amville (the eponymous atheist) requests a
dissection of Charlemont, who demonstrates a religious faith that D’Amville believes
can be empirically pinpointed in the structure of Charlemont’s interior anatomy.
Charlemont has displayed a quality that D’Amville lacks—the “resolution […] to die”
with the assurance that a desirable afterlife awaits—and D’Amville assumes that the
difference in their spiritual temperaments is localizable in the differing “parts” and
“dimensions” of their bodies (5.2.144-152). D’Amville desires anatomical knowledge
because it seems to him the most ready way to tap into, and eventually harness for
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himself, those aspects of Charlemont’s personality that he “admire[s]” (5.2.161). In The
Wedding, Cameleon begs to anatomize Rawbone (the Machiavellian Jewish usurer), a
request which indicates “a powerful desire for direct final knowledge of a figure so
frustratingly unknowable just because of the contradictions Renaissance society has
used to construct the Usurer” (Sugg 67). All of these theatricalized dissections and
fantasies of anatomization offer spectators an alternative means by which to relate to the
violent acts they see performed: as inquisitive forays into a material vessel—the human
body—which seems to be a key site of access to a wealth of immaterial knowledge
about individual and collective human nature.
Like these anatomically-inflected acts of dramatic violence, the work of
anatomists produces a body of knowledge in and through the dissolution of the body’s
integrity, leading me to theorize bodily violation—on a stage of any kind—as an act
whose effects can reconstitute something in place of that which is lost or destroyed in
the process. In Cynthia Marshall’s view, that “something” is release, catharsis, and
self-shattering for the viewer (or reader). In my estimation, the viewer is equally
offered an experience that, through the acquisition of epistemological power, can shore
up rather than break apart subjectivity and sense of selfhood. I see scientific and
theatricalized dissections as akin to the process of the proverbial phoenix rising from
the ashes. What Glen Harcourt calls the “deadening” force (qtd. in Traub 52) of the
body’s partial or complete destruction is accompanied by the conceptual rebuilding of a
body of knowledge. This production-from-destruction suggests that bearing witness to
the violation of a body need not necessarily entail shattering the subjectivity of the
viewer in the way that Marshall suggests. As dissections show, bodily violations can
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also present opportunities for a viewer’s self-affirmation, educating and empowering by
literally and figuratively opening up forms of knowledge. The examples above
demonstrate that these potentials also surface powerfully in the drama of the time. The
plays of Shakespeare, Ford, Tourneur, and other early modern playwrights all exemplify
how plays took part in dissective culture, by linking the seeming destruction of the body
to the production of power and knowledge. These linkages suggest that a person who is
made privy to the body’s mysteries—namely, its interior—is also offered the chance to
attain a sense of epistemological mastery over the body, and over the human subject
who has been opened up. Such a privilege is proffered not only to the characters who
fantasize about and perform violent penetrations of the body, but is also extended to
audience members who take up their place within the model of engaged spectatorship I
have developed in previous chapters.
Regarded as the repository of earthly and divine knowledge, the human body in
the Renaissance bore the ideological weight of the culture’s desire for knowledge, as
well as the weight of the anatomist’s scalpel. Even for those who could not “know” the
body directly by observing it (attendance at public dissections was limited, as were the
number of dissections per year), the body’s physiology and internality emerges as a
potent locus of imagination and desire, as the violent acts and fantasies surveyed above
indicate. A look at non-dramatic texts on the body, written by theologically and
scientifically minded early moderns, is able to offer additional evidence as to how the
anatomists’ pursuits injected themselves into a variety of knowledge-seeking and
knowledge-producing fields of cultural production26. In order to provide a deeper, more
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Sugg reports that approximately 120 literary anatomies (texts like Robert Burton’s Anatomy of
Melancholy or Philip Stubbes’s The Anatomie of Abuses) were written between 1576 and 1650; the word
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comprehensive understanding of how literary and scientific texts of the time seek out
new ways of understanding body, self, and world, I pair the insights offered by small
anatomical instruction books and didactic studies of “the whole body of man”
(Underwood 1) with what is already known about the major historical figures and works
that helped define Renaissance anatomy. While only a few early moderns performed
dissections, many wrote about them, and about anatomy, in a way that annexes the
“whole body of man” to a deeper comprehension of more than just physiological
matter(s). This connection surfaces in plays that range from the early to the late parts of
the period, and in non-dramatic textual evidence that also bears witness to the multiple
means by which the body and its parts come to be endowed with epistemological value.
Whether intended for the theatre or for the reader’s consumption, these historical and
dramatic texts all attest to my claim that the opportunity for discovery and
empowerment attends many performances of the body’s violation. It is within this
culture of bodily knowledge that spectators of early modern plays find themselves
called upon to participate in theatrical violence that opens up the body in order to
epistemologically empower the dissector and his audience.
Spurred on by Belgian-born anatomist Andreas Vesalius, the efforts of English
and European Renaissance anatomists contributed to a more comprehensive and
accurate understanding of the human body than had ever been achieved in the
“section” (which has an anatomical etymology) also comes to prominence as many books draw upon the
discourse of anatomization in their formal structure. While literary anatomies certainly attest to the farreaching effects of anatomy, its vocabulary, and its concepts, this is not an argument I put forth here,
since the analysis of the literary anatomy has already been insightfully handled by a number of other
scholars. See especially Devon Hodges’s Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy (1985) and Grant Williams’
“Disfiguring the Body of Knowledge: Anatomical Discourse and Robert Burton’s Anatomy of
Melancholy” (2001). While some of the historical documents I include in my analysis self-identify as
anatomies, I analyze these texts for their content, not for the way they link their structure to anatomical
discourse. The authors I deal with focus on the body as their subject matter, whereas the literary anatomy
is not necessarily as useful for my purposes since it need not in fact be about the body at all.
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anatomical works of Galen, Aristotle, and Mondino, some of Vesalius’s most notable
ancient and medieval predecessors. Although the older models of these anatomists
were still popular in the Renaissance—so much so that Andrea Carlino refers to a “blind
adherence to classical authorities” and a “monopoly of the Galenists” (Books of the
Body 2) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries— eventually, Vesalius effectively
overturned the Galenic paradigm in what is often referred to as the “Vesalian
revolution” of anatomy. His efforts were reflected, albeit belatedly, in English
anatomical praxis and theory. What I would like to emphasize here is the way in which
Vesalius’s approach to the discipline of anatomy positioned the body, and its visceral
exploration, at the heart of all anatomical learning. This change is noteworthy because
it catalyzes a discursive construction of the body that is reflected in, and refracted by,
early modern plays that inflect corporeal violence with anatomical or dissective
nuances. Never before had the tangible body and all of its parts occupied such a central
position within anatomical study. As Jonathan Sawday writes,
Vesalius and his contemporaries…in their urge to overturn Galenic authority,
stressed the primacy of ‘ocular evidence’ in their explorations of the body. The
important difference between their undertakings and those of classical authority,
they continually claimed, was that, unlike Galen and those who followed Galen,
they had seen the body with their own eyes. (26, emphasis in original)
Sawday’s choice to use and italicize a tautological expression—seeing the body with
one’s own eyes—is significant, I believe. His phrasing suggests the degree to which the
penetrative visual encounter (and further, the tactile, visceral encounter) with the body
would become a defining feature of the newly revitalized discipline of anatomy. The
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Vesalian approach emphasized “autopsia, seeing-for-oneself,” as Cunningham puts it
(“The End of the Sacred Ritual of Anatomy” 190). A German student of anatomy,
Baldasar Heseler (whom Sawday mentions only once in his book, in a different context
than I do here), records his experience of Vesalius’s teachings in terms remarkably
close to those Sawday uses: during dissection “[Vesalius] showed us pictures which he
has published in his little book and in his Tabulae and he compared them with the
present subject, and to be sure, they corresponded completely. For I saw this with my
own eyes, as I stood quite near” (237, emphasis added)27. If Vesalius’s precursors had
“seen” the body through the eyes of others, in reported textual form, anatomists, or
would-be anatomists, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are encouraged to “see”
in an entirely different way, in an unmediated, perceptually immediate way.
As is evident in Heseler’s commentary on Vesalius’s anatomy lesson, ocular
observation not only enters into dialogue with textual authority, but becomes the means
by which prior information is validated or rejected, and thus new knowledge gained.
Opened up before the anatomist’s eyes, the body has the final word. It is this shift in
the theory and praxis of dissective science that makes the anatomical investigation
resonate so powerfully with the body-centered dynamics of the theatre. Characters like
Lear, Soranzo, and D’Amville, who wish to acquire knowledge of others, are
(sometimes compulsively) drawn to the possibility of fulfilling their wishes by seeing
the body opened up, and their fantasies (whether unrealized or not) encouraged early
modern spectators to perceive enactments of the body’s violation as occasions for
27

Heseler’s eyewitness account of the 1540 dissections at Bologna is a valuable piece of historical
evidence. Heseler’s notes form the earliest first-hand spectator account of Vesalius’s lectures. See
Charles O’ Malley’s article, “The Anatomical Sketches of Vitus Tritonius Athesinus and Their
Relationship to Vesalius’s Tabulae Anatomicae” for how Athesinus’s notes (reportedly documenting a
public anatomy of Vesalius’s in 1537, and thus earlier than Heseler’s account) are in fact revised after the
fact and supplemented with material from Galen and other textual sources.
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epistemological empowerment. The body-as-proof engendered a means of responding
to instances of penetrative violence based on the promise of discovery and revelation,
rather than upon the destruction of the human frame.
As both Sawday and Carlino note, and as is evident even from the
quodlibetarian model of dissection (see Fig. 1 below), prior to Vesalius the transmission
and cultivation of anatomical learning was, counterintuitively, text-centered28. What
Sawday calls the patrilineal model of the body’s history helped to promulgate the work
of the ancients by favouring textual information rather than practical advancements in
knowledge that could have literally rewritten history29. Mondino’s approach, for
example, holds up the textual authority of prior authors of anatomy over and above
first-hand discoveries he might have made in his own dissections. Of key significance
to my analysis of bodily dynamics in the playhouses is the transfer from the Mondinolike model of textual authority to corporeal authority, which would install the body as
the primary referent of knowledge in the Renaissance anatomist’s quest to know human
anatomy better. Although it would seem as though the practical demonstration Heseler
relates is still reminiscent of pre-early modern anatomy, where “the purpose of
dissection is the verification or demonstration of the text” (Wilson 64), the Heseler
example is in fact subtly, but importantly different. Heseler seems to suggest that the
dissected subject is, in relation to Vesalius’s drawings, at least in a position of equal

28

The quodlibetarian model was the one prevailing prior to the Vesalian revolution. In keeping with this
model, those participating in the process of dissection assumed compartmentalized roles. During the
dissection, the demonstrator (ostensor) and the reader (lector) were at a remove from the cadaver because
the surgeon (sector) physically performed the dissection, while the learned anatomy lector (lecturer) read
from a canonical anatomy text; one often used in Renaissance dissections was Mondino de Luzzi’s
Anathomia (1316).
29

Sawday offers a useful genealogy of how knowledge of the human body was textually transmitted
throughout the ages, from the Alexandrians and onwards (see p. 39).
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Fig. 1. An example of a dissection performed in accordance with the quodlibetarian model. From
Johannes de Ketham, Fasciculo di Medicina (1493). As many critics of this image have noted, the
textually-based learning represented by the professor triumphs over the manual manipulation of the body,
and what it might reveal in the moment of dissection. Credit: Wellcome Library.
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authority, for he notes that they correspond. The ambiguity of the pronoun “they” in
Heseler’s writing is instructive; if “they” refers to both the body and the text, the
implied meaning of “they correspond” is that neither the cadaver nor Vesalius’s book
holds out ultimate authority: both are equalized in relation to one another. If “they” is
taken to refer back to Vesalius’s published pictures, then the transfer of authority from
text to body is even stronger: the latter is being checked against the former, in a radical
reversal of the Mondino hierarchy. Heseler’s engagement with Vesalius’s methodology
gives us some indication of the body’s newly acquired agency in the empirically
oriented dissective science of the mid- to late Renaissance. As I will show, Heseler is
one of many writers in the period who understand the body and its entrails as something
more than simply that which can be read to be learned or known. It is this very
understanding of the body which is conveyed to the spectators of plays that “would find
out by […] anatomy” (The Atheist’s Tragedy 5.2.144) something more about the
particular individual under scrutiny and also about the human subject he or she is taken
to represent. Under this logic, when in early modern drama the human body is cut into,
or when its entrails are exposed, even if the circumstances surrounding this exposure
victimize the character, the audience is still left with the opportunity to view violence in
a revelatory light. Plays in this vein affix their attention not to reading about bodily
interiority—for what could Lear glean from an anatomy textbook about his daughter’s
“hard heart”?—but to seeing and performing anatomization in a way that tempers its
necessary corporeal violence with the promise of visceral knowledge.
Working to challenge the flawed information that resulted from his
predecessors’ reluctance to confront the body’s viscera, Vesalius’s approach sought to
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synthesize the multiple roles within the quodlibetarian model into one. The anatomist
now became the dissector. A painting (c. 1580) depicting English anatomist, physician,
and surgeon John Banister (1533-1610) delivering a lecture on anatomy at the BarberSurgeons’ Hall illustrates the consolidation of these two identities within the newly
reformed practice of dissection (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. A depiction of a dissection later in the period (c. 1580) in which the anatomist-lecturer (here, John
Banister) no longer distances himself from the corpse. From John Banister’s Anatomical Tables. Credit:
Anatomy Acts Exhibition Website.

In his emphasis on praxis, Vesalius made direct contact with the physical body of
paramount importance for members of the medical profession like Banister, and for the
student of medicine. The new corporeally-centered science of the later sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries would in turn play a formative role in intensifying interest in the
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body, and in shaping the direction of that interest not only for members of the medical
community but for the early modern public at large. Because “anatomy is as it were a
most certaine and sure guide to the admirable and most excellent knowledge of
ourselues, that is of our owne proper nature” and of the nature of “all those things which
are contained in the most spacious and ample bosom of this whole Vniuerse” (Crooke
13-14, 12), the early modern body became welded to epistemes not merely confined to
scientific disciplines. Unsurprisingly, then, the far-reaching, almost cosmic application
of the revelations promised by anatomization extends to dramatic depictions of bodies
whose interiors are seemingly irresistible to those seeking the kind of knowledge
Crooke describes.
Of course, the acquisition of bodily knowledge is not a pursuit exclusive to the
Renaissance; it is at stake for both ancient and early modern anatomists. In many ways,
the human body has always been a body of knowledge. However, what leads me to
emphasize the epistemological drive of Renaissance anatomical inquiry in what is
primarily a project on drama is the way in which that drive is literally and figuratively
solidified in the body to body encounter. I would respond to the reservations voiced by
Hillman and Sugg regarding modern criticism’s reductive assimilation of staged
violence and public dissection by asserting that, in terms of its heavy focus on learning
about the body by using the body itself, the early modern practice of anatomy resonates
closely with the intercorporeal dynamics produced by plays that adopt dissective
discourse. Although pre-early modern anatomists certainly depended upon the practice
of dissection to further their knowledge of the body, an even higher value was placed
upon textual learning; by contrast, post-Vesalian anatomy prioritized the experience of
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being in the physical presence of the opened body. In terms of their mutual
endorsement of the body-as-proof, the intimacy that developed between the two arenas
of dissective science and dramatic performance during the early modern period might
not have been possible without the shift to a less text-heavy economy of anatomical
learning. This shift certainly has valuable methodological implications. It enables me
to consider the anatomical discourse of the Renaissance as participating in a cultural
awareness that also informed the theatre and spectator responses to violent
entertainment, and to look beyond the fact that characters like Lear or D’Amville or
Webster’s Ferdinand (The Duchess of Malfi) explicitly import the vocabulary and
practices of English Renaissance anatomists into the playhouses via references to
anatomies and the processes of dissection30. These kinds of allusions in plays, while
providing valuable examples for analysis, give us only part of the picture if we lose
sight of the three-dimensional bodies that perpetrate (and withstand) corporeal violation
in performance.
It is for this reason that I have also maintained that the
presentation/representation divide is instrumental in structuring a particular kind of
response to the body’s violation, one which is guided by the spectator’s knowledge that
the actor’s living body is able to withstand the death and decay typically accompanying
non-representational wounding and cutting of the body. Allusions to anatomical
science in playtexts are not simply (inter)textual, but also draw upon the physical
dynamics of events that are performed on, or between, two or more bodies. To study
30

Ferdinand makes a topical reference to the Barber-Surgeons of London, who gave anatomy lessons,
and sometimes performed dissections (see The Duchess of Malfi 5.2.77-80). References such as these
abound in plays of the time (see especially Neill, Nunn, and Sugg for further examples). For more
information on the Barber-Surgeons see Dobson and Walker’s Barbers and Barber-Surgeons of London:
A History of the Barbers’ and Barber-Surgeons Companies (1979).
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theatricalized dissections only as textual representations would be to “flatten” the body
in the same way Galen and his followers did, by studying a “human organism […]
composed not of bone, muscle, and tissue, but of books” (Sugg 1). It would be to
ignore the magnetism of the physically present, material body which so evidently
captivated the early modern public’s attention, and the attention of theatre audiences.
As I imply below in my analysis of The Bloody Banquet, in both playwrights’ and
anatomists’ excavations of the body, spectators are imbricated in a process of visual and
verbal unveiling that deserves to be carefully differentiated from readers’ textual
encounters with anatomized bodies. When the play directs the banquet attendees to
“wonder” at “what’s seene” it instructs witnesses inside and outside the fictional frame
to partake in an embodied and sensory learning experience that revolves around a three
dimensional, visibly present body. What is to be known—the body and its story—
cannot truly be known unless it is seen, as the Tyrant in The Bloody Banquet expresses,
and as anatomists of the time intimate. In this respect, the Tyrant’s lines fall short of
their meaning if they are read only as text and not interpreted with regard to the
performance they call for. In anticipation of the presence of a sensorily engaged
audience (both onstage and off), the visceral dynamics of the banquet scene draw their
significance from the potential performance of the body as cannibalized flesh and as
optical object of “wonder” (s.d. 1922). While the many writers of literary anatomies in
the period textualized the body, or corporealized the text, anatomical epistemology
disseminated the idea that the body, and its knowledge, could not simply be reduced to
text, or confined to books. The visceral experience of other human bodies was better,
the anatomists claimed, for the advancement of learning, and many fictional characters
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seem to have taken this instruction to heart in their violent fantasies of corporeal access.
By referencing anatomy and dissection, dramatists invoke not just literary contexts, and
not just the content of anatomical textbooks, but also live, fleshly contexts like actual
dissections, the allure of which was transferrable to theatrical performance precisely
because it, too, was live.
As the sixteenth century progresses, what the authors of anatomical treatises
look for, discover, and describe is likely to be governed by a connection (or a desired
connection) to the material human body. John Caius (1510-1573), for example, adhered
to the classic teachings of Galen and Hippocrates in his lectures for the BarberSurgeons of London, but in 1552 he published an account of disease (sweating sickness)
based on his own direct observations of those suffering from illness—a first in
England’s medical publication history (Buckland-Wright 807). Eventually, once
Vesalius’s influence reached England, this kind of primary contact with the body would
become first and foremost the ground of knowledge, rather than the (often out-of-date)
texts which offered second-hand knowledge about the body31. It is in this new spirit of
direct observation, experimentation, and treatment, that John Banister annexed to his
Needefull, New, and Necessarie Treatise of Chyrurgerie (first published in 1575) the
experiments he claims on his title page are “mine ovvne inuention, truely tried, and
daily of me practised.” In 1594, The Pearle of Practise, or Practisers Pearle, For
Phisicke and Chirurgerie (authored by John Hester, but “found out” by James
31

J.C. Buckland-Wright identifies the work of John Banister, who lectured for the Barber-Surgeons, as
the turning point in England’s transition from antiquated to “modern” anatomical practices. Although the
Barber-Surgeons were licensed by Henry VIII to perform four dissections per year beginning in 1540,
Banister was the first lecturer to use and publish (in 1578) the new discoveries derived from the groundbreaking work of Vesalius and Columbus on the continent (see Buckland-Wright 810-811). The reforms
in the medical community are also coincident with the popularization of anatomy, which in the 1570’s
“swept England” with “new intellectual and dramatic possibilities” (Sugg 2).
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Fourestier after his death) reflects a similar emphasis, promising on its title page “the
learned obseruations and prooued practises of many expert men in both faculties.”
Virtually the entire text (pages 1-72) intersperses a collection of anecdotes regarding the
healing of various illnesses and injuries with the appropriate treatments for each case.
These anecdotes anchor the text firmly in the realm of empirical bodily knowledge,
recording the experiences of several practitioners (listed in the text by their initials) with
a diverse population of men, women, and children. Even though the tangible
immediacy of this kind of intercorporeal connection is sustained and recorded textually
(in anatomy textbooks, surgical manuals, instructional medical treatises, philosophical
and theological tracts on the body, and other historical records like the Barber-Surgeons
annals), and even though the fantasy of intracorporeal knowledge may have substituted
for first-hand experience, these texts disclose the preeminence of the intimate body to
body encounters that the new anatomical science and discourse popularized in its
practice and theory. I propose, then, that the way early moderns outside the theatres
document their conceptual and hands-on engagements with anatomy and dissection can
help to fill in some of the gaps left by evidence regarding audience engagement with
violated bodies in the theatre. In their non-dramatic writings on the body, these authors
attest to the association between knowledge and the palpable human body that would
resurface both in the texts of plays, and in the available frames of reference that
shadowed theatrical performances of violently articulated bodily discoveries.
A macabre scene from The Bloody Banquet (1639) provides an excellent
example, in that it offers spectators the opportunity to perceive the play’s “bloodiness”
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through the lens of anatomy32. These anatomical outlines ultimately allow the violated
body to produce knowledge and power for the characters who look upon it. Instead of
merely embodying destruction, the eponymous bloody banquet takes on the qualities of
an anatomy lesson or lecture in its preoccupation with intensively viewing and thereby
learning from the body on display. Near the play’s conclusion, stage directions indicate
that flesh and a “skull all bloody” (1920) are brought in for an adulterous Queen to eat
(and presumably drink blood from) as her punishment. The scene is reminiscent of a
perverse anatomy lecture, for the skull and limbs of the Queen’s lover, Tymethes,
provide a focal point around which the Tyrant (the victim of the Queen’s infidelity)
explains at length the precipitating events behind the bloody banquet. Although the
Tyrant’s narrative relates the Queen’s punishment—to “taste no other sustenance […] /
Till her loves body be consum’d in hers” (1949-50), the scene is not punitive in nature;
rather, much like a dissection it is structured around a process of verbal exegesis that
relates to a present audience (the banqueters) the meaning of the sight they see before
them. What might have been only a gruesome sight to behold, both for viewers inside
and outside the fictional world, is reconfigured as an occasion for epistemological
empowerment. Eventually, the information the banqueters glean extends beyond the
purpose of the banquet to the identity of the corpse itself, bringing the attention back
around full circle to the fleshly matter from whence it originated. As in the Vesalian
anatomy lesson, those present participate in centralizing the body within a process of
disclosure that relies heavily upon bearing witness by “seeing with one’s own eyes.”
32

There is no universal critical consensus on the play’s author. In Thomas Middleton: The Collected
Works, the play is included as a Middleton-Dekker collaboration. The text I cite here is the Malone
Society reprint (1962), in which Samuel Schoenbaum gives a brief summary of potential authorship
theories (see v-vi). See also Gary Taylor’s article “Thomas Middleton, Thomas Dekker, and The Bloody
Banquet” in Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 94.2 (2000):197-233 for further discussion
of authorship of the play.

148
As it was with Sawday’s use of the phrase, here the tautological nature of the expression
is appropriate, for the scene itself seems to overemphasize how much these characters
use their ocular faculties: the Tyrant’s own emphasis on the banqueters’ eyes and their
insistent desire to see is equally matched by the way his guests self-identify as
onlookers. Indeed, prior to the Tyrant’s elucidation the guests have already noticed
“three quarters of a man hung up” (Tymethes’s remains) and asked, “What horrid and
inhumaine spectacle / Is yonder that presents it selfe to sight?” (1883, 1881-82). These
are inquisitive guests who describe their engagement with Tymethes’s body in terms of
what they can see; one guest (the King displaced by the usurping Tyrant) even
complains, “Where ere I looke these limbes are in mine eye” (1915).
All of these pointed references to seeing suggest the climactic scene of the play
is not just intended to convey the horror of forced cannibalism. As much as this is a
scene about violence done to Tymethes’s body and to the Queen’s humanity, it is also
about what the violated body can reveal, and how those on the receiving end of that
revelation can access the body’s information. If the repeated mentions of the bloody
spectacle might encourage spectators to “grossly gape” (Othello 3.3.400) at what they
see onstage, the scene’s self-reflexivity about the connection between seeing the body
and extracting its knowledge suggests that spectators turn their attention back upon
themselves as well, and reflect upon what can be gained when one’s eyes become
“serious suitors” (The Bloody Banquet 1925) to the meaning of what is laid out before
them. When the deposed King discovers his son is the victim whose flesh is on
gruesome display, he utters “my sonne Tymethes” (1956, italics in original), verbally
and symbolically closing the “anatomy lesson” and reiterating one of its major findings:
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the identity of the corpse. The King seems to gain not just information, but power as
well from the “lesson” his eyes have sought—indeed, the play suggests that one follows
upon the other, for immediately following the disclosure of Tymethes’s name and his
body’s “narrative,” the King is able to execute his plan to defeat the Tyrant. The King
is also able to effectively transfer his power, since in the play’s denouement Tymethes’s
death is redefined as a sacrifice that is divinely compensated for by the reappearance of
the King’s younger son, who will be the kingdom’s new ruler. The plot’s conclusion,
although moving away from what I have argued are the echoes of anatomical
demonstration in the banquet scene, is the culmination of the play’s reworking of the
consequences of corporeal violence. Invoking and reflecting its liaisons with the
pursuit of knowledge via dissection, in the end The Bloody Banquet self-consciously
reframes its violence in terms of achievement, rather than loss, and models for
spectators the potential epistemological empowerment that may await witnesses of
bloody spectacles.
The Bloody Banquet places vision and empowerment at the heart of its
characters’ encounter with the body’s entrails, and in doing so, it strikes up a dialogue
with the practice and pedagogy of English anatomists who, following the Vesalian
revolution, valorized direct observation and contact with the body. In the work of
William Harvey (1578-1657), the English physician recognized as the first to accurately
detail the blood’s circulation, we find a clear emphasis on seeing as a prelude and
partner to knowing. In 1616, Harvey’s assessment of anatomy was forcefully ocularcentric: “Anatomy is that branch of learning which teaches…by ocular inspection and
dissection” (qtd. in Wilson 76). In Harvey’s estimation, seeing enables anatomical
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knowledge, empowering the beholder, the dissector, or the surgeon to learn and to
engage with the body which is at the receiving end of the anatomical cut. Three aspects
of Harvey’s statement reroute us back to the drama of his time: dissection, visuality, and
the promise of learning. Instructing his auditors much like an anatomist in a dissection
would, the Tyrant in The Bloody Banquet mitigates the horror of the dismembered body
on display by associating the act of seeing with the acquisition of knowledge: “I will
discourse; what’s seene shall now be knowne” (1926), he states. The insistent
epistemological visuality of this scene—the idea that seeing prepares one for
knowing—is coupled with the fact that a body lies at the center of visual attention,
directing the revelation of information. Once more, Othello provides an apt phrase: this
is a version of “ocular proof” (3.3.365) but without its attendant anxieties. Such
empirical “proof” requires a number of elements that are clearly also the structuring
properties of the anatomy lesson: lecturer and audience, demonstration and witnessing.
What should be the horrific aftermath of the body’s destruction becomes at the same
time the catalyst for the production of knowledge, allowing spectators to engage with
corporeal violation in a way that can prove to be pleasurable rather than disconcerting.
What I have been suggesting is the importance of examining what perhaps might
be termed the “interfaces” by which the body came to be associated with knowledge
and learning in early modern anatomical culture. The promise of corporeal knowledge,
which the science of anatomy encouraged early moderns to view as a window onto the
nature of human beings and their divine creator, was most present in the body to body
encounter, and thus was most ardently promised by both the dramatic and the
anatomical theatres. Spectators in both arenas were persuaded to overlook the body’s
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destruction, which could be quite “horrid and inhumaine” as The Bloody Banquet
asserts, by the popular notion that opened bodies were gateways themselves—to the
acquisition of higher knowledge epitomized or evidenced by the human body’s
structure and contents. Violent entertainment, then, appealed not to a twisted or dark
facet of audiences’ desires, but to the very real promise that bearing witness to the
body’s sometimes bloody undoing could be instructive, edifying, and empowering.
I have also remarked upon the value in remaining attentive to how theatre
functions as a medium, especially in terms of how spectators are invited to process the
bodies onstage and all that befalls them33. Implied, but not directly stated, in Paster’s
and Garner’s comments about the centrality of the actor’s body in dramatic performance
is the idea that theatre is not just about one body (the actor’s body) but at least two. The
“spectator’s gaze” (Garner’s phrase, as cited at the beginning of this chapter) involves
an intercorporeal relationship between a physically present witness and the body that is
witnessed, as does the way the actor’s body signifies (Paster’s focal interest). While the
dynamic between anatomist and corpse is not dialogic in the same way it is for spectator
and actor, Renaissance anatomy comes to be defined by a praxis that nevertheless
occurs between simultaneously present bodies, replacing the formerly cherished
interface between reader and the absent bodies represented in text. As Vesalius
expresses in his writing and teachings, immediate contact with the cadaver, and
apprehension of all its parts, is not to be avoided, but rather to be welcomed. Whether
between anatomist and corpse, or between the fictional dissector and the dissected,
“from this point on, the opening of the body will serve as the basis of new knowledge”

33

See Samuel Weber’s Theatricality as Medium (2004) for a philosophically and theoretically informed
analysis of why theatre deserves consideration as a medium whose properties affect and effect meaning.
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(J. Martin 224). Following Vesalius, English anatomists endeavored to use the body in
front of them, rather than the textual body of anatomical work that lay behind them.
“Demonstrare propria illius Cadaveris Nova vel Noviter inventa,” vows Harvey in the
second of his “Canones Anatomiae Generalis,” the numbered pedagogical selfreminders that he lays down at the beginning of his Prelectiones. In his determination
to “demonstrate the particular features of the body on the table” (the translation of this
second rule, given by the Royal College of Physicians of London in their 1882
reproduction of his notes), Harvey offers to his anatomy students the opportunity to
value the sensory information the sensible flesh has to offer. Harvey’s pedagogy, like
the other medical methodologies discussed in this chapter, encapsulates an intensively
body-oriented epistemology that in the early modern period migrated from its scientific
context into the playwright’s imagination, and into the playgoer’s frame of reference.
Preparing the spectator of dramatic theatre to engage with, rather than just visually
consume, the spectacular violence exacted upon performing bodies, the cultural
(en)trails that left their mark upon staged images of brutality offered spectators an
alternative to the “shattering” experience of horror. If dissections, both of the anatomy
and of the dramatic theatres, could not avoid the body’s destruction, they nevertheless
offered something else in return—a body of knowledge that duplicated within the
boundaries of its frame the structure of everything outside itself. They offered each
audience member the opportunity to extract this paradigmatic knowledge, and to
become “an emp’ror of a world, / This little world of man” (The Atheist’s Tragedy
3.3.44-45).
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Actors Dead and Alive
While anatomical constructions of the body’s inherent epistemological value
insinuated their way into enactments of violence on the Renaissance stage, the
embodiment of “disectees” in the playhouses was also crucially different than in the
anatomy theatres, despite the fact that both venues shared many definitive features of
performance. If the body and its recesses could facilitate a larger understanding of the
relationship between body, self, and world, what were the implications for this
knowledge (and access to it) when the body in question was not simply a corpse?
Where dramatized violence borrowed from anatomical discourse and practice, it also
departed from live anatomies in the way subjects of dissection were embodied, since
actors in their actor/character blend were capable of withstanding the body’s (seeming)
physical disintegration without actually sustaining permanent damage in the way that
corpses did. Dramatists’ reminders to audiences of this fact are not as overtly
metatheatrical as the examples discussed in Chapter One, but they exist nonetheless. In
what follows, I offer examples from Shakespeare and Ford that exemplify how, and to
what end, dissectively-imbued dramatic violence provides a unique experience of the
body’s unveiling, a focus I sustain and develop throughout the following chapter as
well.
In a scene from As You Like It, Silvius, a shepherd, calls upon Petrarchan
convention to convince his beloved shepherdess, Phebe, of the intensity of his love. He
does so by imploring her to show more compassion than “the common
executioner…that dies and lives by bloody drops” (3.5.3-7). In an extended metaphor
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to which both Silvius and Phebe contribute, love’s potential to physically wound a lover
is (very briefly) considered, then debated, and rejected:
PHOEBE: Thou tell’st me there is murder in mine eye.
[…]
And if mine eyes can wound, now let them kill thee.
Now counterfeit to swoon, why now fall down;
Or if thou canst not, O, for shame, for shame,
Lie not, to say mine eyes are murderers.
Now show the wound mine eye hath made in thee.
Scratch thee but with a pin, and there remains
Some scar of it. Lean upon a rush,
The cicatrice and capable impressure
Thy palm some moment keeps. But now mine eyes,
Which I have darted at thee, hurt thee not;
Nor I am sure there is no force in eyes
That can do hurt.
SILVIUS: O dear Phoebe,
If ever—as that ever may be near—
You meet in some fresh cheek the power of fancy,
Then shall you know the wounds invisible
That love’s keen arrows make. (3.5.10-32)
Phebe’s response is intended to deflate the rhetorical logic that would endow that which
is immaterial (love) with the power to bring about physiological effects. However, the
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scene’s complex treatment of the body’s relationship to material and immaterial
violence is worthy of further consideration. A similar exchange is to be found in Ford’s
’Tis Pity She’s a Whore:
SORANZO: Did you but see my heart, then you would swear—
ANNABELLA: That you were dead.
[…]
SORANZO: I’m sick, and sick to th’heart.
ANNABELLA [calling]:

Help, aqua vitae!

SORANZO: What mean you?
ANNABELLA:

Why, I thought you had been sick. (3.2.23-24; 35-

36)
In both instances two different understandings of the body seem to be at play. Before
the addressees of their amorous petitions respond, both Soranzo and Silvius are able to
conflate emotional and physical wounding or illness by drawing upon the conventions
of Petrarchan cliché. Phoebe, however, demands that her suitor recognize that love’s
“wounds” are different than the discernible imprint recorded by the body as a result of
its vulnerability to the material world. Annabella similarly insists upon the difference
between Soranzo’s vulnerable emotional state and his true physiological state, by
following through on the literal implications of his bodily discourse. Onstage, these
two scenes have the power to remind audiences that the body in performance has real
presence for them as a fleshly entity. And yet it is not quite the case that the literalizing,
material focus of Annabella’s and Phoebe’s approach to the body triumphs, and that
spectators are invited to see the actor’s signifying body in relation to its external
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influences in a way that neatly divides “wounds invisible” and that which can truly
leave the body hurt, scarred, or dead. The very idea of invisible wounds—and indeed,
the whole trajectory of these two conversations about the body—encapsulates the
paradox lurking within the actor’s doubly defined body as both self and character. The
actor/character’s body participates in producing an effect of physical trauma that carries
the force and semiotic weight of material violence, but which is also immaterial in the
sense that it leaves only a fictional corporeal mark in its wake. In an important sense,
Silvius’s comparison of Phoebe to one who “dies and lives by bloody drops,” is not just
a lover’s hyperbole, but an analogy for the performing body’s ability to sustain fictional
injury or death and, of course, live on past the performance’s bloody drops.
In the same way, Annabella metatheatrically points towards the body’s
paradoxical capacity to die and live through theatrical violence. At the level of fiction,
Annabella is right to imply that “one can literally see the heart only when its owner is
dead and cut open” (Bevington 1937)34; the body of Soranzo as character would have to
die in order for her to accomplish what he implores. However, the actor’s body can
survive what its character’s cannot. As the play will shortly imply with spectacular
force, in performance Annabella’s statement rings partly true and partly false. When
Giovanni enters with Annabella’s eviscerated and bloody heart upon his dagger (5.6.10)
spectators see the evidence of a violent act that has killed the character (thus affirming
Annabella’s observation that the body must die when its heart is to be seen) but not the
actor. The death of the character but not the actor thereby complicates the applicability
of Annabella’s observation to theatrical events, suggesting spectators think further
about how the body participates in staged violence. The heart materializes as a
34
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legitimate theatrical object only under the condition that it belongs to the acted persona
and not the actor’s own person. Where the Barber-Surgeons could produce an
eviscerated human heart for their audiences, Ford’s theatre produced a prop, however
grisly and convincing that prop may or may not have been35. Yet in some sense the
heart in the performance of ’Tis Pity does belong to both character and actor, for their
bodies may be perceptually distinguishable—as male actor adopting a female role, for
example—but are anchored in only one indivisible human body. As such, this
particular body, the paradoxically doubled but singular body, can “show” spectators its
heart and avoid the fate Annabella attributes to the dissected body. As a result of
Annabella’s allusion to dissection and her own subjection to it, the phenomenology of
the theatrical body comes into full view; this body gives itself to spectators as a
suffering or violated entity, and yet also as a body whose material physiology is
protected by virtue of the necessarily fictional quality of dramatically staged dissection.
Where violence is aligned with dissection, as it is in Ford’s play, the difference
between the capabilities of the performing body and the anatomist’s corpse is acutely
delivered to the audience. Annabella’s statement and Phoebe and Silvius’s debate
remind spectators why staged violence—even if as seemingly influential upon the body
as “love’s keen arrows”—can only finally aim to inflict invisible wounds upon its
victims. The actor’s body in character, like the figure of the afflicted lover represented
in Soranzo and Silvius, sustains damage that can seem to be physiologically destructive,
but which falls just short of exacting the physical consequences it purports to bring
35

Famously, the plot of Peele’s The Battle of Alcazar calls for stage properties that include three vials of
blood, a sheep’s gather, raw flesh, and decapitated heads; see Greg’s mention of these stage directions in
Two Elizabethan Stage Abridgements (pp. 30, 32, 36, 62). Although no stage directions exist in ’Tis Pity
to clarify what exactly would have been used to represent Annabella’s heart in the early modern theatre,
Cynthia Marshall’s assertion that “an animal’s heart would be on the dagger” (140) seems likely in light
of what we do know about how plays staged the body’s viscera.
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about. Where the violence falls short of its mark is where the actor’s body in and of
itself materializes for spectators. In both the anatomical and dramatic theatres, what
Garner calls the violated body’s “insistent facticity” matters, but, as Garner expresses,
when that facticity is inscribed within the symbolic field of theatre, it can cut through
“the representational structures erected to maintain it” (qtd. in Dickson 7), offering the
actor’s bodily presence, rather than what it represents, as a site of attention for the
audience. The mediation between the body’s own material existence and its existence
as and in narrative representation is one that occurs not in the anatomy theatre but in the
dramatic theatre, which can offer its spectators a presented and a represented, fictional,
image. The process of returning the body to itself as matter, the same process Phoebe
enacts when she insists upon the “cicatrice and capable impressure” of materially real
pain as something quite different than metaphorical wounding, places a demand upon
the spectator to recognize, from a vantage point at least partly outside the fiction, how
the theatrical stage uses the material bodies of its actors. Unlike the lifeless corpses of
anatomical study, actors who representationally absorb the violence inflicted upon their
characters are capable of signifying to audiences as both violated and intact, alive and
dead.
As Lisa Dickson notes in her analysis of Titus Andronicus and contemporary
audience response to its violence, “the conventions of the theatre demand that we
remain in our seats instead of rushing to call an ambulance or onto the stage itself to
administer aid” (17). While the analogous scenario for early modern audiences would
sound (and look) somewhat different, the principle behind Dickson’s observation still
applies to an early modern context. When ten thousand early modern Londoners shed
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tears in response to a performance of “brave Talbot,” as Thomas Nashe famously claims
in Pierce Penniless (1592), they “imagine they behold him [Talbot] fresh bleeding”
(qtd. in Gurr, Playgoing 140, emphasis added). Rather than rushing to the stage to tend
to the freshly bleeding Talbot, spectators, according to Nashe, understand that the
powerful spectacle they witness is effected by “the tragedian that represents his
[Talbot’s] person” (qtd. in Gurr 140). Annabella herself, in her response to Soranzo’s
claim to sickness, provides a caution for audience members who would interpret too
literally the body’s professed or ostensible suffering onstage; she does call for help
(albeit disingenuously), and Soranzo’s subsequent confusion over her response makes it
clear that she has erred (however deliberately) in taking his representations of corporeal
pain too seriously. Beaumont’s George and Nell (from The Knight of the Burning
Pestle) provide a similar example (also discussed further in Chapter One): instead of
engaging with represented stage violence as do the bleeding Talbot’s spectators, they
place too much credence in the fighting they witness onstage and interpret the action as
if Rafe’s acting body were about to meet the same fate as his character’s (see 3.339350). Both Beaumont and Ford dramatize what their playtexts suggest is an
inappropriate or misguided response to the body under fictional threat, or the body that
performs, as opposed to genuinely presenting, its own physical pain. While the power
of the represented image certainly commands the attention of those who are witness to
performed bodily violations, the presented image—the actor and his physical
integrity—does not merely disappear altogether under the weight of representation,
these playwrights suggest. If players are “but shadows” (Midsummer Night’s Dream
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5.1.208), a common trope in early modern drama, their lively corporeal shadows
nevertheless inform the way spectators perceive the sum total of staged acts of violence.
I am aware that my argument raises the issue of what Jody Enders calls “death
by drama”—the title of her 2002 monograph exploring the medieval urban legends
about theatre that are “situated at the fuzzy boundary between theatre and real life”
(xxvi). Enders analyzes historical stories that reveal, in her estimation, “what
spectators hoped and feared could happen in the theatre” (xxii, emphasis in original),
one such fear being the possibility that dramatic depictions of violence could lead to
death or something like it. This possibility seems to be what Beaumont hints at through
the lens of comedy when he puts George and Nell in the anxious position of fearing for
Rafe’s safety as he participates in an onstage fistfight. Enders does not extend her
analysis to English Renaissance drama, but one of the most famous events of early
modern drama’s history—the accidental burning of the Globe Theatre in 1613—
suggests that the fear of theatre becoming all too real would not have been irrelevant to
playgoing at the time. Certainly, the slippage between the world of drama and the
world of its spectators was one of the fears expressed by antitheatricalists, and
dramatized by the plays within plays or masques within plays wherein dramatically
planned events turn deadly, or deadly events occur under the guise of drama (Women
Beware Women, The Spanish Tragedy, Love’s Sacrifice, The Revenger’s Tragedy).
Perhaps some of the thrill of spectatorship derived, to borrow Herbert Blau’s oft-quoted
comment about theatre’s mortality, from the fact that “he who is performing can die
there in front of your eyes” (Blau 83). Whether early modern spectators would have
experienced a sense that the actor’s body was not entirely protected from staged
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violence is an important question which deserves more space than the present
discussion allows. It is my contention, however, that the spectator’s perception of a
threat to the actor’s body contributes to the same metatheatrical awareness of the actor’s
duality as does the perception of the actor’s body as inviolable. Both call attention to
the “liveness” of the actor’s body. This live body, and the way it influences the
spectator’s assessment of the phenomenology of stage violence, is important to my
purposes because it distinguishes dissective violence in playhouses from the medical
dissections they so often echo.
By positing the actor’s “liveness” I am making use of a word that has circulated
prominently in modern performance criticism; the word appears most recognizably in
Philip Auslander’s work on contemporary film and television and mediatized culture,
and is used in a context there that I do not wish to import into the present discussion.
The meaning I intend is closer to Blau’s assessment of live performance as undeniably
mortal, in the sense that it depends upon an actor whose presence as flesh and blood
alerts us to the fact that his or her body is alive. Insofar as the acting body can die or “is
in fact doing so” (Blau 83) across a span of time which includes the time elapsed in the
theatre, it is thereby also a live body. It is live in a way that is distinct from the body it
impersonates, because regardless of the ontological status of the character’s body—
whether it is dead, alive, dying, wounded, or even ghostly—the actor’s own particular
physicality is communicated to audiences, permeating both the representational and the
presentational levels of the performance. An eyewitness account from a 1610
performance of Othello at Oxford provides an example much like the Nashe anecdote,
attesting to the way in which spectators can remain aware of the actor’s liveness even
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in—or perhaps especially in—scenes that depict or register after the fact the character’s
bodily violation. In a letter, Henry Jackson, recording the response Desdemona’s death
elicited from spectators, writes about an audience that, like the spectators Nashe
describes, are moved to tears by what one would presume is their engagement with the
represented fiction. The Riverside Shakespeare translation of Jackson’s Latin writing is
as follows: “the celebrated Desdemona, slain in our presence by her husband, although
she pleaded her case very effectively throughout, yet moved [us] more after she was
dead, when lying on the bed, entreated the pity of her spectators by her very
countenance” (qtd. in Kolin 3). The true locus of this audience’s engagement is
complex, however, lying neither wholly with the actor nor with the character he
represents (in this case, Desdemona). Jackson’s account documents Anthony Dawson’s
contention that “as audience members, we shed real tears on account of what we
recognize as unreal feelings; that is, we separate out the actor’s body from what it
represents” (37). Despite the fact that spectators of this performance of Othello shed
tears for the murder they witness unfolding in the drama, thereby demonstrating their
willingness to engage with what the actor’s body represents, they do so, Jackson’s
report suggests, while simultaneously recognizing that there is actorly skill imbuing the
dead Desdemona’s face and persona with life. The translation given in Gāmini
Salgādo’s Eyewitnesses of Shakespeare: First Hand Accounts of Performances 15901890 (1975) is slightly more direct about Desdemona’s capability to affect audiences
after her death: “when she was killed she was even more moving” (30). In both
translations, Jackson’s assessment of the actor-audience dynamic is both puzzling and
revealing; how could Desdemona still garner a powerful response from the audience
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after she dies, thus losing the ability to speak or move? How can one move another
without movement or life?
What Jackson’s peculiar logic suggests is a continued recognition of the actor’s
live body on the part of spectators. Once again, the “insistent facticity” of the body
returns, and, as Dickson claims is the case with staged violence in general, spectators
“know that the character is wounded but that the actor is not” (Dickson 17). To possess
a “countenance” that can affect an audience with its expressive nature is to remind those
watching of an animating force that exists in and beyond the moment of represented
violation and death. Jackson’s description provides a telling instance of the actor’s
ability to seem both dead and alive to spectators. Even as the spectators’ tears imply
their response to Desdemona’s murder, in sympathetically mourning her death, the
audience evidences its persisting and heightened reaction to her persona, a reaction
which happens in relation to an emotionally moving sight that draws upon the actor’s
own live(li)ness. Desdemona’s staged death and its after-effects are both made possible
only by the fact that the actor’s body has lived on past his character’s death. In
response to violence, these spectators seem to experience the performing body as a
doubled image, affirming Desdemona’s death by also affirming the animate vitality of
the body delivering the image of her deadness.
Liveness, then, makes its mark upon the spectatorial experience of sick,
wounded, traumatized, bleeding, and dead bodies, delivering these vitiated bodies to the
spectator’s consciousness in a way that crucially separates what is enacted in the
anatomical theatre from what is re-enacted upon the dramatist’s stage. I have suggested
that plays which draw upon anatomical practice and discourse to inspire fictional acts of
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violence offer spectators the opportunity to relate to the body as a site of knowledge. In
this regard, I have aligned the corporeal dynamics of dissections that are medically
didactic with those that are for the purposes of theatrical entertainment, positing an
intersection between the experiences of playgoers and those of spectators at public or
semi-public (as were the anatomy lectures attended by Baldasar Heseler) dissections.
This alignment encourages spectators of drama—some of whom may also have been
attendees at the dissections performed by the Barber-Surgeons or the Royal College of
Physicians36—to see and move past the experience of violence as nihilistically
destructive in its aims and effects, and to think of the physically mutilated body in terms
of its contribution to larger, immaterial bodies of knowledge. Offering spectators
access to corporeal information, the theatrically-articulated dissections of early modern
drama also extend to playgoers an accompanying promise of epistemological
empowerment.
By cultivating in their spectators a habit of viewing that links the theatrical
opening of the body with the expansion of knowledge, dissectively-imbued
performances complicate the idea that a viscerally shocking event like Gloucester’s
blinding “promote[s] a sense of undoing or loss of control” (Marshall 3). Besides
associating corporeal unveiling with the acquisition of power, these same performances
involve the spectator in a process of reflection upon the presentational level of the
drama, where the actorly body’s physicality matters substantially. As both plays and
36

Dissections became a form of popular social entertainment in Europe as well as in England, attended
not just by members of the medical community but by the lay populace as well (see Nunn pp. 5- 6 and 9).
Early modern Londoners were eager to be present at the limited number of dissections occurring in both
the Barber-Surgeons’ Hall (rebuilt in the mid 1630s as a theatre designed by Inigo Jones) and in the
Royal College of Physicians’ anatomy theatre. So desirable were these events to witness that “records
show that whilst the needs of scholastic anatomy in England during the 1620s and 1630s were
increasingly catered for by secular law, the supply of cadavers was not adequate to provide for the rise in
public dissection as fashionable entertainment” (Billing 4).
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eyewitness accounts show, those who gaze upon and engage with the corpse of a
Desdemona or the remains of an Annabella do not completely see through or past the
materiality of the actor’s body, but rather recognize its capacity to (re)vivify the dead or
dying body of the character. The persistence, rather than the erasure, of the actor’s
vivid liveness in the way characters under physical duress signify in performance means
that “the dynamics of such feigned theatrical destruction of the body” may not “mirror
those of the Barber-Surgeons anatomical dissections” (Nunn 2) or other dissective
contexts as closely as some critics have suggested37.
This last qualification of the anatomy/dramatic theatre analogy is significant
because of what the following chapter describes as a fantasy of vivisection circulating
within the field of early modern medicine, and traceable also in select moments and
images in early modern playtexts. This is a fantasy which goes largely unacknowledged
by anatomists themselves (attesting to the status of vivisection as a cultural taboo) but
which is evidenced by the form that anatomical drawings take, and by textually
recorded commentaries on the process of dissecting corpses. In both their writings and
their artistic reproductions of anatomized bodies, Renaissance anatomists
acknowledged, if sometimes inadvertently, the self-defeating paradox of dissection best
described by Luke Wilson:
In order for the body to function properly, and thus to be what we believe it
really to be, it must deny us access to it—to our selves in other words—either
literally or analogically. Any glimpse of the inside of the body is felt to
37

See also Neill’s discussion of Renaissance anatomy theatres and their “double function” (117). Of the
anatomy theatres, Neill asserts that “on the occasion of the grand public lectures, they became, in the full
sense, ‘theatres’, show-places of the body and stages of improving spectacle, where the anatomist acted a
drama of the human encounter with death” (117).
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invalidate it: a body whose interior is exposed to the eye is felt always to be
impaired or damaged. Knowledge of the inside, ‘true’ body has always been a
logical and emotional inference from the sight of the impaired body. (62)
The writings of Aulus Cornelius Celsus (a pre-Galenic encyclopedist who documented
the important work of Alexandrian anatomists Herophilus and Erasistratus) forward a
claim about vivisection that was to persist into the early modern period: that the best
way to observe anatomy was to cut open men who were alive. (In the case of
Herophilus and Erasistratus, the subjects of vivisection were criminals38.) Following
Aristotle, who claimed that “no part of a cadaver, for example an eye, a hand, is any
longer truly such” since it does not retain its original function (qtd. in Carlino, Books of
the Body 137, note 56), Celsus adheres to the idea that “the best way by far” to ascertain
the body’s true interior structure is through vivisection (qtd. in Carlino 137).
Confirmations of this ethically troubling idea abound in Renaissance medicine, as
dissectors struggle with corpses that decay too quickly for the anatomist’s liking, or that
provide an inferior opportunity for observing the body’s true inner state than would a
live subject. Reportedly, Vesalius “constantly importuned the magistrates to allow him
to take the heads of executed criminals so that he might dissect the brain while still
warm” (qtd. in Sawday 155). What anatomists—and those who would learn from
them—needed was a body that could conquer the self-defeating paradox of dissection.
They needed a body that could submit to dissection while maintaining its own vitality
38

Condemned criminals were the subjects of Renaissance dissections as well. Carlino, like Sawday,
explains how the choice of cadaver was bound up with the judicial system, and that the executed body
was specifically chosen to further punish the soul in the afterlife. Carlino cites regulations that forbid the
dissection of doctors, students, and people of upright/honorable status and encourages the dissection of
foreigners (few were Romans in the sixteenth century period that Carlino surveys) to show that “the
anatomist’s scalpel was to be used on the bodies of marginalized, ignoble, and despised people” (95).
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and true physical integrity. They desired what could only be achieved by the actor’s
performing body.
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4

The Fantasy of Vivisection and Its Theatrical Double

“What shall I do now I behold thy lively body so?”
—Titus Andronicus (3.1.104-5).

Retaining its liveness at the metatheatrical level, the actor’s doubled body could
offer up its physical interiority without succumbing to the processes of decay and
surgical interference that diminished the validity of the results of medical dissection.
Like the Desdemona of Henry Jackson’s spectator account (described in the previous
chapter), the actor’s body was capable of being paradoxically moving in stillness, alive
in death. This body could be “hot ice and wondrous strange black snow” (A
Midsummer Night’s Dream 5.1.59), and “sick health, / Still-waking sleep, that is not
what it is!” (Romeo and Juliet 1.1.173-74). By being “not what it is,” the theatrical
body could do—or appear to do—that which the non-representational body could not:
reveal its internal or physiological mysteries while also remaining, in a sense, immune
to the fundamental physical changes initiated by death and dissection. In this way, the
performing body represented a temporary, but important defeat of human mortality in
terms of the limitations such mortality placed upon discovery of the human anatomy.
Where corpses failed to live up to the ideals of anatomization, their theatrical body
doubles presented spectators with a seductive alternative to the self-defeating paradox
of dissection: the live body anatomized.
The vitality and liveness persisting in the actor’s body during moments or scenes
of physical destruction is of particular importance because key aspects of early modern
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anatomical doctrine define study of the dead body as necessary, but not ultimately ideal
for the development of knowledge. It is rather the live body, with its processes and
structural composition in an uncorrupted and uncompromised state, which can most
fully contribute to a complete and accurate anatomical mapping of the human being.
Without endeavouring to create an irresolvable contradiction in terms, many anatomical
texts nevertheless foster the contradictory idea that the less a subject has met the
conditions for or suffered the consequences of the dissective procedure, the more
pedagogically ideal this subject is. That is, at times, anatomists seem to desire the
impossible: a live body that has been both fully dissected (in the sense of being
physically opened and laid bare) and yet has not undergone dissection at all. This
fantasy of unobtrusive vivisection is vividly articulated in the anatomical texts and
illustrations that I survey in the first half of this chapter, where my aim is to not only
provide evidence of a desire for living anatomies, but to show how this desire was also
shared by the many early moderns outside the scientific community who eagerly
absorbed or were exposed to the published work of anatomists. As was the case in
Chapter Three, I ultimately aim to argue that knowledge of the body is seductive to
spectators in a way that helps to account for the popularity of (sometimes extreme)
corporeal violation, wherein the opening of the body could also tantalize audiences with
the promise of epistemological empowerment. However, the present chapter advances
this argument by analyzing early modern anatomical illustrations and commentaries for
the way they convey to a wide readership of potential theatre spectators the value in
accessing the human body’s interiors in a live, uncorrupted subject.
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Early modern fantasies of vivisection found their way into the theatre, as my
reading of Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy suggests. When I turn to an
extended close reading of Tourneur’s play in the second half of the chapter, I will make
the link between the idealized mode of corporeal access anatomists and their followers
craved, and the way theatrical embodiment in plays like The Atheist’s Tragedy could
seem to satisfy that craving. By offering spectators a paradoxical body that seemed, in
the spectator’s perceptual cognizance of the character’s but not the actor’s wounding,
immune to impairment, dramatic performances of penetrative violence could
approximate for their audiences the experience of human vivisection and its
accompanying ideal corporeal knowledge. Tourneur’s play is itself ideal in illustrating
this particular aspect of spectator experience because it amplifies a widely circulating
fantasy of vivisection by honing spectators’ desires towards the revelation of a live
human brain, which occurs at the play’s climax, where the vivisectee temporarily
retains full control of his body and indeed of his exposed brain(s). The representation
of cranial vivisection in the fictional world exemplifies (up until the victim’s death)
how actors project to audiences the impression of physical invulnerability even as they
(in their actor/character blend) appear to sustain deep, traumatic wounds that can cut to
the very core of what sustains human life. As I will argue, The Atheist’s Tragedy
underscores the importance of the relationship between the paradoxically constituted
stage bodies that early modern theatre drew to its audiences’ attention and the violent
acts in which these bodies participated. Responding to the yearning for a dissective
practice that did not mar its object of study, the violable/inviolable theatrical body
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promised to satisfy a desire for ultimate knowledge of bodily interiority that was
otherwise unavailable to spectators.

Why Vivisection?
At least three issues (which I deal with in turn) are contributing factors to the
desire for a vivisection-like access to the body that was as uninvasive as possible: the
corpse, as opposed to the live human body, was static rather than active, it was subject
to rapid putrefaction, and, once dissected, it had been structurally altered by the
scalpel’s invasive path. To investigate the action of organs and internal systems (the
heart, the circulatory system, respiration, the embryo), some anatomists sought out
animal vivisection rather than human dissection, since the former enabled them to view
internal physiology in motion. Most notable among those who promoted animal
vivisection was Colombo, who thought that “only systematic vivisection” was capable
of “lead[ing] us to the truth” (Cunningham 158). Columbo’s view arose from his belief
that a view of “the body in action” (Cunningham 160) was pedagogically illuminating
and necessary for a complete and accurate understanding of the human body. Of
course, many of the advancements made in medical science during the early modern
period were achieved without the use of vivisection—notably, Harvey’s theory of the
circulatory system. And yet Harvey, and others, shared Columbo’s view on the body in
action, a viewpoint which implicitly denigrated the motionless, inactive corpse as an
object of study, whether or not vivisection was explicitly cited as a reasonable
alternative to dissecting the corpse. To the anatomist, the medical student, or the
surgeon, the body in motion offered more—was more epistemologically desirable—
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than just the dissected cadaver. Although not an advocate of vivisection per se, the
anonymous London surgeon whose 1392 manuscript formed the basis of Vicary’s
popular A Profitable Treatise of the Anatomie of Mans Body (1577) anticipates the
sentiments of other medical practitioners of the early modern period (both in England
and abroad) when he declares the knowledge of the human body’s function to be
essential to surgery. He writes, “And as Galen saith, he that would know the
soothfastness of a thing, busy him not to know only the name of the thing: but the
working and the effect of the same thing” (qtd. in Duncan 237). Vicary clearly agreed,
reproducing the original comment in only slightly different words in the 1577 edition of
his Anatomie: “as Galen sayth, he that wyl knowe the certentie of a thing, let him not
busy him selfe to knowe only the name of that thing, but also the working and the effect
of the same thing” (qtd. in Duncan 238). Echoing these sentiments, Harvey asserts that
“the end of Anatomy is knowledge of the part, why it exists, for what purpose it is
necessary and what is its use” (qtd. in Persaud, The Post-Vesalian Era 58). Even where
vivisection is absent from the conversation, the sentiments of anatomists such as Harvey
and Vicary help to arouse interest in the human physiology at work, and to place a high
value upon its discovery—an achievement which was not possible with the human
corpses that were supplied for dissections.
In the experiments carried out on dogs by Vesalius, and by Colombo, to whose
works Harvey “often referred” (Persaud, The Post-Vesalian Era 56), an understanding
of the “working and the effect” of body parts under investigation is made possible by
the use of a live animal subject, and documentation of these animal vivisections
textually reconstruct what was, during the course of the vivisection, a body in motion,
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alive and pulsing under the anatomist’s knife. Columbo, like Harvey, was motivated by
“an awareness that true knowledge of a part included knowledge of its function”
(French 207), and chose to demonstrate the workings of a living body in his vivisections
on dogs. The last demonstration in the series of Vesalian lectures student Baldasar
Heseler attended features the vivisection of a dog, where one by one Vesalius cuts the
recurrent laryngeal nerves to demonstrate how the voice disappears, in order to “see
[…] the function of the nervi reversivi” in relationship to the dog’s bark (Heseler
292)39. Such features of the living body could not be detected in human subjects with
the medical techniques available to Renaissance anatomists, even though the desire to
witness and learn about living anatomy was strong. Despite rumours that some human
vivisections were conducted in the Renaissance, the live “pulsation of the brain, the
motion of the arteries and the contents of the blood vessels that connected the heart to
the lungs” (French 208) accessible via animal vivisection were functions of the body
only seen first-hand in animal but not human anatomy40.
Importantly, the contrast between the state of the live animal subject designated
for vivisection and the human corpse at the time of dissection testifies to the desirability
of a living object of study in more ways than one. Aside from the fact that the active
processes of the human body had been arrested by the time of dissection, the human
corpse was already in the process of decaying as the dissection took place; Heseler’s
notes refer to a cadaver that “is already stinking” (107) during Vesalius’s
39

40

See Chapter Three for a fuller analysis of Heseler’s eyewitness account of Vesalius’s lectures.

Explaining that dogs became the prime objects of vivisection in the Renaissance (replacing the pigs and
apes that were used in previous practice), French writes that while most early moderns seemed in
agreement about the offensiveness and cruelty of human vivisection, “rumour, however, had it that at
least two Renaissance anatomists succumbed to temptation and ventured into human vivisection” (2).
Such rumours have not been given very much credence by scholars today.
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demonstrations at Bologna, requiring a fresh replacement in order to complete the series
of planned dissective procedures. Putrefaction of the corpse to the point that it became
unusable for study was an inevitability that often arrived all too quickly. In his tenth
demonstration, for example, Vesalius is forced to defer his lesson until the following
day, promising his students that “tomorrow we shall have another body—I believe they
will hang another man upon which I shall demonstrate to you the anatomy of all the
veins, arteries, and nerves. For this subject is now too dryed and wrinkled” (Heseler
177). The body, rather than the anatomist, dictated the anatomist’s own course of
action. As Jacopo Berengario da Carpi (c.1465-1530) describes in his instructions for
dissecting the lower abdomen, “the Work-man must begin his incision from the lower
belly, wherein there are many members first to be Anatomised and cast away, lest if
they bee left behind, they should hinder the rest of the body by their putrefaction and
evil savour” (qtd. in Larkey and Suden 66). Remarking upon the material limitations of
dissection, Ludwig Choulant writes that “in the absence of preservatives, the anatomical
operations of Mundinus [Mondino] and of his followers were necessarily hurried.” He
goes on to say that unfortunately, “this haste has left many marks on the Anathomia,”
Mondino’s canonical anatomy textbook, in which Choulant sees “ample internal
evidence of limitation of material” with regard to what Mondino and other anatomists
could properly do with the corpses they acquired (21-f).
As well, Heseler’s comments indicate that the occasions upon which Vesalius
needed to make use of an additional human corpse or dog resulted not only from overly
decayed subjects, but also from the anatomist’s inability to use what was already at
hand. A body might be deemed inadequate for demonstration because it had been
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damaged either by the cause of death (with human subjects, often hanging) or by a
dissective procedure that had impinged upon another part or parts of the body. In plate
fifty-five of the fifth book of the Fabrica, the accompanying text (here translated by
J.B. Saunders and Charles O’Malley) explains that certain parts of the abdominal cavity
depicted in the illustration have been surgically altered for ease of study: “The omentum
[…] has been entirely resected, for had it been left it would perhaps cover over the
position of some other organ. Furthermore, that the individual organs might be exposed
to view more conveniently, we have fractured the ends of some of the ribs” (Saunders
and O’Malley 160). In one instance, Heseler records Vesalius explaining that because
the cadaver had been hanged it was partially impaired for study; Vesalius instead “used
a dog to demonstrate the muscles that move the neck and head […] because these had
been damaged when the human subject was hanged” (Cunningham 110). Perhaps this
is why Vesalius stresses in one dissection—the female subject featured prominently on
the cover page of the Fabrica—that the bladder and uterus of the corpse have preserved
their original integrity and have remained in exactly the position they were in:
“Everything is seen intact just as it appears to the dissector immediately upon moving
the intestines to one side in a moderately fat woman” (qtd. in O’Malley 143).
The human form seems to seduce its explorers with the promise of a revelation
that one human corpse often cannot make good upon—what, then, would be adequate to
fulfill the needs of the dissector? Part of the answer, I argue, lies in the pictorial
convention of the self-revealing body that appears in the anatomical textbooks
published by Vesalius and his contemporaries in Europe, and in the texts published in
England that plagiarized or were inspired by Vesalius and the European tradition. In
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these images, the artistically rendered body does what the actual human body cannot:
pulls back or discards its own flesh to reveal its internal structure. In doing so, the
fictional rendering belies what should be its status as dead, dissected corpse—should be,
because anatomical illustrations were intended to convey the information anatomists
gleaned from performing dissections upon dead bodies. Although her focus is the
literary anatomy, Devon Hodges asks a question of the Vesalian drawings which
captures what I argue is one of the most notable features of many medical illustrations
of the time. As Hodges sees it, in Vesalius, the skeletons retain some index of human
life, and so she asks, “has an anatomy or a vivisection been performed?” (6). Though he
does not discuss the idea in detail, Sawday, too, refers to the “common Vesalian
practice of suggesting that the body is still, in some measure, alive” (101) and notes that
“until well into the eighteenth century, the conventions of anatomical illustration
demanded that the figure, even at the very deepest stages of dissection, should be
represented as still alive” (112).
Hodges is right to note that the boundary between life and death is “significantly
obscured” (6) in the Vesalian drawings, an indicator of what I suggest is a submerged—
that is, textually inexplicit but present nonetheless—fantasy of vivisection on the part of
the authors of sixteenth and seventeenth century anatomical textbooks. While designed
to depict the structure, location, and function of everything from the skeleton to what
lay just beneath the skin as discovered in the anatomist’s dealings with the human
corpse, the self-revealing body was in fact something quite different than a facsimile of
the supine, lifeless cadaver on the dissection slab. Instead, the figures giving life to the
anatomist’s text are strangely life-like themselves, and free from putrefaction, attesting
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to a desire for a body that retains its essential vitality and structure throughout the
dissector’s interventions. The full-body drawings intended to demonstrate anatomy in
situ even tend to elide what has rendered this anatomy available for observation: the
dissection itself. Excepting the illustrations that depict a public dissection taking place
(as do the Ketham and Banister examples I have included in Chapter Three), the
dissector and his knife rarely make an appearance in the frame, producing the
impression of a body that has miraculously shown itself to the viewer or reader in its
original state without any external tampering.
A number of scholars have discussed the images from Vesalius’s Fabrica and
other similar texts, and a few have pointed to the compensatory strategies embodied
within the images. How, and to what effect anatomists choose to represent the didactic
figure and his or her surroundings is intriguing, and far from a strictly technical,
medical, and demonstrative endeavour. Valerie Traub argues that the animation of
Vesalius’ cadavers in the Fabrica serves to offset the destructive, vitiating procedures
underlying the acquisition of anatomical knowledge. She also notes that Vesalius’s use
of classical statuary counteracts the disorderliness of the internal organs with its
coherent and ideal shape, while the pastoral background draws attention away from the
gruesomeness of the living dead figures. This ordering “attempts to manage the
uncomfortable suspicion that the internal structure and workings of the body do not
always express a beautiful, or what’s worse, fully knowable, design” (Traub 52). Of
French anatomist Charles Estienne’s drawings, Sawday writes, “the images are striving
to offer a context for the dissection which is, above all, an assertion of the naturalness of
the fate which has overtaken the body” (116). Anatomization thereby becomes “a
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demonstration of the eventual shared fate of all bodies” (116) and not a transgressive
desecration of the body.
Despite the invaluable contributions of these and other scholars I continue to
draw inspiration from, I believe there is still more to be said concerning the complex
nature of early modern anatomical illustration, and its tendency to compensate for a
variety of cultural anxieties generated by the act of dissection itself (indeed, the very
thing which has ostensibly enabled the drawings in the first instance). The visual
representation of the human body in anatomical texts speaks to a longing that could not
be fulfilled in anatomical practice: the vivisection of live human beings in order to bear
witness to internal, living human anatomy. Such a desire is perpetuated by the pressure
anatomists and those working with/in the body place upon themselves to do justice to
the body’s activities and motions. “Physicians,” writes Berengario (as translated by
Henry Jackson), “do differ from Builders, for they [builders] doe only know the parts
and composition of Houses, whereof none hath operation, because it is not a living
creature” (Mikrokosmographia 2-3). Berengario goes on to stress that a “real
Anatomy” should take into account the “Operations, Complexions, and Passions” that
are present “in a living man, and not in a dead” (3). The inescapable difficulty towards
which Berengario gestures, but for which he does not offer a direct solution, is how to
access the integral components of a “living man’s” bodily constitution. Anatomists
were to find a partial resolution to this conundrum in the fantasized anatomies they
created through their woodcut and copperplate prints. In this chapter I propose to see
the iconography of the anatomical figure as a symptom of, and inspiration for, a cultural
fantasy of human vivisection that produced a wide radius of influence in the early
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modern period. Unlike Hodges, Sawday, or Traub, I will posit a relationship between
these fantasies of vivisection and the live body that participated in invasive theatrical
violence.

Imag(in)ing Vivisection
In Chapter Three I characterize early modern anatomical science as “a field
whose development was shaped primarily through the sense of sight” (Carlino, Paper
Bodies 11) and through direct interaction with the body. Aside from this direct contact,
the next best method for the dissemination of information on anatomy and dissection
was via the pictorial reproduction of what could be seen first-hand, and so anatomists
provided illustrations to serve as a visual aid outside the classroom or lecture theatre.
When partnered with discursive description in a medical textbook, anatomical images
elucidated what could not be articulated solely by linguistic description41. Thus “in the
age of printing and dissection, illustration was regarded as necessary by all authors and
editors of anatomical texts, who were aware of the ability of illustrations to explain and
communicate facts in a discipline that advertised its own reliance on the visual sense”
(Carlino, Paper Bodies 19). However, the iconography of early modern anatomical
images reveals much more than simply that which was observed and practiced by those
privileged enough to attend or undertake dissections. While they ostensibly fulfill a
didactic purpose, the printed woodcuts and copperplate engravings accompanying
Vesalius’s Fabrica and the work of other early modern anatomists also belong to the
realm of fantasy and imagination. The illustrations featuring the human body document
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For more on this partnership between “words and images” see Carlino’s section of the same name in
Paper Bodies, pp. 12-29.

180
not only its fabric, but its fabrication as well. In the way they depict the subject’s
relationship to his or her own anatomization, they speak to a constructed—indeed,
fantasized—version of the parameters by which dissection is performed. Although
cross-sections and individually isolated structures (whether they be particular limbs,
muscle groupings, organs, or systems) are often depicted in a technical manner without
imaginative amendment, depictions of the whole human body seem motivated by
interests that exceed the demonstrative or the didactic. In these imagined dissective
contexts, the body’s liveliness is almost always preserved, even under the most extreme
physical duress, yielding semiotic results that deliver just as much information about the
dissector’s desires as about the anatomical lesson itself.
One of the ways in which the illustrated subject exhibits his or her vivacity is by
participating, or seeming to have participated, in the act of dissection. Whether what is
depicted captures the moment during which the subject pulls back his or her flesh, or
the moment seemingly just after, the implication is the same: in order to self-reveal, the
“self” must be physically capable, functional, even mentally present—and thus alive in
a way the cadaver never could be. One of several scholars who comment upon “the
apparent complicity of the corpse in dissection,” Katherine Rowe sees in these artistic
renderings of anatomy “a body inviting its own dissection and actively engaged in the
demonstratio” (301). To Rowe’s argument I would add that the apparent active
engagement of the figure suggests the desirability of a body which is able to resist or
triumph over the mortal constraints attendant upon actual dissections. For this reason,
“corpse,” with its attendant suggestion of deadness, is a word that does not quite do the
bodies in these images justice; even when those bodies are pared down to the bone, as is
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the case with the skeletons which are missing most or all of the corporeal matter that
enables the body to live, they radiate a vital life force. Although many of Vesalius’s
plates—which found their way into a number of plagiarisms across Europe and
England—feature skeletons, the skeletal figure is by no means the dominant mode of
representation in early modern anatomical illustration, and even so, these skeletons
distinguish themselves from corpses in their ability to stand and pose, holding shovels
or meditating upon other objects such as hourglasses and skulls. An arresting exemplar
of the illustrated skeleton’s imagined capacity for activity, a copperplate from Felix
Platter’s De Corporis Humani Structura et Usu (Basel, 1583) features two young
skeleton figures holding hands, the larger of which holds a bow and arrow in his left
hand, as if to indicate they are about to participate in archery (See Fig. 3)42.
When considering the conventions of skeletal illustration, then, we might
distinguish two terms which are often used interchangeably in criticism: “selfrevealing” and “self-demonstrating.” Although they do not self-reveal by means of
pulling back outer bodily tissue and musculature, the skeletons actively selfdemonstrate by posing from the front, side, and back, to show the position and
interrelation between bones as the body assumes different postures. Through these
kinds of lively images, the self-demonstrating and the self-revealing body introduces its
viewer to an implied dissective method that I argue possesses key commonalities with
the virtual dissections enacted upon live actors (and those imagined but not executed) in
anatomically-inflected stage violence. As is the case with the dissective violence that
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Platter’s is not the only anatomical textbook to use the archery motif; subsequent depictions of
skeletons holding a bow and arrow appear, for example, in Helkiah Crooke’s Somatographia Anthropine
(London, 1616) and in Caspar Bauhin’s Vivæ Imagines Partium Corporis Humani (Frankfurt am Main,
1620).
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permeated London’s dramatic theatres, the methods hinted at by the pictorial studies of
anatomy, in fact, trouble the distinction between dissection and vivisection, by seeming
to make use of an animated human body. A quick look at some examples of anatomical
illustration (from both the English and the European Renaissance) suggests the way in
which this vivisection-like fantasy of anatomical discovery is manifest within a range of
early and late texts in the period.
Early examples of the illustrated self-revealing body are to be found in the work
of Berengario da Carpi. In his Carpi Commentaria Cum Amplissimis Additionibus
Super Anatomia Mundini (1521), Berengario sets out to improve upon Mondino’s
classic anatomy text by making corrections and adding illustrations “which were based
on actual human dissections” (Persaud, Early History 116-17) (see Figs. 4 and 5 below),
but which clearly evidence the desire to see the anatomized body as lively and intact.
Like Berengario, French anatomist Charles Estienne published illustrations that were
based upon dissections he personally undertook with surgeon Etienne Riviere, but
which represent a fantasized version of the human body tidily revealing itself layer by
layer (see Fig. 6). Illustrations from later in the period continue to use the motif of selfdisplay, rendering the figures in greater detail (see Figs. 7-8), yet almost always
perpetuating the convention of representing the dissected figure in an upright, lifelike
posture. The visually impressive drawings of Giulio Casserio (see Fig. 7, for
example)—a good deal of which are self-revealing—all depict a variety of live, erect
subjects, whose vital human energy is conveyed by a fleshy robustness and fully
detailed facial expressions. As was conventional, the processes of decay and the
vulnerability of the body to the invasive procedures of dissection—aspects of corpse
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dissections that so troubled anatomists in their practice—are remarkably absent from
the frame. What is equally striking in Casserio’s case is his seeming attempt to imbue
each of the figures with his or her own individuality, to render each with a specificity
that enhances its lively quality; on the whole, these are clearly energetic characters, not
corpses. Indeed, depicting the dissected as corpse was an unusual exception to the rule.
In his survey of anatomical fugitive sheets (discussed further below) Carlino records
only one of this type, a sheet drawn by Hans Wechtlin (included with another German
publication by Johann Schott in Strasbourg, published in 1517). In this instance, the
subject, a hanged criminal, is reportedly drawn from life, producing “the only
anatomical sheet in which the subject is actually represented as a cadaver” (Carlino,
Paper Bodies 82). The singularity of the Wechtlin sheet, and the rarity of dissection
scenes themselves in anatomical books, testifies to what can only be described as the
deliberate exclusion of dissection (the body’s methodical deconstruction) from a
pictorial tradition of anatomization (the body’s epistemological reconstruction during
and after the process of dissection). Anatomists are willing to display in illustrated
form the surgical tools used to cut open and explore the body, and they are eager to
write about how to proceed with dissection, but they are not willing to showcase their
procedure(s) in graphic, realistic form. Once the body’s destruction has been elided or
displaced in these illustrative contexts, anatomists and their followers are free to
conceive of the opened body as inherently alive and structurally unmarred, having
created an ideal candidate for displaying the human body’s structure and function.
A few other anatomical works are notable for the way they betray a desire for a
vivisection-like experience with the human body. Juan Valverde, a Spanish anatomist
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who was a well-known plagiarist of Vesalius’s, pushes further the conventions of
anatomical illustration in one of the few images from his plagiarism of the Fabrica that
does not borrow from Vesalius. Included in his Historia de la Composicion del Cuerpo
Humano (first published in 1556, and then subsequently translated into several
languages across a dozen editions), Valverde’s now famous “flayed man” depicts the
subject of the drawing holding the entirety of his body’s skin in one hand, and a knife in
the other (see Fig. 9). If the self-revealing figure seems in other images to be both the
vivisector and the vivisected, here Valverde leaves little doubt as to who is responsible
for the act of flaying, and yet the body of the vivisector/vivisectee still remains alive
and structurally sound. The fantasy suggested here forcefully insists upon the figure’s
ability to transcend the limitations which would render this procedure impossible in
practice. So too do the plates in Bartholomeo Eustachi’s Tabulae Anatomicae (most of
which were published posthumously in 1783) evidence the pursuit of a mode of internal
revealing of which the human body is incapable. While eschewing the convention of
leaving the flesh attached as a displaced flap (as seen in Figs. 4, 7, and 8), Eustachi’s
examples in the Tabulae are dominated by an x-ray effect that seems to endow the
viewer-reader with a literally penetrative gaze (see Fig. 10). Of variously penetrated
bodies in the Tabulae, the figure shown below is the most deeply infiltrated,
showcasing muscles, nerves, organs, and bones—and yet in all instances including this
one Eustachi’s x-ray vision allows the bodies on his pages to survive multiple levels of
unveiling without ever seeming compromised. Whether cause or effect of the desire to
experience the live human body exposed as is, Eustachi’s and Valverde’s images
participate in a diffuse but consistent trend in anatomical illustration. They, like their
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counterparts in a range of European and English Renaissance texts, skirt the imagistic
portrayal of the process of dissection itself in order to delve into the representationally
live body by alternative means, in what become, in effect, virtually realized
vivisections.
One final trend in early modern anatomical illustration is crucial to the
dissemination of early modern fantasies of vivisection: the flap anatomy. This
technique of superimposition, “which proliferated from 1538 and onwards and
continued to appear all through the sixteenth and well on into the seventeenth century”
(L. Wells 403), uses illustrated layered paper flaps that successively reveal the deeper
structures of the body as the flaps are lifted. Such a pictorial strategy seems to respond
to the practical difficulty sometimes inherent in isolating for observation certain
structures of the human body without disturbing others. Whereas in practice, several
cadavers may have been required to properly isolate more than one internal organ or
structure, in these images access to the body’s depths becomes a simple matter of lifting
pieces of paper in succession. The flaps can be returned to their original placement,
allowing the object of study to appear undisturbed, and rendering the dissected body
whole and intact once more. The destructive consequences of surgically entering the
body’s depths are replaced—indeed, literally papered over—by a minimally invasive,
bloodless fantasy of access. Further, the progressive unveiling of the body that artists
strove to represent across a series of linked plates—as, for example, in Vesalius’s
musclemen images featuring a progressive dissection across a number of drawings—is
accomplished in one singular multilayered image. Here, an ideal and yet unrealizable
mode of vivisection is simulated in the transaction between the reader-viewer and the
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body on the page; the lifelike three-dimensional figure invites the “lifter” of the flaps to
assume the role of virtual vivisector, just as it implies its audience will already desire
the kind of unreal bodily penetration it offers. In such transactions the unattainable is
attained by proxy, in a substitutive encounter that both responds to and furthers the
desire for an experience of physical internality unrestricted by the limits of dissective
science and its human subjects.
Although flap anatomies appear in both books and broadsheets, they are much
more commonly found in the latter form (although not all broadsheets of anatomy
feature the superimposed paper flaps). Such broadsheets have been termed “anatomical
fugitive sheets” in critical discourse. The Anathomye of the Inward Parts of Man (Fig.
11) provides an early English example (published in London circa 1545) of both the
flap technique and the genre of the fugitive sheet. These “paper bodies” (the term
Andrea Carlino uses in the title of his recent monograph on anatomical fugitive sheets)
found “immediate and tremendous commercial success” (Carlino, Paper Bodies 1)
across Europe and in England. As Carlino explains, “the woodcuts, drawings or even
woodblocks were circulating not only between Germany and Flanders but also between
Flanders, France and England” (98). The widespread popularity of anatomical fugitive
sheets—a fact that Carlino repeatedly emphasizes and charts throughout his book—
suggests they struck a chord with a significant number of early moderns, many of whom
may have been unable to acquire or read the hefty, often Latin-based anatomical
textbooks. Carlino stresses that “crucially, the public for this market was of limited and
modest culture, its members certainly had no Latin and its education was based
primarily on images” (3). The inclusive scope of the target audience for fugitive sheets
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meant that “this kind of anatomy was no longer confined to the university lecture-room:
it was a matter of concern to larger segments of society” (Carlino 90). Because a
typical moral-religious message of the sheets was the exhortation to “know oneself”
(nosce teipsum) and, correlatively, to comprehend God’s grandeur in the works of
nature, their relevance and appeal was wide. The 1559 sheets attributed to Gilles Godet
and/or Thomas Geminus (published in London) accompany their two illustrated figures
(one male, one female, as was often conventional) with the expectation that the anatomy
depicted is “very necessarie for Phisytians and Surgians and all other that desvre to
lznowe them selues” (qtd. in Carlino, Paper Bodies 216). Characteristic of the fugitive
sheet genre, this promise of a global and at the same time highly personal application
made the teachings of anatomy available to many outside the medical elite.
Additionally, like the drawings in anatomical textbooks, the fugitive sheet also
implicitly advertised its own kind of anatomical encounter, one which created an
imagined human body immune to the obstacles that were present in actual dissections
and which threatened to limit the advancement of knowledge in the field.
The “paper bodies” of the fugitive sheets and anatomical textbook traditions
may seem far removed from the human bodies that underwent their own kind of
dissective penetration in the early modern theatre. And indeed, the difference between
the fleshly and the textual is partially my point—that the virtual experience of the body
provided by the fantastical illustrations surveyed in this chapter fills a gap left by the
fully fleshed out human subject of anatomical study. Yet the actorly body also differs
crucially from the bodies of the anatomy theatres and lecture halls, as I argued in
Chapter Three, and it does so in a way that aligns bodies in the dramatic theatre and
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those in anatomy texts in terms of what both can offer their viewers. Both theatrical
and textual-visual engagements with the field of early modern anatomy were able to
(re)present a “lively body” (Titus Andronicus 3.1.105) capable of sustaining its own
physical integrity even as it submitted itself to varying degrees of penetration—a
capability the corpses of the anatomy theatres did not possess. These lively bodies
participated in and provided inspiration for a fantasy of vivisecting the human body, in
which the vivisected individual’s physical interiority could be seen to be breached
without becoming essentially broken. The work of anatomists—and the public who
eagerly consumed it—established, although in complex ways, the perceived
invulnerability of the body as a desirable attribute of the body as vehicle of knowledge.
Consequently, anatomical science helped to implant within early modern culture a
fascination with a fictional brand of vivisection upon which the theatre and its doubly
envisioned bodies would capitalize.
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Fig. 3. Young skeletons with bow and arrow, from Felix Platter’s De Corporis Humani Structura et Usu
(1583). Credit: Alfred Taubman Medical Library, University of Michigan.
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Fig. 4. From Berengario’s Carpi Commentaria Cum Amplissimis Additionibus Super Anatomia Mundini
(1521), the condensed companion to his longer commentary on Mondino. The illustrated, seemingly live
figure reveals his abdomen. Over a century later, Berengario’s work was translated into English by
surgeon Henry Jackson, as Mikrokosmographia, or, A Description of the Body of Man (London, 1660,
and 1664), a work which includes several reinterpretations of this particular image. Credit: Wellcome
Library.
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Fig. 5. Another image from Berengario’s Commentaria, depicting a woman whose uterus and abdominal
cavity are made visible by the self-removal of the flesh she holds away from her body in her left hand.
The garment she holds in the other hand serves to further animate the picture, lending the viewer the
impression of movement and liveliness rather than stasis and deadness. Credit: Wellcome Library.
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Fig. 6. From French anatomist Charles Estienne’s De Dissectione Partium Corporis Humani (1545).
Credit: Wellcome Library.
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Fig. 7. Self-revealing man rendered in lifelike detail, from Giulio Casserio’s Tabulae Anatomicae (1627).
(Alternately attributed to Adriaan van der Spiegel, who wrote the accompanying text, but who is
unattributed in the Tabulae itself). Credit: The National Library of Medicine (Historical Anatomies on
the Web).
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Fig. 8. From John Browne’s A Compleat Treatise of the Muscles as they Appear in the Humane Body,
and Arise in Dissection (1681). Published in London, Browne’s treatise demonstrates the influence of the
self-revealing body upon 17th century English anatomical culture. All of the drawings in Browne’s text
are of figures caught in motion or dynamically posing, and all are depicted with peeled-back skin
revealing the body’s internal structures. Credit: The National Library of Medicine (Historical Anatomies
on the Web).
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Fig. 9. A famous and striking image from Juan Valverde de Amusco’s Historia de la Composicion del
Cuerpo Humano (1560). Although many of the illustrations in the Anatomia were derived from
Vesalius’s woodcuts, this one is unique to Valverde. Though Valverde’s work was not translated into
English, Helkiah Crooke made this image available to an English readership when he published a copy of
it in his English-language Somatographia Anthropine. Or, A Description of the Body of Man (cited
above). Credit: The National Library of Medicine (Historical Anatomies on the Web).
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Fig. 10. From Bartholomeo Eustachi’s Tabulae Anatomicae (1783). The viewer is able to see to the
deepest recesses of the body with no perceptible sign of the dissector’s intervention. Credit: The National
Library of Medicine (Historical Anatomies on the Web).
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Fig. 11. An English fugitive sheet titled The Anathomye of the Inward Parts of Man (c. 1545), recently
restored. For the most detailed scholarly account to date on this topic, see Andrea Carlino’s Paper
Bodies: A Catalogue of Anatomical Fugitive Sheets (1999). For further images of this kind, see also the
Wellcome Library’s online catalogue of anatomical fugitive sheets (dating from the mid-1500s to the late
1600s). Credit: Wellcome Library.
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“Thou Shalt See My Braine”: Living Anatomy in The Atheist’s Tragedy

“The time has been / That, when the brains were out, the man would die, / And there an
end. But now they rise again.”
—Macbeth (3.4.77-79)

In Cyril Tourneur’s The Atheist’s Tragedy (first published in 1611), an
unintentional self-execution takes place. Near the play’s conclusion, D’Amville,
Tourneur’s atheist, impatiently seizes an executioner’s axe and knocks out his own
brains on the upswing of a weapon intended for his rivals, Charlemont and Castabella.
Following this surprising turn of events D’Amville makes a final speech before he
succumbs to his injury. Critical reception of this scene has been mixed at best. R.J.
Kaufmann argues that D’Amville’s self-execution “has been, and possibly will remain,
an embarrassment to Tourneur’s admirers” (259), noting the scene’s potential for
comedy. Since moments prior to the accident D’Amville had expressed the desire to
anatomize Charlemont following his impending death, Christian Billing reads the text
as a failed opportunity for a realistically depicted dissection, claiming that instead, “the
audience gets a ‘slapstick’ execution for our would-be anatomist” (2). Huston Diehl
asserts that modern readers “have dismissed the scene as ridiculous and crude, even
explained it as literary parody” (53). Reviewing a contemporary production of the play
(Birmingham Repertory Theatre, 1994), Paul Taylor expresses a similar sentiment—
that “the moment can’t escape bordering on farce.” Finally, referring to other aspects of
the play (a handkerchief reminiscent of The Spanish Tragedy, the appearance of several
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ghosts), Katherine Eisaman Maus comments on the play’s tendency to “ventriloquize
the conventions of revenge tragedy” (vxiii), an effect that in itself perhaps contributes to
what Kaufman and Diehl imply is a reluctance on the part of critics to take D’Amville’s
accidental suicide seriously. The precise nature of D’Amville’s accident, however, is
crucial to an important leitmotif in the play, and thus is deserving of further
consideration beyond its perceived potential for self-parody or slapstick humour. The
revealing of D’Amville’s grey matter is, in fact, the culmination of what I will show is
the play’s specific fixation upon brains. By threading this preoccupation with brains
throughout his narrative, Tourneur fetishizes the organ in such a way that makes this
final act of violence—which, I will argue, in fact takes on the qualities of the
anatomist’s desired but unattainable human vivisection—seem to be the consummation
of a carefully cultivated desire to see the functioning human brain exposed. In effect,
Tourneur gives his audience what he has encouraged them to want all along: the live
human brain on display.
Despite its fascinating treatment of the human body, Tourneur’s play has not
received much critical attention; as Alan Dessen notes in reviewing Jeremy Lopez’s
Theatrical Convention and Audience Response in Early Modern England (2003), the
play has “achieved occasional attention in specialized studies” (254), and, as far as I am
aware, has not yet been analyzed for its remarkable focus upon the human brain. The
text of The Atheist’s Tragedy contains eleven references to a brain or brains, including
the stage direction for D’Amville’s self-execution: “As he raises vp the Axe, strikes out
his owne braines” (L3r). The play’s notable thematization of this particular organ
functions in several different ways, although Tourneur never uses the word “brain” in
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its then popular verb form, as in “to brain,” meaning to strike on or across the head,
typically causing death. Tourneur’s use of the word always takes the noun form, as he
variously employs “braine” or “braines” to indicate intellect, cognition, an idea or plan,
and the cerebral matter of the organ itself. This oscillation between what I will refer to
as the figurative and literal uses of the noun helps to establish an interest in both the
insubstantial (cognitive) operations and substantial (physical) qualities of the brain.
Spectators are thereby encouraged to be attentive not only to the physical organ they
will eventually see for themselves at the end of the play, but also to what the brain
does—specifically, how it functions to produce cognition—when it resides inside a
sentient, healthy individual. In this sense, Tourneur’s play taps into a desire that
anatomists both harboured and promulgated (although perhaps not deliberately): to
behold an aspect of the live body normally concealed from sight.
Therefore, when the doubly-inflected concept of brains appears in dialogue, it
always appears in a context that denotes an activity or process. Tourneur demonstrates
little interest in the dead organ; rather, like Vesalius, the play itself craves contact with
the warm brain. (Vesalius’s desire for recently deceased subjects is discussed at the end
of Chapter Three). Crucially, when it comes to the brain, the play will persist in
clouding the distinction between the categories of the literal and the figurative, the
substantial and the insubstantial, making the final exposure of D’Amville’s own brain
even more alluring, because it comes to signify as an anatomical gateway to cognition,
which is the property of live human subjects. D’Amville and his “instrument” Borachio
are most closely associated with the conceptual synthesis of the brain as physical organ
and immaterial consciousness, a synthesis Tourneur is able to engineer only because
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references in the play are never to a dissected, lifeless brain that cannot take part in
active human thought. By inciting an interest in the unseen workings of the mind, and
inviting audience members to view human cognition as materially grounded in the
physiology of the active brain, D’Amville intensifies the desirability of the live brain as
object of knowledge. He brings spectators into the epistemic fold of anatomy, where
access to the body’s internal activity is both an epistemological fixation and
fascination. Finally, falling victim to his own self-guided scalpel-like weapon,
D’Amville becomes, at the level of fiction as well as metadrama, the ideal object of
dissection—the living dead figure of anatomists’ fantasies.
This conceptual synthesis begins at the outset of the play. As D’Amville
apprises Borachio of the plot to marry D’Amville’s son into a wealthy family, his
choice of words conflates intellectual effort with the source that produces it: “if it [the
plot] prosper, thou shalt see my braine / Make this but an induction to a point / So full
of profitable policie; / That it would make the soule of honestie / Ambitious to turn
villaine” (C2r). Presumably, D’Amville is not implying that Borachio will visually
apprehend his brain performing the promised machinations, and so in this sense the
meaning must be taken figuratively: Borachio does not actually see anything
anatomical. However, the immediate connotation here becomes deeply complicated by
the play’s subsequent destabilization of the figurative/literal dichotomy, especially
given D’Amville’s cause of death. One of the claims I develop throughout this section
is that for the spectator who bears witness to D’Amville’s accidental self-dissection, the
initial promise quoted above—“thou shalt see my braine”—proves spectacularly true in
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performance. In other words, the literal sense of perceiving a physical structure with
one’s ocular faculties is brought into play.
It is worth noting briefly, too, that this is the case even for the reader. Textually,
Tourneur’s decision to divide the enjambed line after “braine” de-emphasizes what the
brain will do (the remainder of the sentence informs us that D’Amville’s “brain” or plan
will maximize the hoped-for marriage for D’Amville’s ultimate gain). Instead, the
structure of the verse initially places the focus upon the part of the sentence in which the
visceral scenario of visually apprehending the brain is conjured up by D’Amville’s
choice of words. While the meaning of the phrase continues on past the end of the line,
the particular placement of the line break allows the first part of the sentence to stand on
its own as well, creating an arresting visual image that can stop the reader in his or her
tracks. For both spectator and reader, D’Amville’s turn of phrase cannot rest
comfortably in its figurative origins; especially once the remainder of the play is taken
into account, “thou shalt see my braine” becomes an undeniable prefiguration of a
literal, corporeal event: the unplanned excision of D’Amville’s brain, described in a
stage direction for readers, and, in performance, occurring onstage in full view of the
audience. Although the potential readerly experience of this moment is not threedimensional and visual as it is for spectators, at the level of fiction, the onlookers at
D’Amville’s accident do see his brain, if we are to take Tourneur’s given stage direction
at face value. When the text assumes a stage life, these fictional spectators are joined
by their theatre-going analogues, the spectators of the play itself, who also see
D’Amville’s brain. Whether the scene is experienced in performance or not,
D’Amville’s particular choice of syntax here effects an unsettling collapse in the
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distinction between a figure of speech (where “brain” is equivalent to idea or plan) and
its non-figurative enactment. As a consequence, D’Amville injects the final display of
his brain in Act five with the double force of both potential anatomical and cognitive
information. When we see his “brain” we are apprehending more than just mute matter;
as analysis of the play’s continuing treatment of brains reveals, the doubleness of
D’Amville’s early comment is prescient, since it will be suggested throughout that the
cerebral organ itself bears the imprint of cognition. The ocular encounter with
D’Amville’s brains, therefore, is an encounter with not just what the brain is, but what it
does, making the moment all the more alluring for audience members who have been
seduced by the promise of an inside look into human interiority in motion.
As the play continues to muse upon brains, the insubstantial referent of the word
“brain” (thought or intellection) begins to merge with its substantial referent (the
organ), and vice versa. In a few key places, Tourneur’s use of the word “brain”
straddles the conceptual gap between the brain as anatomical structure and as seat of
intellectual function. That these two ways of viewing the brain should even be linked at
all is made possible by the historical context in which Tourneur and his audience found
themselves, as recipients of a long-established discourse about the corporeal
foundations of the body’s many abilities. More specifically, Tourneur’s allocation of
human thought to the cerebral anatomy, and not other parts of the body, situates his text
in a historically-specific matrix of competing models of the body. Whereas the
Aristotelian bodily paradigm, only just being “put to rest” during the Renaissance
(Frampton 108), was cardiocentric, Tourneur’s model—at least as he expounds it in The
Atheist’s Tragedy—appears to be cerebrocentric when it comes to pinpointing the
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physiological source of cognition. Theories of the body’s structure and function had, as
far back as Plato, assigned different organs the ability to control sensorimotor and
cognitive components of human (and animal) behaviour. Galen, still a towering figure
in some Renaissance medical circles, had hypothesized “that the seat of intellect had to
be the brain itself” (Finger 17). Mondino, a powerful medieval authority whose
influence persisted into the Renaissance, describes the head by dividing the brain into
three ventricles: one ventricle houses the sensus communic (a medieval anatomical term
for common sense), another the imagination, and the third memory, all contributing
factors to an individual’s cognitive abilities. This “doctrine of psycho-physical
parallelism,” itself a “medieval common-place,” represented a kind of “brain
physiology [that] survived till the seventeenth century and beyond” (Choulant 21-I). A
complex issue for early moderns and their intellectual predecessors, the debate
concerning the localization of cognitive function had by no means been resolved by
Tourneur’s time. Scott Stevens stresses the “myriad of competing theories of the mind”
among early modern medical authorities (265) and notes that “seventeenth-century
physiology was only beginning to question the function of the heart as a muscle and not
as an organ of thought” (267). On the side of Tourneur’s cognitive cerebrocentricism
we find English medical authority Helkiah Crooke, who posits the “Superiority of the
Brain” in Mikrokosmographia, for the reason that “all sense and voluntary motion
proceed from it, habitation of wisdom, shrine of memory, judgment and Discernment”
(qtd. in Martensen 16). Another English writer of the time, Robert Burton, traces the
“sense and motion” of the body back to the brain, and names the brain as the heart’s
“Privy Counsellor” (qtd. in Stevens 270). Whether of Crooke and Burton’s frame of
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mind or not, early moderns had inherited from past medical models a means of thinking
about thinking in terms of anatomy. That cerebrocentric theories were still a matter of
uncertainty during Tourneur’s lifetime could only have served to intensify the
spectator’s interest in the dissection D’Amville requests and the one he clumsily
performs upon himself: would the visible interiority of the human body and its brains
confirm, complicate, or deny the cerebrocentric model of thought?
Yet Tourneur does even more than seize upon some of the conflicting and
unresolved anatomical questions of his day in order to hook his audience. He pushes
further the mind-body connection explicit in discussions like Crooke’s by conflating the
anatomical source of cognition (in this play, the brain) and its product to such a degree
as to make one a ready substitute for the other, and vice versa. After D’Amville’s initial
promise that his brain will execute an admirably devious plan, Tourneur goes on to
develop further the fungibility of the brain’s signifieds. The very next citation of the
word “brain” occurs in a dialogue D’Amville and Borachio overhear taking place
between Levidulchia’s three drunken servants and Fresco, Cataplasma’s servant.
Servant 1 complains to Fresco, “My body is as weake as water, Fresco,” to which
Fresco responds, “Good reason sir, the beere has sent all the malt vp into your braine,
and left nothing but the water in your body” (D4r). During the exchange, the corporeal
discourse Fresco introduces into the conversation characterizes the “drunkenness that
seems ridiculous” (D4r) as a behavioural effect arising from the brain’s physical
susceptibility to alcohol. D’Amville notes the men’s compromised mental state and
seizes the opportunity to manipulate them into unwittingly acting as accomplices in the
murder of Montferrers. As this plan begins to take shape, Borachio picks up on

206
Fresco’s imagery when he states, referring to the drunk men, “Let them drinke healthes,
& drowne their braines i’the floud; Ile promise them they shall be pledg’d in bloud”
(D4r). Both Fresco and Borachio seem to be in agreement about the provenance of the
servants’ mentally debilitating drunkenness, perceiving it as a simple matter of the
brain’s saturation with “malt” or alcohol in general. Although more subtle than the
reference to D’Amville’s brain in the opening scene, the interchangeability of brain as
mental capacity and as body part is being hinted at here as well. In this short scene, the
brain is referenced twice, and is used as a touchstone to provide the primary explanation
for a behavioural phenomenon (inebriation) that the characters conceive of in primarily
physiological, empirical terms. As if to draw attention to the servants’ “flooded” brains
and their resulting idiocy, Tourneur has D’Amville instruct each man to strike the other
“ouer the pate” (D4r)—an action that is both directed towards and enabled by the same
body part: the alcohol-soaked brain.
By exploring an altered state of consciousness (drunkenness) in terms of how
and where such a state resides in and arises from the body, Tourneur prepares spectators
to accept the more forceful conflation of cognition and corporeality that he continues to
develop in the play. Witnessing an overt mental degradation in the servants which is
coupled with other characters’ speculation upon the anatomical source of this
physiologically induced stupidity, spectators are provided a means of imagining the
occluded inner body at work producing the behaviour they are able to see. Such a use
of the imagination was not uncommon, either, for even (or especially) outside the
context of dissection, hypotheses and theories concerning the body’s internal structures
and functions abound. For example, other writers of the period also provide similar
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commentary concerning the cerebral physicality of drunkenness: drinking “depryue[s]
man of vnderstanding,” “spoyle[s] [man] of his brayne” (Beroaldo 26v), and
“intoxicateth the brain” (Younge 16). Indeed, while not specifically focused on
inebriation, many of Tourneur’s contemporaries envisioned and wrote about physical
interiority along these lines (further examples follow at the end of this chapter). One
might, then, think of dissection and the work of anatomists not as the final, exemplary
achievement of access to the body’s contents, but as part of a wider set of cultural
practices which engaged with corporeal interiority through a variety of concrete and
speculative means. While anatomists dealt with the body more closely than some, a
wide spectrum of early modern individuals shared the medical community’s fascination
with the body’s internal architecture and especially sought to understand what
percolated beneath its visible surface. Tapping into this fascination, Tourneur’s play
also performs an imaginary or virtual anatomical mapping of the way the body’s organs
and systems function, with a specific focus on the brain. The result is twofold: the
brain-as-organ draws ever closer to its accompanying cognitive signified—thought
itself—and as a corollary, attention is drawn to an aspect of the live body’s internal
processes, one which is displayed in all of its visceral, vivisected glory by the play’s
conclusion.
The conceptual marriage of the brain as matter and as mind means the climactic
unveiling of cerebral anatomy offers viewers much more than just a frisson of physical
spectacle or, as some scholars have surmised, the impression of farce. Admittedly, it is
impossible—and not at all necessary for my purposes—to rule out responses to
D’Amville’s blunder that find humour in the scene. What I am proposing is one among
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a range of possible audience responses, but it should be noted that there are few
opportunities in the text itself besides the unusual nature of D’Amville’s accident for
spectators to find the stage action comical. Although the soberness of the execution
scene is somewhat derailed by D’Amville’s intervention, the tone of the dialogue and
action surrounding the unintentional self-execution remains serious, and in keeping with
the tragic genre. Furthermore, by the time D’Amville accidentally substitutes himself
for Charlemont as the subject of dissection, D’Amville’s offstage viewers have been
conditioned to link the (heretofore) imperceptible workings of the brain with its
existence as a physical phenomenon, its identity as an organ belonging to the human
body. What spectators of The Atheist’s Tragedy can hope to find in this theatricalized
dissection, therefore, is the tantalizing conjunction of cerebral anatomy and its cognitive
product—a revelation of the at-once physiological and intangible life of the lively mind.
The impossible rendered possible through fiction, a (represented) human vivisection
takes place, exposing an element of living anatomy in a way that human dissections in
the anatomy theatre or the lecture hall could not.
A brief overview of the play’s remaining citations of “brain” will suggest how
Tourneur further confers upon the word its double conceptual status, amplifying what
was likely an already-present interest in the “inward parts of man” (see Fig. 11) on the
part of spectators. As D’Amville accompanies Montferrers across a darkened field
following a banquet at the house of Castabella’s father, he makes some passing
remarks, presumably in the form of an aside, about the impending murder he is about to
facilitate. D’Amville comments, “who can but strike, wants wisedome to maintaine: /
Hee that strikes safe and sure, has heart and braine” (D4v). The “want” or lack
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expressed in the first part of D’Amville’s sentence (wisdom) finds its correlative (heart
and brain) in the second half, and an interesting correspondence is established.
Wisdom, a definitively incorporeal attribute, is identified with the corporeal by means
of an absence/presence dichotomy. When wisdom is present, D’amville implies, it can
be adequately accounted for by the presence of “heart and braine.” While he does not
single out the brain as solely responsible for the sound judgment D’Amville identifies,
Tourneur does, once again, destabilize the distinction between its literal and figurative
connotations. If the intended meaning of brain is strictly anatomical, what can it mean
to say that “hee that strikes safe and sure” has a brain, given that having a brain in the
literal sense is a sine qua non of living? Yet by the same token, if a truly figurative
meaning is intended, why not employ a synonym for wisdom, rather than a physically
localizable stand-in?
The dialogic relationship between the two halves of D’Amville’s sentence
positions the meaning of the word “brain” midway between two poles, where neither
meaning of the now-hybrid word asserts full authority. Indeed, as I have been
suggesting, Tourneur begins to ascribe a bifold significance to “the braine of man”
(E3r). On the one hand, the literal sense of the physical brain does not disappear from
the conversation—brains are still vulnerable to the material world, as in Borachio’s
comment about murdering Montferrers with a stone: “Oo; I knock’d out’s braines with
this faire Rubie” (E3r). On the other hand, Tourneur’s usage seems also to skew the
denotation of the word towards the realm of seemingly intangible qualities such as
mental aptitude and intelligence. In a short exchange with Languebeau Snuffe, the
morally dubious Puritan of the play, D’Amville indicates his comprehension of one of
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Snuffe’s comments on the existence of ghosts by saying, “My braines begin to put
themselues in order. I apprehend thee now” (I3r). Once again, anatomy is the logical
point of reference for a mental process; D’Amville conveys an abstract concept
(understanding) in terms of a shuffling around of internal parts, somewhat akin to gears
shifting or wheels turning—expressions in our contemporary usage that metaphorically
denote something similar to what D’Amville expresses. Although not directly citing
The Atheist’s Tragedy, David Hillman’s comments on early modern corporeality and
phrases like these are useful to keep in mind here, and worth quoting at length:
It may be precisely the fact that our language is so suffused with the body’s
inner activity that has made it difficult to register the significance of such
language in the Shakespearean text. The reality of the body has become for us
practically impalpable in these words and phrases, which have been gradually
diluted and attenuated until they have been transfigured into mere figures of
speech […] To early modern ears, however, such language had not yet mutated
beyond its corporeal referents […] In turning to read the body in a Renaissance
text in particular, it is necessary to try to balance out the figurative with the
physical (rather than, as happened for many years, simply to gloss the latter as
the former). (2)
I agree with Hillman that self-reflexive expressions of bodily internality like
D’Amville’s are not necessarily more metaphorical than they are literal. If, as a 1619
religious tract puts it, a brain could become tangibly troubled by a certain kind of
knowledge that affected it “like vndigested meate in the stomach” (Adams, The
Happines of the Church 73), could Tourneur mean to suggest that D’Amville’s cranial
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circuitry is in fact physically responding as it digests Snuffe’s comment? Could
spectators construe such a meaning? If the answers to these questions are elusive from
our contemporary standpoint, so too might they have been for Tourneur’s audience.
The meaning of brains putting themselves in order is not entirely clear, and this, I
believe, is Tourneur’s point. In his playworld, both the tangible and intangible
meanings of “brain” fuse somewhere along the continuum between the corporeal and
the incorporeal, between the material and the metaphorical. Thus it is possible for
Borachio to tell D’Amville, “T’has crown’d the most iudicious murder, that / The
braine of man was e’er deliuer’d of” (E3r) just a few lines after Borachio has reported
Montferrers’s brains knocked out. Is the brain that bleeds in response to physical
trauma the very same that dreams up elaborate plans for murder? Or is the brain that
thinks—the one that belongs to the world of ideas—conceptually distinct from the one
that can be “knocked out” by a blow to the head? The play raises these questions only
to answer them equivocally.
Further evidence of this conceptual indistinguishability is to be found in the
externalization of the internal: thought seems to reside inside the body, being attached
to the cerebral organ itself (in a way that is never made clear in specific detail), and yet
spectators are given multiple opportunities to observe the outward manifestations of
brainpower. In this scene, for example, they witness the idea engendered in the brain—
the “most judicious murder”—become flesh, as it “delivers” itself from an internal point
of origin inside D’Amville’s head into the material world existing outside the body.
Indeed, the entire trajectory of the main plot is built upon the progressive actualization
of the abstract plan D’Amville’s brain formulates at the outset of the play, a process of
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concretization that unravels and incrementally reveals his thoughts by means of bodies
acting upon other bodies. Once we are drawn into Tourneur’s vision of deeply
corporeal consciousness, it is no longer possible to distinguish categorically between the
organic matter residing inside the skull and the thought processes it generates. When
D’Amville boasts about Montferrers’s murder that “not any circumstance / That stood
within the reach of the designe, / Of persons, dispositions, matter, time or place, / But
by this braine of mine, was made /An Instrumentall help” (E3r), the signifier “brain” (or
“braine of mine”) seems to have become ambivalent, offering no immediate context
within D’Amville’s utterance for interpreting the concept definitively one way or the
other. Finally, in the play’s antepenultimate citation, D’Amville’s “brain has made
[Charlemont] the happy instrument / To free Suspition” (K2v), and we cannot be certain
whether D’Amville is referring to what the brain as organ has itself effected, or whether
he is using the word as a metonym for the scheme that has been produced by the brain’s
work.
This hybridity has significant consequences for the interpretive options
Tourneur presents his audience. Because the mind at work is also at once the
anatomical brain at work, to “see” a brain, in D’Amville’s universe, can mean not only
to apprehend the ideas, feelings, and habits of thought produced by cognition, but also
to see the organ itself in the flesh. Tourneur’s fundamentally embodied model of
cognition prompts spectators to imagine access to the inward psyche in terms of access
to the interior body. Where this is made abundantly clear is in D’Amville’s final
assumptions about the anatomical structure of the body of his nephew Charlemont,
whose piety is directly antithetical to D’Amville’s atheism. Although D’Amville does
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not specify whether the post-mortem he desires will encompass all or merely part(s) of
Charlemont’s body, he assigns an (as yet undetermined) interior, anatomical locus to his
nephew’s stoic attitude towards death—one which he hopes will become manifest
through dissection. D’Amville’s fascination with and attraction to Charlemont’s elusive
character trait is in keeping with his own demonstrated interest in philosophical matters
of life and death, human existence, and its relationship to perceived godly intervention
in human affairs. At the outset of the play, a Socratic dialogue between D’Amville and
Borachio reveals D’Amville’s rejection of the possibility of life after death; D’Amville
concludes that “Death casts vp / Our totall summe of ioy and happinesse” (B1r), a
crucial tenet of his belief system. However, D’Amville’s certainty about the finality of
death, coupled with his proclivity for contemplation on the topic, leaves him acutely
vulnerable, especially when death (either his own or others’) is on the horizon.
Understandably, for the atheistic D’Amville, “the thought of death is a most fearefull
torment” (L2r), and so he struggles to comprehend his nephew’s “peace of conscience”
(L1v) with regard to the matter. Charlemont’s confidence in God supplies him with
something that D’Amville comes to see as a deficit in himself—one which he will
eventually construe in terms of anatomical difference. Just as Charlemont’s physical
presence haunts the opening dialogue of the play—D’Amville has just seen him “part
from his Father” (B1r) and awaits Charlemont’s summoned return throughout the
duration of his philosophical debate with Borachio—Charlemont’s ability to remain
unruffled by his impending execution, and by the concept of death itself, eats away at
the margins of D’Amville’s self-assured world view. When Charlemont and Castabella
are found sleeping in a graveyard with “Death’s head for a pillow” (s.d. I2r), D’Amville
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wonders at their serenity: “A sleepe? so soundly? and so sweetly vpon Deathes Heads?
and in a place so full of feare and horrour? Sure there is some other happinesse within
the freedome of the conscience, then my knowledge e’er attain’d too” (I3r). In a space
saturated with what D’Amville perceives as the horror of human mortality, Castabella
and Charlemont demonstrate a (presently) unaccountable composure that D’Amville
will soon come to hypothesize as physiologically explicable.
D’Amville’s fascination with Charlemont’s attitude towards death leads him to
posit an anatomical explanation for their different mindsets, bringing to a climax the
play’s suggestive coupling of mental and physical interiority. Seeking to ascribe a
material existence to Charlemont’s faith—an endeavour which in and of itself indicates
D’Amville’s inability to accept a concept which does not necessarily manifest itself
concretely and quantitatively—D’Amville requests a post-mortem investigation of
Charlemont’s body:
I would finde out by his Anatomie;
What thing there is in Nature more exact,
Then in the constitution of my selfe.
Me thinks, my parts, and my dimentions, are
As many, as large, as well compos’d as his;
And yet in me the resolution wants,
To die with that assurance as he does.
The cause of that, in his Anatomie
I would finde out. (L1v)
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In this speech, two bodily “constitutions” are pitted against one another upon the basis
of concrete and insubstantial attributes, and one (D’Amville’s) is found to be lacking in
both regards. D’Amville’s axiomatic materialism is made clear by his use of contrast;
the two men seem to be physically comparable “and yet” they somehow evince
different worldviews. The answer to this puzzling disparity, therefore, must lie beneath
the exterior “parts” and “dimentions” D’Amville can account for empirically—it must
lie in the anatomical recesses of Charlemont’s body. The concept of finding out by
anatomy leads us both into and out of the conversation, forming two halfs of a chiasmus
(“I would finde out by his Anatomie” and “in his Anatomie I would finde out”) that
encloses D’Amville’s reflections upon the body’s mysteries in the interior of a
linguistically bounded structure. Just as D’Amville’s thoughts are contained within this
microcosmic linguistic body, Charlemont’s habits of thought are, ostensibly, entombed
somewhere within his physical body. Not only is D’Amville’s assumption about
Charlemont’s corporeality in keeping with “the period’s resolutely materialist habits of
thought,” wherein “what we now call inwardness or interiority was inseparable from the
interior of the body” (Hillman 2), but it also serves to intensify interest in the promised
dissection of Charlemont’s corpse and the unplanned vivisection of D’Amville’s brain.
The Atheist’s Tragedy has propelled its audience towards this summative moment of
revelation by repeatedly embedding within its dialogue conspicuous references to the
brain which, taken on the whole, effect a union between internal anatomy and character
traits, doubling the potential epistemological value of the dissective procedure
D’Amville desires. This will not simply be a medical anatomy, designed to elucidate
the body’s parts and their interrelationship; this will be an investigation of the somatic
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foundations of consciousness. By means of anatomization not only will spectators
acquire precise knowledge of Charlemont’s internal anatomy, as Tourneur suggests
through D’Amville, but they will also discover where and how the flesh makes this man
fundamentally who he is.
The idea that the body (especially its interior) can both elucidate and confirm
identity is one that Renaissance dramatists experiment with more often than they
unequivocally confirm; of the many plays in which dissective language surfaces, only
some actually carry out dissective acts of violence (other examples besides The
Atheist’s Tragedy include The Bloody Banquet,’Tis Pity She’s a Whore, The Battle of
Alcazar, and The Tragedy of Hoffman), and even fewer present the results of visceral
anatomization in a way that demonstratively proves what is so often implied about the
body’s capability to disclose information and knowledge. When Feste in Twelfth Night
avers, “Nay, I’ll ne’er believe a madman till I see his brains” (4.2.107) he draws upon
the rarity of becoming a witness to physical interiority that can serve as evidence of
character—a situation applying even to most Londoners living in proximity of two
anatomy theatres—as he speaks of an event that Shakespeare implies will never
transpire. “Till I see his brains” functions in Feste’s comment much like the figure of
speech adyneton, which uses hyperbole to comparatively suggest the impossibility of a
particular outcome or happening. (Modern-day colloquial examples include the sayings
“when pigs fly” or “when hell freezes over”). What Feste implies is quite simply, “I’ll
ne’er believe a madman,” because he never will see his brains. Taking into account the
infrequency of genuine anatomical disclosures on the early modern stage, one must
consider that it is the promise of corporeal knowledge and all it could signify that holds
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the attention of characters and audiences alike. Theatre’s failure to satisfy the fantasy
of vivisection is, in fact, what sustains the spectator’s desire indefinitely. As Judith
Butler writes, “desire is never fulfilled […] the fulfillment of desire would be its radical
self-cancellation” (381). In early modern plays anatomical enlightenment is sought but
proves often to be elusive, and it is rather the hope that the Lear-like fantasy of
understanding the other inside and out will finally materialize that keeps spectators
engaged despite the few number of performances that depict any success at such an
endeavour.
Perhaps, too, playwrights and their audiences were urged on by the medical
anatomies executed in their day which claimed to offer conclusive evidence of the way
identity was thought to assume a corporeal form. In his chapter “The Body as Proof”
(from Murder After Death), Richard Sugg describes four autopsies (three from the early
modern period), the results of which provide an interesting context for the way
D’Amville assumes anatomy is indicative of personality. An Augustinian nun named
Sister Chiara (dissected 1308), a Frenchwoman of “Moorish” extraction (dissected
1605), King James I (dissected 1625), and a young man named John Pennant (dissected
1637) were all found, posthumously, to have distinguishing anatomical features that
were thought to reflect something about who they were as people. Of particular
relevance to Tourneur’s play is James I’s autopsy, during which physicians were
surprised by an abundance of cerebral matter that spilled out from the monarch’s
opened head, taken by one witness to be “a great mark of his infinite judgement” (qtd.
in Sugg 90). Such findings—however inaccurate or inventive they might seem from the
perspective of contemporary medical knowledge—form part of a cultural tendency to
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somaticize human nature, and provided for many writers of the time “an authoritative,
quasi-scientific basis upon which to evoke anatomically grounded, verifiable images of
character” (Sugg 93). Authors did so in both non-fictional and fictional contexts. Thus
when Oliver (As You Like It, written c. 1600) seeks a means of describing what he
(unfairly) claims is the deeply villainous nature of his brother Orlando, he declares to
Charles, “should I anatomize him to thee as he is, I must blush and weep, and thou must
look pale and wonder” (1.2.132-33). While it is probably not the case that this
hypothetical anatomization is as literal as the one Lear envisions performed on his
daughter, Oliver’s language suggests a penetrative unearthing of Orlando’s character
that carries corporeal overtones, as if his brother’s body would, if physically
anatomized, attest in full to his personality traits. When D’Amville speaks of “finding
out by anatomy” what he desires to know about Charlemont, he is not the first, nor the
last to think in such terms, but rather articulates a mode of thought that, by the 1611
publication of The Atheist’s Tragedy, was buttressed by an established and evolving
cultural legacy.
As I have indicated, however, like many analogous examples in drama of the
early modern period, the desired bodily excavation in The Atheist’s Tragedy never takes
place. And it must be acknowledged, too, that some of the same constraints which
prohibited anatomists from cutting into live human bodies are also implicitly in place
here, as D’Amville does not think to (or perhaps cannot) obtain a vivisection of
Charlemont. Yet it is perhaps precisely for this reason that Tourneur circumvents the
projected dissection in favour of representing a vivisection in the form of D’Amville’s
accident. In place of the post-mortem, the audience is offered what is arguably a more
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extraordinary feat—or one that at the least provides a comparable substitute for the
anticipated disclosure of information regarding the corporeal foundations of mental
activity. As not only the stage direction indicates, but as the executioner verbally
confirms, D’Amville, “In lifting vp the Axe […] has knock’d his braines out” (L3r).
Remarkably, however, he continues to converse with those present at the intended
execution for another seventeen lines. The peculiar characteristics of this live
dissection allow it to mimic and in fact exceed to a certain degree the very goal
D’Amville had in mind when he proleptically assumed what the dissective investigation
of Charlemont would yield. The represented vivisection symbolically echoes the
association in D’Amville’s original description of Charlemont’s “anatomie” between
the onlooker’s visual apprehension of corporeal matter and his or her conceptual grasp
of the consciousness belonging to the body under scrutiny. The former is afforded to
spectators by the unearthing of D’Amville’s grey matter and the latter by D’Amville’s
very personal, revelatory disclosure of his murderous plot. By having D’Amville
confess his “brain”—the term he has used all along for his master plan—while holding
his brains, Tourneur unveils the functional internal anatomy that a dissection of
Charlemont could never reveal and that anatomists could only conceive of in illustrated,
fantasized form. Becoming that idealized figure of literal and figurative self-revelation,
D’Amville caters to a fantasy of vivisection. Tourneur’s work, like the anatomical
drawings surveyed at the beginning of this chapter, tempts his viewers to partake in this
fantasy, a temptation which in Tourneur’s case is accomplished by means of inculcating
spectators into the anatomically-based model of cognition I have argued for above.
Finding a loophole of sorts in the ethical prohibition against human vivisection,
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Tourneur stages a self-vivisection, an event that is epistemologically more radical than
conventional dissection in its ability to provide the ideal bodily knowledge anatomists
and their peers sought. Depicting a miraculous (because live) corporeal self-revealing,
Tourneur invites his audience to experience the rare satisfaction of witnessing the
functional internal body and of absorbing the valuable information it had to offer.
Although the text provides no indication for staging in between D’Amville’s
self-delivered blow to the head and his death, it is possible to infer that early modern
spectators did in fact see D’Amville’s brain represented onstage. Because he has, as the
executioner points out, struck out his own brains, the performance must make good
upon the stage direction in some palpable way. Surviving evidence regarding early
modern staging practices suggests that D’Amville’s cranial dissection could have been
performed in a realistic manner. Beheadings, for example, seem to have been
graphically simulated onstage in some plays. Famously, Reginald Scot describes the
“Decollation of John Baptist” in his Discovery of Witchcraft (1584), an illusionistic
trick for the performance of a beheading onstage in full view of the audience (which
Scot claims was carried out in London in 1582). In addition to the table used in this
particular illusion (and perhaps more relevant to D’Amville’s particular situation), other
props were available to amplify the realism of “copious bloodshed and the display of
severed limbs” (F. Martin 7) in plays that gravitated towards a violent aesthetic.
Animal viscera and blood could be strategically employed in a variety of ways to
produce the appearance of human innards; with reference to beheadings, English
physician Thomas Ady describes the clever means by which “the very bone and
marrow” of the human neck could be represented onstage (qtd. in Martin 10). While
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these examples from Scot and Ady do not specifically refer to performances in the
dramatic theatres (their focus is more generally upon witchcraft and representational
illusion in the period), they provide us with a sense of the available performance options
in the period. Early modern stage practitioners were capable of realizing, in all of its
bloody fleshiness, the textually scripted unveiling of physical interiority43. Sugg
implies as much when he argues for the use of a human skeleton (or a convincing
facsimile) as a prop in The Tragedy of Hoffman, and he goes so far as to suggest that the
use of animal skeletons instead “might well have provoked howls of derision” (24) from
spectators conditioned to expect verisimilar representations—and especially from those
familiar with anatomy. He writes, “a botched-up compromise, in the way of a picture or
some other half veiled impression, would certainly not have been acceptable to the
hardened theater- and execution-goers of early seventeenth-century London” (24).
Similarly, spectators might also have expected the staging of The Atheist’s Tragedy to
produce a near-realistic simulacrum of D’Amville’s extruding brain. That early modern
playgoers were intimately familiar with the aspects of human interiority revealed by
executions and similar juridical punishments is a point Marissa Greenberg also makes
by calling attention to “the pillories, gallows, and offenders’ bodies that early modern
audiences encountered on route to London’s playhouses” (2). Because “historians
uniformly agree on the immediacy and frequency with which early modern Europeans
encountered punishment as a public spectacle” (Greenberg 3), even spectators who had
never set foot in an anatomy theatre would have had significant exposure to the
appearance of mutilated and opened bodies. It therefore seems reasonable to assume
that when it came time to witness D’Amville’s own cerebral unveiling, spectators may
43

See also my discussion of The Battle of Alcazar and ’Tis Pity She’s a Whore in Chapter Three.
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have anticipated—and been treated to—a visual spectacle which rivaled those of the
anatomy theatre and of Londoners’ own encounters with dead or dying bodies.
Although a non-fictional dissection of human parts would have been unthinkable in a
performance of The Atheist’s Tragedy, something quite like it was not out of the
question.
With no record of the early modern performance of The Atheist’s Tragedy
beyond its claim to having often been acted in “diuers places” (on the title page of its
1611 quarto), modern productions of the play can also provide us with a sense of the
performance possibilities suggested by the text. One in particular stands out: in the
Birmingham Repertory Theatre production, actor “Gerard Murphy embarks on a
leisurely death speech while rummaging in his skull for a handful of cerebral cortex”
(Wardle). Director Anthony Clark takes the playtext’s instructions for self-dissection
quite literally by having “the dying D’Amville dissect himself, wrenching out a chunk
of bleeding brain and displaying it to the audience” making the moment into “a graphic
admission that it was his [D’Amville’s] own grey matter that needed testing” (P.
Taylor). Clark’s macabre mise-en-scène attests to the possibility that performances of
the play can feature D’Amville performing his lines with his own brain in hand, an
image reminiscent of Hamlet discoursing while holding Yorick’s skull. In such a
staging, the eviscerated grey matter can serve as the corporeal correlative to the
personal information D’Amville is making truly public for the first time. As
D’Amville’s onstage and offstage spectators are able to see his physical brain, they are
also made privy to the sum total of D’Amville’s identity as he confesses his plot against
Charlemont and Castabella and indirectly labels himself a murderer. The revelation of
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the anatomical organ accompanies the exposure of the insubstantial product of
cognition: here, intellection, subjectivity, moral belief, even identity. Even if the
“diuers” and many performances of The Atheist’s Tragedy during its period did not
push Tourneur’s vision to the extremes of Clark’s production, the association remains;
D’Amville’s brain is exposed to some degree by the axe’s blow, and so too are his
psychological innards.
For the significant number of writers in the early modern period who held the
brain to be the primary or singular agent of the intellect—the “Privy Counsellor” as
Burton puts it (qtd. in Stevens 270)—a cranial vivisection would have seemed to
provide a window into an important facet of bodily interiority. Textual evidence from a
diachronic search of printed matter in the period reveals that many early moderns
thought of the brain as both a physical repository of knowledge and a site of intellectual
invention. On the topic of faith, writers of religious tracts often contrast God’s
knowledge (divinely conveyed to human understanding) with ideas that are of human
provenance, and the brain is often targeted as the site of such intellectual production:
“This then is no newefangled fayth no straunge fayth, no fayth inuented by mannes
brayne” (Bullinger A4r); “we brought this interpretation out of our owne brayne”
(Bucer L2r); faith “is not of mans braine inuented” (Werdmüller C6r); “mans brayne is
neuer content too bee ruled by Gods wisedome, but pleases him selfe in his owne
inuentions better then in ye whiche God teaches hym” (Pilkington J7r). Examples in
this category persist throughout the period and are far too numerous to cite
comprehensively. Not all references to the brain’s capacity for invention are religious
in nature, however. David Chytraeus exhorts “that no man haue a stately opinion of
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himself, nor rashly & proudly misdéem other men, nor deuyse new interpretations &
opinions of his own brayne” (55). Other writers conceive of the brain as a site of
reception, absorbing and storing secular or religious knowledge: “as out of the head and
brayne, which is the seate of the senses whereof ryseth all knowledge (as the
Philosophers and Phisitians write)” (Carlile D2r); “it [an illusion] sinketh not yet into
my brain” (Walker C2r); “the brayne, [is that within] which wit and wisedome made
their chest” (Baldwin A3r); “[men] may heape up knowledge upon knowledge, bee ever
powring into their brains” (Younge 606). In at least one writer’s opinion, the brain can
be thought of in architectural terms; Thomas Adams refers to thoughts residing in the
brain like a guest in a house (Diseases 11), and asserts that “we must conceiue in the
brayne three ventricles; as houses assigned by Physitians for three dwellers,
Imagination, Reason, and Memorie” (Mystical Bedlam 35), clearly drawing upon the
tripartite medieval model of cognition (discussed earlier with reference to Mondino).
Whether productive and/or receptive, the early modern brain played a central role in the
corporealization of knowledge, providing a focal point of interest for those who
imagined—and encountered, in real or feigned form—the body’s internal constitution.
That in Tourneur’s play the brain is the excised (or partially excised) object made
available to perception seems to testify to—and perhaps dramatically exaggerate—the
idea that theatricalized dissections produce knowledge (an argument I make in Chapter
Three); what better organ with which to educate spectators than the one thought to be
responsible for knowledge itself?
Carefully engineered by Tourneur, D’Amville’s blunder provides for an
epistemological experience like no other public, medical dissection. It in fact fulfills
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two conditions anatomists longed to be able to realize in their practice upon human
bodies; it is performed upon a live human subject, and it occurs with a minimum of
surgical interference, as the axe swiftly “de-brains” D’Amville without apparently
damaging any of his bodily functions, including, remarkably, the function of speech.
Indeed this is a fantasy much like those graphically portrayed in the anatomy texts and
drawings surveyed at the beginning of this chapter, where the body easily or voluntarily
yields to invasive exploration without destroying either the life or physical integrity of
the vivisectee. What makes Tourneur’s play remarkable, I have argued, is the fact that
it caters to a fantasy of human vivisection on the representational level, working into the
narrative an opportunity for audiences to glimpse the brain of a walking, talking,
fictional subject. Yet what I have also proposed in this thesis is that this need not
necessarily be the case in order for plays to deliver an experience of the live body
anatomized, for through the doubleness of the actor-character’s embodiment, the
theatrical medium itself makes possible the perceptual encounter with violated bodies
that can seem dead and alive, damaged and intact.
Thus it is worth noting briefly that Tourneur’s play also draws attention to this
possibility, by metatheatrically commenting upon the lively body beneath the fiction.
There exist at least two signal moments in the play where we are reminded of the
actor’s ability to generate a doubled image of life and death. When Montferrers’s dead
body is discovered, D’Amville embarks upon a lengthy (and disingenuous) speech in
which he pretends to experience deep grief for his brother (whom he has in fact just
murdered). Gesturing towards Montferrers, D’Amville encourages the servants and
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Belforest and thus, by extension, the audience, to look upon the body which D’Amville
claims retains its lively vitality:
Indeede had hee beene taken from mee like a piece o’dead flesh, I should neither
ha’ felt it, nor grieued for’t. But come hether, ’pray looke heere. Behold the
liuely tincture of his bloud! Neither the Dropsie nor the Iaundies in’t. But the
true freshnesse of a sanguine red; for all the fogge of this blacke murdrous night
has mix’d with it. For any thing I know, hee might ha’ liu’d till doomesday.
(E2v)
Reminscent of the final scene of The Bloody Banquet, where a dead body is at the
centre of attention and one man (the Tyrant) interprets for a rapt audience the sight they
see, this scene places D’Amville in the position of lecturer-anatomist, calling his
onlookers’ attention to specific aspects of the body on display. Unlike in The Bloody
Banquet, however, the information to be gleaned from this particular inspection of the
body is of benefit to the audience only, as it operates primarily on a metatheatrical level.
(The characters present during D’Amville’s lament are focused upon the process of
grieving and little else). D’Amville’s insistence upon the “lively,” healthy, and “fresh”
appearance of the character’s corpse encourages spectators to attune themselves to the
presence of the equally lively body (the actor’s body) that enables this fictional image
of corpseness. Spectators who maintain their metatheatrical awareness of the
perceptually doubled theatrical body will find D’Amville’s self-vivisection even more
compelling in terms of its ability to offer up a living anatomy, since as the character
dies from his injury, the actor playing D’Amville continues to subliminally radiate the
“true freshnesse” inherent in the living body he presents to the audience’s perception.
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The second instance in which Tourneur calls attention to the theatrical
corporeality of the actor’s body is in Charlemont’s highly suggestive explanation of the
visit from his father’s ghost. Here, Tourneur also provides for a metatheatrical vantage
point on the part of spectators, reminding us of the way perception can manipulate the
impressions bodies make upon us. Charlemont states,
My actions daily conuersant with warre;
(The argument of bloud and death) had left
(Perhaps) th’imaginary presence of
Some bloudy accident vpon my minde:
Which mix’d confusedly with other thoughts,
(Whereof th’remembrance of my Father, might
Be one) presented all together, seeme
Incorporate; as if his body were
The owner of that bloud, the subiect of
That death. (F3r)
Charlemont muses about the phenomenal nature of what he sees, and yet his complex
speech also resonates with the way spectators are invited to relate to the violation of
bodies in the play. Although he turns out to be mistaken (in the play’s supernatural
economy, he really has seen a ghost), his hypothesis about what he perceives is
significant for the way it attributes to the mind the capability of making thoughts seem
“incorporate”—literally, into an apparently corporeal or substantial form. He
hypothesizes that his father has appeared to him as a spectral apparition because his
brain has conflated the impression of visceral deaths he has witnessed with other
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memories (specifically, the memory of his father) that are housed in the same place in
his mind. Charlemont’s theory of incorporation does similar work to Theseus’s idea of
the imaginative supplement (discussed in Chapter One), in that it attributes to the
human psyche a particularly powerful form of imagination—one that can seem to
influence the material world. Although Charlemont stresses (or tries to convince
himself) that his experience is only one of seeming, this “seeming” is, in Charlemont’s
expressed opinion here, strong enough to render the imagined and the “incorporate”
perceptually blurry for the perceiver—much like Theseus’s extended argument
concerning the mind’s ability to bend materiality to its own will (discussed in Chapter
One; see A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 5.1). Furthermore, in the same breath, with
reference to his father’s body taking on the qualities of those he had witnessed on the
bloody battlefield, Charlemont speaks of a double or displaced “ownership” one body
can wield over another, providing a subtle metadramatic commentary on the
phenomenology of the actor’s body. In Charlemont’s estimation, the Montferrers he
sees before him has hijacked the injury and death attached to other wartime bodies, and
this occurs much in the same way that any actor would annex himself to the character’s
“imaginary presence” which becomes, through this act of incorporation, seemingly
material onstage. Almost uncannily, Charlemont perfectly crystallizes in his choice of
words the way in which actors achieve the perceptually realistic impression of an
embodied individual who simultaneously does and does not possess the exact physical
state of the actor. He unintentionally provides a means of describing how the actor
portraying D’Amville or Montferrers, for example, takes on ownership of the
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character’s dead or dying body, becoming the executor (and in D’Amville’s case, the
executioner), the “subject of that death.”
That the axe D’Amville holds falls afield from its original purpose, as
D’Amville the character also becomes the subject of a death rather than being solely its
enforcer, suggests the degree to which the violence enacted onstage is unstable, capable
of attaching itself to more than one body. In having D’Amville unintentionally stand in
as the recipient of the axe’s blow Tourneur represents the transmissibility of stage
violence and death, both at the level of fiction and performance. Within the fictional
world of The Atheist’s Tragedy, as is the case with many revenge tragedies, a planned
or intended act of violence takes an unexpected victim or victims (one is reminded
especially of the masque in Women Beware Women and the final scene of Hamlet), and
“the argument of bloud and death” becomes contagious between bodies as it is in
Charlemont’s speech above. Indeed, Tourneur had already hinted at the forthcoming
substitution of D’Amville’s life for Charlemont’s moments prior when he had
D’Amville exclaim, “at the reflexion of thy [Charlemont’s] courage my cold fearefull
bloud takes fire, and I begin to emulate thy death” (L2v). Not only does D’Amville
absorb and emulate Charlemont’s intended death, but as a result of D’Amville’s
accident, Castabella’s death sentence is also lifted. This unexpected and almost
instantaneous exchange of victims encourages us to think about how theatrical
bloodshed might possess a transferable quality in terms of the actor’s performance as
well. As The Atheist’s Tragedy sublimates the death of one character into another, it
echoes the means by which actors take on the bodily violation of the characters they
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embody, making themselves seem owners of any “bloudy accident” that may transpire
within the playwright’s fictional world.
In both Charlemont’s confrontation with Montferrers’s ghost and D’Amville’s
assumption of a deadly fate that should have been another’s, Tourneur’s play comments
metatheatrically upon the corporeal dynamics underpinning the actor’s own assumption
of fictional physical trauma. Admittedly, however, the analogy between the
transmissibility of fictional violence and the way actors’ bodies absorb and project the
corporeal destruction belonging to another individual (the fictional character they
portray) breaks down when one considers that for the actor, this absorption is not final;
D’Amville dies, but the body portraying his death does not. Yet the argument stands
that theatrical violence in the storyworld of the plays is, in terms of its ability to move
between and amongst bodies, mobile in a way that is suggestive of how performance
achieves its representation of bodily harm. As I argue in Chapter Three in slightly
different terms, mobility is key to the way audiences perceptually relate to the staging
of graphic violence, as the actorly body is known to remain fundamentally invulnerable
to the damage it adopts temporarily as its own. In the case of The Atheist’s Tragedy, the
resilience of the performing body, coupled with the enactment of D’Amville’s live
dissection, provides ample opportunity for spectators to come as close as possible to the
experience of witnessing human vivisection—an encounter with the body in action that
enticed and yet eluded anatomists and their audiences.
The lively figures that graced both the stages of early modern London and the
pages of early modern anatomical textbooks allowed anatomists and readers a
significant freedom: the freedom to imagine the subjects of dissection triumphing over
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the mortal (and moral) constraints that hindered the investigation of corporeal
interiority. Circumventing the vulnerability of the human body, these extraordinary
figures revealed themselves, by means of their physical viscera, in a way that could
seem to divulge something about the internal action of the body without marring or
destroying it. Wanting the resources and technology to access the body’s contents
without compromising its structural integrity and vitality, early modern medical
practitioners invented their own fantasies of corporeal access, as did a significant
number of authors and playwrights. Written in 1612, just one year after the first
publication of The Atheist’s Tragedy, Robert Underwood’s The Little World. Or, A
Liuely Description of all the Partes and Properties of Man perhaps best encapsulates a
cultural moment that fixated intensely upon aspects of the body that resisted
epistemological mastery. The extended conceit of Underwood’s tract is a dream
narrative that compares the human body to a house—a structure that in this author’s
vision will permit the kind of exploration the living fleshly body will not. First, the
author is uplifted into a large “city” (an analogue of the world itself) containing
thousands upon thousands of “houses,” (analogues for the bodies of human beings) the
workmanship of which “did excell” (2) because each had been moulded by God. The
reference to God’s handiwork is important for the way it elevates the body/house and
imbues it with a grand significance which is wondrous to behold—a common
convention of anatomists’ writings as well. Upon this basis, the author constructs a
compelling justification for the value in penetrating beyond the exterior of the
body/house: “These Houses, be so wonderful and glorious; then no doubt, Those things,
the which we cannot see, which in these Houses are, Must nedes exceed these outward

232
things and go beyonde them farre” (4). In other words, the exquisite exterior of God’s
creation conceals an even more wondrous architecture, one which Underwood implies
is supremely desirable to behold. Then, in the most telling passage of all, the dream of
access is fulfilled: the author is alerted by an anonymous stander-by to look again, and
miraculously he is able to behold that “The Houses all were open, and each did it selfe
vnfold, That I might see all thinges in them, which was a thing most rare, To marke how
thinges within the same, in order placed were” (4-5). Like the self-revealing Vesalian
figures, these body-houses open themselves up to inspection, enabling the beholder to
see “all thinges in them” without disrupting the intrinsic order and essential character of
the object under investigation. As a result of this privileged form of access to the body,
the author, who has now taken on the role of vivisector, is able to provide a detailed
metaphorical catalogue of the body’s various internal organs, systems and functions,
and he is able to do so without seeming to disturb all that he documents.
In exploring the represented “unfolding” of the live human body, Underwood’s
text joins the ranks of plays like The Atheist’s Tragedy and scientific texts like
Vesalius’s Fabrica, all of which testify to a fantasy of vivisection that promised a
superlative knowledge of anatomy, and all it was thought to disclose about the
properties of the individual and the universe. In pursuing and sometimes catching sight
of a corporealized knowledge that “must nedes exceed these outward things and go
beyonde them farre,” the dissective violence of early modern theatre placed its
spectators in range of a bodily experience—the apprehension of an idealized form of
human vivisection—that anatomy theatres could not offer. Although anatomists desired
and intrinsically promoted unmediated access to all parts and functions of the body, in
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their practice they fell short of this goal, unable to excise the body’s depths without
intruding upon the intricate structure thought to mirror and reveal all other aspects of
human life. Drawing upon the unique doubleness of the actor’s body, and the
audience’s willing imagination, the dramatic theatre, however, could without damage
“cut to th’brains” (King Lear 4.6.187) and to the core of the ultimate living object of
study: the elusive and yet potentially empowering human body.
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Conclusion
Bert O. States asserts that “the inevitable starting point of any discussion of the
actor’s presence on the stage is the fact that we see him as both character and
performer” (119). In slightly different terms, Stanton Garner writes that in performance
all “theatrical objects” (including but not restricted to actors) “oscillate between the
illusionistic (fictional, virtual) and the actual” (“Sensing Realism” 117). “This
perceptual instability [that] characterizes all forms of theatre” (Garner 117) is a
fundamental aspect of dramatic performances in the early modern period, as
demonstrated (and activated) by playwrights’ metatheatrical acknowledgements of their
own fictional creations. Early modern theatre’s characteristic self-reflexivity
concerning theatrical illusion encouraged spectators to perceive the perceptual “double
image” generated by the superimposition of fictional and non-fictional worlds on the
theatrical stage, and to take note of the audience’s own central role in bringing
performances to fruition. Further, the phenomenology of Renaissance spectatorship I
have traced here encompasses spectatorial experiences of the blood, guts, and gore
violent plays of the time sought out, and reinforces the contributions of auditors who
bring meaning to bloody spectacles—and, by extension, the spectacle of theatre—by
participating with their senses. What I have suggested is that although critically
neglected, the intersection of violence and metatheatricality on the Renaissance stage
deserves to be analyzed for the nuanced ways in which it informed spectators’
perceptual experiences of the body, especially in terms of the way theatre allows
performing bodies to break free from their everyday ontological moorings, and directs
audience attention towards that process of escape. Although atypical of the theatrical
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techniques generally thought of as “metatheatrical devices,” the dramatic performance
of violence itself might be thought of as inherently metatheatrical to the degree that it
encourages spectators to recognize the dehiscence of the presentation/representation
double image—that is, violent play performances are fuelled in part by the spectator’s
knowledge that bodily wounding only permanently affects one half of the
actor/character’s embodied persona. When, for example, in Thomas Preston’s
Cambises (c. 1560), Cambises instructs an executioner to make a man’s “death more
vile” by “pul[ling] his skin over his eares” (C2v), this flaying occurs (as far as the stage
directions indicate) in full view of an audience that would have been cognizant of the
fact that represented violence takes the character’s body, but not the actor’s, as its
victim. Steeped in the Renaissance dramatic tradition of simultaneous illusion-breaking
and illusion-making, early modern audiences were trained by plays of their time to
acknowledge stage phenomena as mentally blended constructions of signifying and
signified elements. The core questions that have buttressed my argument throughout
this project—What motivates a viewer to become a witness to fictionally enacted
violence? What desires are satisfied or perpetuated by this participatory event?—are at
least partly answered by the notion that spectators can enjoy violent corporeal unveiling
by virtue of their awareness of theatre’s dually signifying bodies and their unique
capabilities.
Violent plays like Cambises would become more sought after as the early
modern period progressed, and the increasing popularity of public dissections and
anatomical explorations would confer upon the body’s interior an epistemological
quality that early moderns longed to discover for themselves. Yet despite the
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commercial viability of violent revenge drama in the early modern period, the spectacle
of the body in pain likely had the potential to elicit indeterminate or mixed reactions
from audiences. Not only is it to be expected that no audience member will duplicate
another’s intellectual and affective response to staged violence, it is probable that
individual viewers may find themselves responding in varied, unstable, and perhaps
contradictory ways. On the topic of violence in Titus Andronicus, Marshall writes that
its “brilliance” is to be found in “the way it allows viewers to be scandalized and
morally outraged by events portrayed on stage but also and at the same time to identify
with characters who suffer and commit acts of horrific violence” (107). I would also
argue that the gravitation towards bodily wounding early modern playgoers exhibited
through their theatrical predilections was haunted by an opposing force: the sense of
epistemological destruction accompanying the tearing apart of the body’s fabric.
Certainly, early modern anatomists attempted to elide those aspects of dissection that
had the potential to spoil their object of study, in order to satisfy a fascination with the
body’s inherent capabilities and limits, its external and internal composition. It is this
fascination that inspired early moderns to cut open, anatomize, and graphically
textualize the body, while imagining a means of fully cataloguing the physical human
form in its undisturbed, God-given state. The dramatic theatres of early modern
London were able to most closely approximate the fulfillment of what I have described
as a self-defeating fantasy of corporeal access, by providing audiences with an
endoscopic gaze that perceived itself as able to enter the actor-character’s body without
ultimately leaving any physical traces of that penetration. In the events prefacing and
following the body’s represented desecration, early modern performances offered their
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spectators the opportunity to experience the fantasy of empowering knowledge that The
Bloody Banquet articulates so precisely: “the huske falls from him now, / And you shall
know his inside” (1338-39).
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